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ABSTRACT

CONTESTED GROUNDS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN UPPER
OHIO VALLEY AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN EASTERN CAPE,

1770-1850

MAY 2005
CHRISTOPH STROBEL,

B.A.,

HIRAM COLLEGE

M..A.,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Ph.D.,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Neal Salisbury

This dissertation examines the circumstances created by colonial encroachments
in the

American Upper Ohio Valley and

the South African Eastern Cape. Beginning in

the second half of the eighteenth and lasting well into the mid-nineteenth century,

American Indians and Africans
European

in the

two areas faced increasing

origin. Colonialism, the encounter

between

intrusions

by people of

alien cultures, infringements

on

homelands, violence, dispossession, decimation, cultural invasion, removal,

accommodation,

revitalization,

and survival led

populations and white colonizers.

to rapidly

changing worlds for local

My comparative study highlights the similarities and

differences between historical developments in the two regions, with a particular focus on
the creations of colonial racial orders in the United States and South Africa. Comparative

history

is

a valuable method for examining phenomena of cross-cultural significance

while subverting any notions about an area's historical uniqueness.

It is

an especially

helpful approach in understanding the significant roles that the institutionalization of

vi

colonial expansion, racism and racial domination played in the United
States and South
Africa.

The Upper Ohio Valley and

the Eastern

Cape functioned

grounds for American and British expansion. Developments
the

making of colonial

Africa.

racial

While the scenarios

themselves identically

systems

in the

in the larger

many ways

as testing

each place contributed

to

United States and greater southern

Upper Ohio Valley and

in other locations,

in

in

the Eastern

Cape did not

comparable patterns would emerge

repeat

in later

years as the United States expanded westward and Britain expanded into southern and
eastern Africa.

In the late eighteenth

and nineteenth century

in the

Upper Ohio Valley and

the

South African Cape, systems of racial exclusiveness became entrenched through
increasingly close ties between settlers and the state. In both places, settlers, indigenous

groups, missionaries and humanitarians attempted to influence the emerging colonial
racial orders with varying success.

ability to defeat indigenous

which shaped

the

groups

Yet ultimately,

it

was

the

militarily, to dispossess

two regions' colonial

racial orders.

vii

power of the

and move, and

state

with

its

to legislate,
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INTRODUCTION

In June of 1966, the
at the

University of Cape

American

Town

in

politician Robert

South Africa.

Kennedy addressed

He began his

the students

speech with the following

comment.

come

here this evening because of my deep interest and affection for a
land settled by the Dutch in the mid-seventeenth century, then taken over

I

by

A land in which the native

the British, and at last independent.

inhabitants were at

subdued, but relations with whom remain a
land which defined itself on a hostile frontier.

first

problem to this day. A
A
land which was once the importer of slaves, and now must struggle to
wipe out the last traces of that former bondage. I refer, of course, to the
United States of America.

As Kennedy
similar

recognized, the histories of the United States and South Africa are startlingly

on several

histories

1

levels.

These

of the two countries

similarities

in recent decades.

between whites and blacks. This

American and white-African
and nineteenth century. At

have led historians

dissertation,

Most of these

to write

comparative

studies focus

on

relations

however, examines issues of white-Native

relations during the period of colonization in the eighteenth

first

glance, this

may seem

like

an unusual pairing. But

Africans and Native Americans are the indigenous populations of the two regions and

both employed numerous tactics to maintain their culture and ways of life in the face of

European colonialism.

Still,

many South

Africans and Americans maintain that, unlike

Africans in South Africa, Native Americans "disappeared," "vanished," or were
"exterminated," overlooking the fact that significant numbers of people of Native

American descent

live

on and off reservations

much of American mainstream

all

over the United States today. Moreover,

thought ignores the role that internal and external

1

2
colonization and empire played in the history of the
United States.

examination of American and British

efforts at

empire building

in

A comparative

North America and

southern Africa, and their impact on the indigenous populations
may, illuminate our

understandings of the history of colonization, empire, and race relations
in the two
regions.

Argument
This dissertation explores the circumstances surrounding colonial encroachments
in the

American Upper Ohio Valley and

second half of the eighteenth

the South African Eastern Cape.

to the mid-nineteenth century,

From

the

American Indians and

Africans in the two areas faced intrusions by people of European origin. Such encounters
led to the creation of empire, expropriation of land, violence, dispossession, decimation,

and

in several instances

removal of the original inhabitants. In

turn,

indigenous

populations pursued strategies of resistance, accommodation, revitalization, and survival.

Such processes reinforced the colonial transformations of the two regions examined
These transformations aided
United States and South Africa.

1

This quote

is

By

in the creations

of "colonial

"colonial racial order"

I

here.

racial orders" in the

mean

a system

from the PBS documentary Frontline: Apartheid Part

2,

where a white

1948-1963 (Dec.

14, 1987).
2

On this

issue see for example Francis Jennings, The Creation ofAmerica: Through

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); James Wilson,
The Imperial Republic: A Structural History ofAmerican Constitutionalism from the

Revolution to Empire

Colonial Era to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century (Aldershot and Burlington:
Ashgate, 2002), 1-9. There has been an increase on literature on the "new American
empire" since September 11, 2001. Many pundits and commentators imagine the

"American empire"

as a "benevolent" force, set to spread the ideals of "democracy,"

2

settler state

imposed

its

control over indigenous populations, a

over time increasingly manifested

power relationship

itself through "racial differentiation." 3

examinati6n of the above-mentioned processes

in the

two areas can

that

A comparative

offer insights into the

pervasive, complex, and conflicting nature of colonialism
and racism in American and

South African history. The Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape,
functioned

ways

as "testing grounds" for the

American and

British empires.

Developments

many

in

in

each

place contributed to the making of racialized colonial systems in the
larger United States

and greater southern Africa. While the scenarios

in the

Upper Ohio Valley and

the

Eastern Cape did not repeat themselves identically in other locations, comparable
patterns

would emerge
expanded

in later years as the

into southern

United States expanded westward and as Britain

and eastern Africa.

4

and "freedom" around the world. See for example Emily Eakin, '"It takes
an Empire," Say Several U.S. Thinkers," International Herald Tribune, April 2, 2002.
"civilization,"

3

My study implies that "race," "racism," "racial differentiation," and "racial orders"

cannot be understood as monolithic phenomena. They are social and historic constructs

have different meanings at different times and places. They are tied to social
structures - such as the state and empire - and are constantly reshaped. My thinking on
these issues is in part influenced by Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race,
Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (New York: Verso, 1991); David Theo Goldberg,
Racist Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 81-82, 93; Goldberg, The Racial State
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); Paul Maylam, South Africa 's Racial Past: The History and
the Historiography of Racism, Segregation, and Apartheid (Aldershot and Burlington:
that

Ashgate, 2001), 6-7.
4

My argument here has been influenced by

I.

W. Andrews, "The Beginnings of the

Colonial System of the United States," in Ohio Archaeological and Historical
Publications, vol. 1 (Columbus: Fred J. Heer, 1900), 1-9; George Knepper, Ohio and

its

People (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1989), 46; Edward Watts, An American
Colony: Regionalism and the Roots of Midwestern Culture (Athens: Ohio University
Press, 2002); and Clifton Crais, White Supremacy and Black Resistance in pre-Industrial
South Africa: The Making of the Colonial Order in the Eastern Cape (New York:

Cambridge University

Press, 1992), 3.

3

The creation of empire and
the Eastern

American

Cape was

efforts

a

colonial racial orders in the

complex process. The

of colonization

in the

emerged

in the

He

in

historian Eric Hinderaker describes the

Ohio Valley

French and British "models of empire."

Upper Ohio Valley and

as "a dramatic departure"

from the

argues that the "empire of liberty" that

region stood "European imperial principles on their head" by
advocating

two legacies - "decentralized, atomized
racial separation."

5

Yet,

it is

political authority

and deeper, sharper

lines

of

important to underscore, that British efforts of empire

building in the nineteenth century Cape underwent similar, though more gradual changes,

when

Britain seized control of the

Colony from the Dutch. 6

Certainly, there were striking differences between the

disparities

grew out of differing

local circumstances.

two

regions.

The Upper Ohio

These

Valley, for

example, faced a larger wave of European migration than the Eastern Cape. This

demographic

distinction, as well as the ecological differences

between the two regions,

shaped the colonizers' disparate expectations regarding land and
River, land

became

labor.

North of the Ohio

the central interest of white settlers. In the Eastern Cape, European

colonizers were as interested in having an adequate non-white labor supply, as they were

in obtaining African land.

Moreover, slavery and involuntary servitude were,

paper, forbidden in the areas north of the Ohio River claimed

and unlike

in the

on

the Americans. Thus,

Cape, non-white labor did not play a central role

colonial racial order in the

5

by

at least

in the

making of a

Upper Ohio Valley.

Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-

1800 (New York: Cambridge University

Press, 1997), 185-186,227.

4

Yet despite such differences, which can,
British

Empire

in the

some revealing

for example, also be observed within the

Cape Colony and New South Wales

similarities in the creation

in Australia, there

were also

of the two regions' colonial racial orders. In

both the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape, the

state

played a significant role in

shaping the processes of colonization and dispossession. Though the
change in the
Eastern Cape

settlers

was more

and the

state as

gradual, there

emerged

in

both regions increasing

ties

between

systems of racial supremacy and exclusiveness became more

entrenched. Popular and official racial attitudes reflected in the population of the two
areas also

became more

rigid as a result

of this transformation. Moreover, in both

regions, colonization and white efforts to undermine indigenous sovereignty

met with

local resistance.

Historiography
In the last few decades scholars have begun to explore the comparative potential

of South African and United States

They argue

history.

that

it is

an especially helpful

approach in understanding the institutionalization of colonial expansion, racism, and
racial

domination

method

for

in the

two

societies.

They believe

that comparative history is a valuable

examining phenomena of cross-cultural significance while subverting any

notions about an area's historical uniqueness.

6

Edward Watts

points to a similar "departure" in the British Empire, but does not explore

this issue further.

See Watts,

An American

Colony, 17.

7

See for example Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson, "Comparative Frontier
History," in idem, eds. The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa
Compared (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); George Fredrickson, White
Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History (New York:

5

The concepts of "race,"

"frontier," "colonization,"

and "conquest" play an

integral part in shaping our understanding of the history
of the United States

Africa.

As organizing

principles, however, they

led to conflicting interpretations.

the discrepancies in the

unlike the

first

have also spurred controversy

that has

The work of the comparative scholar must address both

two historiographical

developments. As mentioned

and South

earlier,

traditions

and the differences

in historical

academics and intellectuals often point out

peoples of North America, as well as

that

New Zealand and Australia, who

suffered under severe demographic pressures and marginalization, the indigenous peoples
in

South Africa - though also marginalized - remained

relations

and the issue of the

implicitly

- a fundamental

in the majority.

have thus always played -

"racial order"

Indigenous-white

explicitly or

part in the writings of historians of South Africa. In

American

historiography on the other hand, these issues are less central, and are largely worked on

by scholars with a particular

interest in ethnohistory

and the history of colonial
a

expansion, Native Americans, African Americans, and race.

The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The
Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1982); James Gump, The Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation of the
Zulu and the Sioux (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); Anthony Marx,

Oxford University Press, 1981); John

Cell,

Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of the United States, South
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Africa,

and Brazil

For some thoughts on this issue see Colin Bundy, "An Image of Its Own Past? Towards
A Comparison of American and South African Historiography," in History from South
Africa: Alternative Visions and Practices, eds. Joshua Brown et. al. (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1991), 83-104. On the contested terrain of the racial order in
South Africa see Maylam, South Africa 's Racial Past. My discussion of historiography in
Making
this and the following paragraphs has benefited from Christopher Saunders, The
N.J.: Barnes &
of the South African Past: Major Historians on Race and Class (Totowa,
Noble Books, 1988); and from Andrew Cayton and Frederika Teute, "On the
Connections of Frontiers," in Contact Points American Frontiers from the Mohawk
8

6

1

Earlier generations of historians in the United
States and in South Africa have

accorded special importance to the

frontier. Studies

by the so-called

"settler historians,

such as the American Francis Parkman or Frederick
Jackson Turner, or the Canadian

born South African George Theal, implied that on the frontier
indigenous "savagisnr " or
"barbarism" was forced

to surrender to

an advancing European "civilization." 9

Some

scholars of American and South African history argued that the
frontier played a special
role in shaping the

American

two countries' modern

social orders

and national characters. The

historian Turner, for example, described the frontier as a driving
force for

individualism and democracy in American history. 10 Eric Walker and C.W. de Kiewiet

developed a different but equally influential "frontier thesis" for South Africa. They
maintained that the experiences of South Africa's Dutch speaking

settlers

on the

eighteenth century frontier significantly shaped that country's racial attitudes. George

Fredrickson embraces a similar argument

in

White Supremacy. In

this

prominent

comparative monograph he maintains that Dutch-speaking Boers created a system of
"territorial

regime

in

apartheid" on the frontier, which served as a precursor to the twentieth century

South Africa."

Valley to the Mississippi, 1 750- J 830, eds. Cayton and Teute (Chapel Hill: University of

North Carolina Press, 1998).
9

See for example Francis Parkman, The Works of Francis Parkman, vols. 20 (Boston:
Little and Brown, 1897-98); and George Theal, History of South Africa, vols. 1 1 (Cape
Town: C. Struik, 1964). During his youth in Canada Theal read the writings of Parkman.
10

See especially Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in
American History," in The Frontier in American History (New York: H. Holt, 1921),

1-

38.

See Eric Walker, A History of South Africa, rev. ed. (London: Longmans, Green, and
Co., 1935); C.W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa (London: Oxford University
1

7

Other scholars have challenged the view that European
"settlers" on the southern
African and the American "frontier" were the sole forgers
of the two regions' social
orders and national and cultural identities.

Many

historians today cast doubt

on the

validity of Turner's "frontier thesis" that connects
expansionism to democracy,

exceptionalism, and individualism.
links

between the

racial order.

beliefs held

They argue

that

Numerous

scholars have also

I

do

in Part

between

I

to question the

by South African frontiersmen and the country's modern

on the early

"frontiers" in southern Africa, as in North

America, foes and partners were not always rigidly defined by
as

come

American

race. Here, they contend,

of my dissertation, that despite frequent conflict and violence, exchanges

local people

and Europeans occurred through

convergence, interdependence, and efforts

Such observations have led

trade, social interaction, cultural

to gain at least limited

mutual understanding.

12

historians to maintain that racial orders only really

materialized in the late nineteenth and twentieth-century with the coming of
industrialization

cautiously

-

and segregation.

that the effects

13

However, other scholars argue - more or

of conquest, colonialism, and slavery

still

less

provide some

useful insights in understanding the shaping of racially stratified societies in the United

Press, 1941);

and

I.D.

MacCrone, Race Attitudes

in

South Africa: Historical

Experimental and Psychological Studies (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press,
1937); Fredrickson, White Supremacy, 49-53.
12

See Lamar and Thompson, The Frontier in History; Timothy Keegan, Colonial South
Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
1996), chapter 2; P.J. van der Merwe, The Migrant Farmer in the History of the Cape
Colony, 1657-1842, transl. Roger Beck (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1995); Keegan,
Colonial South Africa, 15-36; Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and
Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1991); Hinderaker, Elusive Empires.

8

States

and South Africa. 14

emerged

in the

My dissertation does not maintain that the systems that

Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape resemble

twentieth century. That

is

why

the racial orders of the

they are referred to as colonial racial orders.

creation of colonial racial orders in the two regions

was accompanied by

Still,

the

the development

and expansion of racism, empire, and capitalism, which played a formative

role,

and

provide a glimpse at the contested construction and representation of race in the two
countries

Outline

My dissertation is divided into three parts.

Part

I,

which consists of a comparative

chapter, looks at the sometimes destructive transformations that early colonization caused
in the

Upper Ohio Valley and

the Eastern Cape.

Still, this

was a period

in

which a

balance of power existed between indigenous people and white colonizer. Furthermore,
the absorption of migrants, as well as political, economic, and social adaptation

among

See Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy; and Thompson and Lamar, The
Frontier

in History.

14

See Keegan, Colonial South Africa; Mostert, Frontiers, XVII-XVIII; Clifton Crais,
White Supremacy and Black Resistance, 3; Alan Lester, Imperial Networks: Creating

Identities in Nineteenth-Century South Africa

and Britain (New York: Routledge, 2001).

See also Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee, The Shaping of South African Society,
nd
1652-1840, 2 ed. (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1989); Marx, Making Race
and Nation, 77. For the Ohio valley see Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, see especially
chapter 5 and

6.

On this

issue see also William

Appleman Williams, "The

Frontier Thesis

and American Foreign Policy," Pacific Historical Review 24 (1955), 379-395; Reginald
Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins ofAmerican Racial Anglo-Saxonism
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Gregory Nobles, American Frontiers:
Cultural Encounters and Continental Conquest (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997);
Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American
West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987); and Edmund Morgan, American

9

the indigenous peoples in both areas, laid
important foundations from which Africans and

Native Americans drew

when

they encountered a sudden influx of white

Contacts between indigenous peoples and Europeans

of what the American historian Richard White,
the North

American Great Lakes

in the

two areas led

in his analysis

settlers.

to the creation

of Indian/white relations

region, calls The Middle Ground. The Middle

in

Ground

portrays a world inhabited by Native Americans and Europeans,
where complex cultural

exchanges led

to the creation

many indigenous
reification

the

of new systems of meaning and exchange. 15 Yet, among

peoples and Europeans, permanent white settlement generated a gradual

of indigenous and white

Upper Ohio Valley

prior to the

identities.

American Revolution and

the early nineteenth century, led to efforts by

makers

to dispossess indigenous groups.

resistance to these processes.

American and

These transformations, which occurred

Still, it

many

They

white

in the

settlers

the

Eastern Cape up to

and some policy-

also spurred Native

was only with

in

American and African

emergence of a more powerful

British colonial state in later decades that a gradual implementation of

colonial racial orders and

more

effective

means of dispossessing indigenous

lands took

place.

Part

II,

which

is

Upper Ohio Valley and

divided into two chapters dealing with regional discussions of the
the Eastern

Cape

respectively, examines the processes of

indigenous dispossession and white efforts

at

undermining Native American and African

sovereignty in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. In both places, colonialism was
not a monolithic or coherent process. Rather there existed, what Frederick Cooper and

Slavery/American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York:
1975).

10

W.W.

Norton,

Ann

Stoler term, "competing visions of the kind of colonialism"
Europeans "wished to

build." Thus, settlers, officials, missionaries, and the
colonial as well as the metropolitan
state often

pursued varying ideals and strategies

emerging colonial

racial orders.

But

in their efforts to

shape the two regions'

both areas, the state increasingly implemented and

in

enforced the two distinct systems of racial order. 16

From an indigenous

perspective, the self-proclaimed "humanitarian" or

"benevolent" strategies of many government
settler

demands

for indigenous dispossession, often

instance, while the

program"

bought

and missionaries, as well as the

proved equally detrimental. For

American president Thomas Jefferson was advocating a

that encouraged

buying land

officials

accommodation with some Native Americans, he was

in the trans-Mississippian

this land for future

Indians to this region.

17

"civilization

also

west through the Louisiana Purchase of 1803.

He

white settlement, but he also intended to remove "savage"

Comparable paradoxical

attitudes existed in southern Africa.

The

granting of "self government" to the Cape by Great Britain, for example, reinforced the

promulgation of the so-called "color blind" 1853 Constitution. Yet these
in the

Cape

frontier." In

also coincided with a

more

intensified cultural assault

political

changes

on the "eastern

1855 Governor George Grey told the colony's Legislative Assembly:

We should, I think, use our time and strength, when our generosity cannot
be misunderstood,

to instruct

15

White, The Middle Ground.

16

Frederick Cooper and

and

civilise

-

to

change inveterate enemies

of Empire: Colonial Control and Visions
of Rule " American Ethnologist 16, (Nov., 1989), 609-621; see also John Comaroff,
"Images of Empire, Contests of Conscience: Models of Colonial Domination in South

Ann

Stoler, "Tensions

Africa," in ibid, 661-685.

See for example Anthony Wallace, Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the
First Americans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 225.
17

11

into friends, alike

from interest and increased knowledge - destroyers of
our stock and produce into consumers of our goods and producers
for our
markets.

18

Though Grey advocated

a message of accommodation and African incorporation

through a "civilisation policy,"
Furthermore, officials
that

it

was

the

this

was

in the Eastern

to

be achieved by force

Cape and

in the

if

necessary.

Upper Ohio Valley argued

American Indians and Africans who had

to

change

their

way of

life.

which

Part Three,

the

is

Upper Ohio Valley and

again divided into two chapters that discuss developments in
the Eastern

Cape

separately, looks at Native

American and

African efforts to maintain their sovereignty - attempts to shape colonial racial orders

"from below."

19

By

ignoring indigenous struggles to

resist, to find

mutual grounds and

to

cooperate with white intruders, and to maintain their independence, historians
misrepresent the complexities of colonial transformation. The sociologist Ran Greenstein
writes in his comparative study of South Africa and Palestine/Israel, that "the capacities

of indigenous people

to

respond to and shape the process of group encounter and

conflict" are vital to understanding the different "historical courses" taken by colonial

regions.

The

role

of what Greenstein

historical processes

18

Governor Grey

and "the

calls

"indigenous capacities," along with world

strategies adopted

to Legislative Council

by

settler

and colonial forces," provide a

and the House Assembly, March

BPP

17, 1855,

1969/1855,56-59.
19

My thinking on this issue has been influenced by Marx, Making Race and Nation.
12

useful

means of distinguishing

the Eastern Cape.

the differing developments in the

Upper Ohio Valley and

20

Africans and Native Americans pursued both accommodation
and confrontation
in their efforts to

maintain their independence. If one option ceased to be perceived as

advantageous, viable, or practical, indigenous peoples were likely to switch
their
strategies.

Miami

Ohio Indian

leaders like the

Little Turtle, for

Shawnee Black Hoof,

example, fought

in three military

the

Wyandot

campaigns

Tarhe, and the

in the

Ohio region

against the United States military in the early 1790s. After the successful American attack
at Fallen

Timbers

in 1794, these chiefs

States south of the

Ohio

river

began

to

who had previously
pursue

fought to keep the United

at least partial

accommodation. In the

Eastern Cape in the early nineteenth century, the African leaders on the Zuurveld,

Ndlambe and Chungwa attempted

to find

ways of peaceful coexistence with

expanding Cape Colony. Yet, when British colonial authorities decided
the Zuurveld

Xhosa beyond

alternatives to defending

the Great Fish River

what they saw

by

force, both leaders

in 181

were

two white

orders in both the

settler populations,

Upper Ohio Valley and

century. This transformation

1

to

left

push

with no

as their rightful territory.

Despite indigenous peoples' efforts to maintain their autonomy, the
assistance of the

the

implemented systems of colonial

the Eastern

was shaped by

Cape by

the

with the

state,

racial

mid nineteenth

violence, conflict and cooperation.

It left

a

legacy that shaped the development of colonization and the contested construction and

20

Ran Greenstein, Genealogies of Conflict: Class Identity and State in Palestine/Israel
and South Africa (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1995), 3; Ran Greenstein,
"Rethinking the Colonial Process: The Role of Indigenous Capacities in Comparative
14-137.
Historical Inquiry," South African Historical Journal 32 (May, 1995), 1

13

representation of race in the United States and southern
Africa.

now

turn our attention.

14

To

this history

we

will

PARTI

CHAPTER

1

NATIVE AMERICANS, AFRICANS AND EUROPEANS: A COMPARATIVE

OVERVIEW OF THE PRE-COLONIAL AND EARLY COLONIAL HISTORY OF
THE UPPER OHIO VALLEY AND THE EASTERN CAPE

Even though

the gradual implementation of colonial racial orders only

became

possible in the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape with the emergence of a more

powerful American and British colonial

state in the nineteenth century, historians

interested in race relations and systems of colonial order should not ignore the pre- and

early colonial developments in the

two regions. These shaped a legacy of inter-ethnic

cooperation and partial accommodation as well as irreconcilable
affected

how

interaction,

and played a

crucial role in shaping the transformation of the

provided the point of origin for the social and
1

Thus, they

Europeans, Native Americans, and Africans thought about cross-racial

Historians have challenged the view that

Africa.

rivalries.

These

initial

two

regions.

indigenous-white contacts

racial orders

of the United States and South

revisionists contend that the history of early colonization, lasting in the

Upper Ohio Valley roughly
British take-over from the

to the

Dutch

American Revolution and

in 1806,

was

in the Eastern

Cape

to the

a period of balance of power with complex

and diverse cross-cultural encounters. The American historian Richard White describes
this

phenomenon

in the

North American Great Lakes region as the "middle ground,"

For the traditional view in the comparative scholarship see Fredrickson, White
Supremacy; Louis Hartz, ed., The Founding ofNew Societies: Studies in the History of
the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964). For a comparative critique to this argument see Lamar
3-13.
and Thompson, "Comparative Frontier History," in The Frontier in History,
1

15

which he sees as a mutually comprehensible world
Europeans searched

Though
acknowledging

common meaning

this chapter

the Eastern

meaning,

it

also

which indigenous people and

and accommodation. 2

embraces the concept of the "middle ground,"

that indigenous groups

Ohio Valley and

common

for

in

Cape

and people of European origin

interacted

examines the ways

in both the

Upper

and searched for accommodation and
in

which

regions defined themselves in opposition to each other

different ethnic groups in the

- a process

that often reinforced

irreconcilable rivalries and violent struggles. In both the Eastern

Cape and

Ohio Valley, Africans and Native Americans sought

and

to maintain

two

to

in the

impose

Upper

their

diplomatic, trade, and social practices and understandings on white intruders. Likewise,

many of the two

regions' white colonizers attempted to reproduce their metropolitan

practices and understandings, and tried to impose their commercial and imperial

imperatives on indigenous groups.

The Pre-Colonial and Middle Ground Eastern Cape and Upper Ohio Valley
Indigenous efforts to shape and respond to the
British in the Eastern

in the pre-colonial

Cape and by

the

and middle ground

Americans
histories

efforts

in the

of empire-building by the

Upper Ohio Valley were rooted

of the two areas. In both regions, through

migrations, the incorporation of outsiders, political, economic, and social interactions as

well as competitions and rivalries, indigenous peoples had developed a wide variety of

Harcourt, Brace

& World,

1964). For a comparative critique to this argument see Lamar
"Comparative Frontier History," in The Frontier in History, 3-13.

and Thompson,
2
White, The Middle Ground.

16

diplomatic, trade, and social practices, which would,
in later years, shape their
interactions with Europeans. 3

The Pre-Colonial Eastern Cape
Long before white
migration.

known

The

first

colonists arrived, the Eastern

Cape saw two major waves of

encounter occurred between autochthonous hunter-gathering
peoples

as San and pastoralists generally called Khoikhoi. The herders are
believed to

have moved into South Africa
the Eastern

Cape no

later

than

in the first centuries

1

CE, and had permanently

settled in

100 CE. The second contact in the Eastern Cape was

established between Khoikhoi and San communities and migrating Bantu-speaking
pastoralist-cultivators, probably

no

later

than the fifteenth century. For centuries prior to

European colonization, these two migrations spurred
and competition

in the Eastern

Cape, and turned

it

interaction, cultural transmission,

into "a site," as Clifton Crais writes,

"of ethnic ambiguity and intensive social construction."4

South Africa's original inhabitants, the San, lived

of a few

to several families.

economies.

in

autonomous bands consisting

A gendered division of labor shaped their foraging

Women collected the veldkos (roots, berries, honey and insects)

and often

contributed up to two thirds of the food required for the subsistence of a community.
did the trapping and hunting.

3

Compared

to the social structures

My thinking on these issues benefited from Neal

Men

developed by Khoikhoi

"The Indians' Old World:
Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans," The William and Mary Quarterly, 53
(1996), 435-458; for southern Africa see Igor Kopytoff, "The Internal African Frontier:
The Making of African Political Culture," in The African Frontier: The Reproduction of
Traditional African Societies, Kopytoff, ed. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
Salisbury,

University Press, 1987), 3-84.
4

Crais, White

Supremacy and Black Resistance,

17

14-15.

and Bantu speaking groups
political organization

egalitarian

even

after

that migrated to the

Cape region

in later centuries, the

of hunter-gatherer societies remained decentralized and

new groups

The encounter between

arrived.

5

the hunter gatherers and the migrating pastoralist,
which

most scholars believe occurred throughout South Africa beginning

CE,

led to rivalries but also to

conflict, or clientage,

were compelled

some

relatively

in the first century

accommodation and confluence. Through emulation,

hunter-gatherers were transformed into pastoralists. Others

to retreat to

more

isolated,

mountainous areas from which they raided the

herders' livestock on occasion. External and internal circumstances also led to social
and
cultural mobility

milk,

women

among

the herders.

gathered veldkos, and

Although

pastoralists raised herds

men provided most

and collected

of the meat through hunting -

ways of subsistence not unlike those of hunter-gatherers. Many herders were
switch to a hunter-gathering subsistence economy

when

forced to

they lost their cattle and sheep in

times of drought or war. Moreover, as a result of centuries of interaction, herder

Khoikhoi and hunter gatherer San shared many
elements, leading

many

another advantage as
largely

5

economic

On the

it

scholars to group

religious, linguistic, cultural,

them together

and physical

as Khoisan. This term has

underscores that the differences between the two groups are

rather than ethnic.

6

example
Anders Sparrman, A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope towards the Antarctic Polar
Circle around the World to the Country of the Hottentots and the Caffres from the year
J 772-1776, 2vols., ed. V.S. Forbes (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1975-7), 2: 194social organization of hunter-gatherers in southern Africa see for

Roger Hewitt, Structure, Meaning, and Ritual in the Narratives of the
Southern San (Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag, 1986), 1-60.
6; see also

6

For a comparison of "hunters" and "herders" in the Eastern Cape see Crais White
Supremacy, 14-15; and Les Switzer, Power & Resistance in an African Society: The

18

Important differences remained, however,
between hunter-gatherers and herders.

For one, herder settlements, though varying
dramatically

in size,

were usually larger than

hunter-gatherer communities. Pastoralist societies
were also characterized by a higher

degree of social inequality based on differences

in age,

gender and wealth. Yet again, as

with the size of settlements, the scale of social disparity
differed widely
partrilineal herder societies in southern Africa.
Furthermore,

among

the

wide discrepancies

in social

organization and authority existed within pastoralist societies.
Political strength was

based on the size of herds and claims of originating "from a
great family." One early

European observer underscored

this

tremendous

political diversity

herders were "for the most governed by a chief." But

some

gatherers, lived "in the wilds without a leader," or "like the

northwestern Cape were, as the same writer put

remember

that

it,

by noting

that the

pastoralists, like hunter-

Namaqua"

"under a king." Yet,

in the

it is

important to

Europeans' use of the term "king" to describe pastoralist leaders was

based on a misperception. Though some larger herder groups did develop hereditary
lineage systems, they hardly ever emerged as powerful centralized societies. For the most
part, political

and social

that largely consisted

Ciskei Xhosa

and

the

life in

a pastoralist group evolved around a village

encampment

of members of the same clan and was led by a headman. 7

Making of South

Africa (Madison:

The University of Wisconsin

Press, 1993), 19-22. For a general introduction to Khoisan-speaking peoples see Alan

Barnard, Hunters and Herders of Southern Africa: A Comparative Ethnography of the
Khoisan Peoples (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Isaac Schapera,

The Khoisan Peoples of South Africa: Bushmen and Hottentots (London: George
Routledge and Sons, 1930).
7

Travel accounts provide interesting insights into Khoikhoi societies. See for example

Cape Hottentots: Described
in the Writings of Olfert Dapper(1668), Willem Ten Rhyne (1686) and Johannes
Guiliemus de Grevenbroek (1695) (Westport: Negro University Press, 1970), quote on
75, see also 23, 27, 43, 55; Extracts of a Despatch from Commander Simon van der Stel
Isaac Schapera and E. Farrington, eds. and trans. The Early
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Rivalries, competition, interaction, cultural
transmission,

the Eastern

began
larger

and accommodation

Cape were once again energized when Bantu-speaking

pastoralist-cultivators

to arrive in southern Africa. Scholars believe
that these groups

Bantu migration out of central Africa

BCE, and which extended

south of the

that probably

in

were

part of the

began between 2000 and 1000

Limpopo River probably no

later

than the third

century CE. The complexities of these processes are too intricate
to be discussed

adequately here. For our purposes

it

is

enough

to state that

Bantu expansion

into eastern

and southern Africa from was spurred by a new Iron Age economy.
The Bantu speakers'
discovery of iron and the development of mining and smelting, some time as
scholars
0

believe between 700-200

BCE,

led to

more

effective

means of agricultural

increase in herd keeping, and a centralization of power

means of food production among

the Bantu,

among

combined with

production, an

political leaders.

The new

the increasing consumption

of milk, led to a population explosion and expansion. As the Bantu speakers gradually

expanded

into southern Africa,

either absorbed into

Bantu

Khoisan speakers who populated much of the area were

societies as discussed below, or

The forebears of the Xhosa people were
in Africa.

These

pastoralist cultivators

pushed

pushed

into less fertile areas.

8

the southernmost tier of Bantu migration

into the rolling landscape

between the

Drakensberg Mountains and the Indian Ocean, and reached the Eastern Cape, as most

Chamber XVII, in The Record, or a Series of Official Papers Relative
Condition and Treatment of the Native Tribes of South Africa, Donald Moodie, ed.

and Council
to the

to the

(Amsterdam: Balkema, 1960), 431-40. See also Richard Elphick, Khoikhoi and the
Founding of White South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 38-67, 151216; Emile Boonzaier, The Cape Herders: A History of the Khoikhoi of Southern Africa
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996).
8

Martin Hall, The Changing Past: Farmers, Kings and Traders in Southern Africa (Cape
Town: David Philip, 1987). For a good general survey that looks at these processes in a
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scholars estimate, between the twelfth and the fifteenth
centuries.

Xhosa was

further spurred

by several dramatic schisms. Around

The expansion of the

the late seventeenth and

the early eighteenth century, for example, several smaller
groups split from the

nucleus west of the

Mbashe

Xhosa chiefdoms such

A

further

River.

as the

westward

They migrated

Mdange,

shift

further west and created separate

the Ntinde, and

maybe

the

Gqunukhwebe. 9

of the Xhosa was also reinforced by disputes over

chiefly succession, especially complicated by the practice of polygamy
elite. In

Xhosa

among

Xhosa

the

the mid-eighteenth century, for example, a contest over the succession
of the

Xhosa paramount Phalo
Rharabe and

led to a major schism

the ama-Gcaleka. According to

chief was not to be born from the

wife that a chief would marry

first

among

wife of the "Right

later in life

Xhosa between

Xhosa laws of succession,

the

ama-

the heir of a

Hand House," but

rather

from a

and whose household was known as the "Great

House." Gcaleka, Phalo's "Great House" son's claim
father' death

the

to

become paramount

after his

was challenged by Rharabe a son of the Right Hand House. Even though

continental perspective see Roland Oliver and Brian Fagan, Africa in the Iron Age,

B.C. toA.D. 1400
9

(New York: Cambridge

Scholars disagree on the status of the

c.

500

University Press, 1975).

Gqunukwhwebe

Xhosa

The Xhosa
historian J. Henderson Soga argues that this group was never a part of "the body of the
Xhosa tribe," but was rather a group of Khoikhoi that became only later incorporated by
the Xhosa. See Soga, The Southeastern Bantu (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University
Press, 1930), 1 17. Hermann Giliomee argues that "no eighteenth-century source verifies"
Soga's statement. He argues that the Gqunukhwebe like other Xhosa groups had split
from the Xhosa nucleus. Giliomee argues

that

it

is

within

society.

certainly "conceivable that the

by the Xhosa
because of their partly Khoikhoi origin," since they more than any other Xhosa chiefdom
mixed and intermarried with Khoikoi. "The Gqunukhwebe chief was scorned by his
fellow chiefs because he was not of the royal lineage," writes Giliomee "but there is no

Gqunukhwebe, although Xhosa

in culture,

were regarded as

inferior

evidence that he was politically subordinate to them in the late eighteenth century." See
Hermann Giliomee, "The Eastern Frontier, 1770-1812," in The Shaping of South African
Society, 1652-1840, rev. ed. (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), quote 462,
see also 425.
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Gcaleka defeated Rharabe, his paramountcy was dramatically
weakened as Rharabe and
his followers migrated

westward

Another division

ama-Rharabe chiefdom

that led

nephew

to overthrow

his followers

who

more Xhosa

in the 1790s. This

paramount Ngqika's attack on
his

to the Fish River to

his uncle,

Ntimbo

lost the

to

form a new chiefdom.

move westward

occurred

among

migration resulted from the ama-Rharabe

Ndlambe, who had only few years

the rightful heir to the Rharabe chiefdom.

power

the

struggle against

earlier

helped

Ndlambe and

Ngqika moved onto the Zuurveld. Here

they joined several other groups of Xhosa and Khoikhoi, as well as an
increasing number

who

of European colonists

also began settling in this area.

10

Inter-group relations often reinforced conflicts and rivalries over resources and
land. In 1750, for instance,

contests that effected

an

official report

some Khoikhoi

from the Cape Colony commented on the

residing near the

Amatola Mountains.

Those [Khoikhoi] whom we met could not say what nation they belonged
to, naming themselves according to the river where they lived or
sometimes "the Hottentots [Khoikhoi] of the country." All these
Hottentots were at one time rich in cattle, but have lost them through the
thieving of the

Bushmen

[San] and in wars they fought

and with Caffers [Xhosa].

among themselves

11

Despite the frequency and intensity of such

hostilities, cooperation, cultural

borrowing, innovation, and accommodation also characterized inter-group relations in

many

instances.

who made

Khoikhoi were often absorbed or associated themselves with the Xhosa,

use of them "as servants and

in

war time." Like

10

the Khoikhoi with the San, the

For a general discussion of Xhosa laws of succession see for example John Maclean, A
Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs (London: Frank Cass, 1968), 1 1-23; Giliomee,
"Eastern Frontier" in SSAS, 462-3; Peires, The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa
People in the Days of Their Independence (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1981).
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Xhosa would then generally accept
their society after

their

Khoikhoi or other

one generation of staying with them.

traveler observed, "their clothes

and

clients as full

members of

By that point, one European

lifestyles are precisely alike

and they intermarry

without differentiation." Xhosa societies became thus
more diverse as they expanded
their territorial influence. This observation

several scholars that

seems also

Xhosa nationhood was

to support the

argument made by

a political and not an ethnic concept. But

Khoisan speaking groups were not mere recipients of Xhosa

culture. Scholars argue that

Khoisan languages influenced Xhosa, which over time incorporated "click"
consonants
and cognates. In
.

men.

fact, the

word "Xhosa"

derives from a Khoikhoi

word meaning "angry

»»12

Hunter-gatherers, pastoralists, and herder-cultivators in the Eastern Cape

competed,

at

times violently, for water, land, and other resources. But

through increased contact and interactions on various

worlds and systems. Economic,

linguistic, ritual,

at the

same time

levels, they also created

and other connections

new

social

that developed

over centuries created various lasting bonds between the different groups in the Eastern

Cape, as they interacted through

trade,

diplomacy, and other intercultural exchanges.

Foraging and hunting communities for example made use of iron,

by African farmers, while

11

Peires,

cattle,

and foods grown

the Bantu-speaking pastoralist cultivators adopted Khoisan

The House ofPhalo, 23.

12

Quoted in Peires, The House of Phalo, 22-24, 98. On this issue see also Switzer, Power
and Resistance, 32-35, 45; Elphick, Khoikhoi, 52-53; Crais, White Supremacy, 18; Gerrit
Harinck, "Interaction between Xhosa and Khoi: Emphasis on the Period 1620-1750," in
African Societies in Southern Africa, ed. Leonard Thompson (London: Heinemann,
1969).
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building and hunting practices. Thus the Eastern
Cape developed not only into a place of
intense ethnic competition, but also into a world
of common meanings. 13

Middle Grounds and Rivalries

in the

Upper Ohio Valley Before Anglo-American

Settlement
Adaptation, accommodation, and rivalries also shaped the
history of the Upper

Ohio Valley

prior to the large scale

Anglo-American settlement

the last decades of the eighteenth century. For the

Ohio and Mississippi valleys had
such as the Adena
C.E.),

(c.a.

form of highly developed

(c.a.

began during

two millennia before Columbus,

the

constituted sites of American Indian exchange networks

500 B.C.E. - 100 B.C.E.), the Hopewell

and the Mississippian

efforts that

700 C.E.-1500

artifacts

(c.a.

200 B.C.E. - 400

C.E.). Archeological evidence in the

from mound burial

sites

and other earthworks indicate

the existence of ruling elites and of complex ceremonial and religious organizations in

these societies.

By
fifteenth

14

the time of the first European landfalls in the Western Hemisphere in the late

and the early sixteenth century, the Mississipian moundbuilding centers of the

13

The Changing Past; Crais, White Supremacy and Black Resistance, 14-15.
Richard Elphick has outlined some theories regarding the migration of Khoisan-speaking
pastoralists to southern Africa. Elphick, Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South
Africa, 3-22. See also Switzer, Power and Resistance in an African Society, 19-22, 26.
Hall,

14

For an introduction to this topic see Lynda Shaffer, Native Americans Before 1492:
The Moundbuilding Centers of the Eastern Woodlands (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1992);
James Fitting, "Regional Cultural Development, 300 B.C. to A.D. 1000," in William
Sturtevant, gen. ed., Handbook of North American Indians, XV, Northeast, ed. Bruce
Trigger (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian, 1978), 44-57; Bruce Smith, "Agricultural

Chiefdoms of the Eastern Woodlands," in The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples
of the Americas, I, North America vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
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Eastern Woodlands were in rapid decline
today.

Much

-

a demise that remains

somewhat of a puzzle

of the historiography emphasizes the devastating
influence of alien

pathogens on Native American societies leading to
population declines of about

50% and

with sustained contact over a century to as high as 90%.
The long distance trade that

connected Ohio's aboriginal populations with the Gulf Coast, a
region ravaged by
diseases introduced by Spanish conquistadores and shipwreck
survivors, could have
easily led to the spread of deadly epidemics along the

waterways

that

America's

first

peoples used as their major trade routes. Thus waves of epidemic diseases
in the Ohio
15
region could have caused dramatic depopulation and changes in the social
landscape.

Other scholars have, however, also pointed out
indicates that the

that there

is

convincing evidence that

moundbuilding cultures of the Ohio and the upper and middle

Mississippi river valleys (but not in the Southeast) had already been in decline before

1500 due to indigenous warfare.

16

External demographic pressures on the Ohio country continued as European

colonialism established

its

267-323; Bruce Smith,

ed.,

roots

on the North American coastal peripheries more than

The Mississippian Emergence (Washington D.C.:

Smithsonian, 1990).
15

The influence of disease and

American societies are widely
discussed issues. On the decline of the Mississippian culture and disease see Shaffer, 8692. Alfred Crosby suggests that diseases might have moved along the ancient American
Indian trade routes such as the major waterways of the Eastern Woodlands. See Crosby,
Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 209-215. On disease and its demographic legacy see
Russel Thornton, American Indian Holocaust and Survival: A Population History Since
1492 (Norman: University Press of Oklahoma, 1987); Ann Kamenofsky, Vectors of
Death: The Archeology of European Contact (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
the decline of Native

Press, 1987).
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250 years before Anglo-American settlement of the region began
and 1660s the so-called "beaver wars," reinforced
indigenous

in earnest.

By

the 1650s

rivalries, leading to a

further population decline and a partial
de-settlement of the region.

The

Iroquois'

invasions of their neighbors in the Upper Ohio Valley
were spurred by demographic and

economic

and were part of a series of attacks led by the confederacy
throughout

factors

the northeastern Woodlands.

The Iroquois attempted

to

expand

their territory, in order to

counter the depletion of their population by alien pathogens and
protracted warfare. They
raided their neighbors in "mourning wars" to take captives for torture
and adoption as a

means

to

avenge

their deaths

from the Iroquois' desire

and

to gain

to increase their

new

numbers. But the attacks also resulted

hunting and trapping grounds, which provided them

with fur to obtain European trade goods that strengthened their position against

rival

Indians as well as Europeans. Their campaigns of expansion ultimately failed since a

confederacy of Great Lakes Indians, backed by the French, pushed the Iroquois back
their territory east

to

of the Ohio country. However, their efforts did drive many Indians out

of the Upper Ohio Valley

into surrounding areas to the south, northwest,

A gradual resettling of the Upper Ohio Valley began between the

and west.

17

1720s and the

1750s. Challenging Iroquois' claims of territorial supremacy over the region, and seeking

refuge from white encroachment and Iroquois' pressures, an increasing number of

Delaware and Shawnee from the Susquehanna and the Delaware River region moved

16

See for example Salisbury "The Indians' Old World," 435-458; and Daniel Richter,
Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America (Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 2001), 2-7.
17

See Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire (New York: Norton, 1984), 84113; Daniel Richter "War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience," William and Mary
Quarterly 40 (1983), 528-559; Richter, The Ordeal of the Long-House: The Peoples of

26

towns

their

to the

Upper Ohio Valley. The Delaware, an Algonquian
speaking people,

largely centered their settlements on the Allegheny,
the Beaver and the

Rivers.

The Shawnee, another

society of Algonquian speakers,

Muskingum

may have been one

of the

groups originally driven out of the Upper Ohio Valley region
by the Iroquois
Confederacy. The Shawnee stayed predominately around the
Scioto, Mad, and the Miami
Rivers, where they were also joined by

some Shawnee migrants who came from

the

south.

During the same period, other Native American groups moved

their settlements

eastward to situate themselves more centrally between British and French trade.
With the

end of the Beaver wars
their

in the early

Miami

eighteenth century, the

Indians returned to

homelands on the south end of Lake Michigan, leaving behind

their

temporary exile

around today's Green Bay, Wisconsin. There they had found refuge from Iroquois
attacks.

The Miamics now

eventually

By

become

rebuilt their

towns

in the

western parts of what would

the state of Ohio as well as the state of Indiana.

the 1740s the rich hunting grounds of the northeastern parts of the

Upper Ohio

Valley also began to lure some Seneca and other members of the Iroquois League

move

further west. This Iroquois faction

became known

fiercely independently of the Iroquois confederacy

of the group

that the English called

their settlements

the Iroquois

League

often acted

council at Onondaga.

A

faction

to

Ohio from southwestern Ontario,

around Detroit and on the Sandusky River. The Ottawas

Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill: The University of
1992); White, The Middle Ground, chapters 1-2.

in the

North Carolina Press,

its

Mingos and

Wyandots, remnants of the Huron nations destroyed

by the Iroquois during the Beaver Wars, migrated
and focused

and

as

to

27

followed the Wyandots onto Ohio's Lake Plains,
but
the

Maumee and

came

to settle farther

west on

Auglaize Rivers. 18

Finally, Native

American migrants such

as well as Nanticokes from
their migration

later

as

Mahicans from western

Delaware and eastern Maryland, who had

New

England

for decades prior to

west lived in the vicinity of many Delaware and Shawnee
villages

Susquehanna valley of Pennsylvania, joined Indian settlements
further reinforcing the already polyglot character of the area.

Upper Ohio Valley emerged
accommodation, but also

at

in the

From

Upper Ohio

in the

Valley,

these migrations, the

as a region of interaction, cultural transmission, and

times of renewed rivalries and competition.

For Native American groups who suffered from the pressures of colonial
expansion and inter-Indian competition, and for those

who

searched for richer hunting

grounds, the Upper Ohio Valley provided a favorable haven for maintaining a more
"conservative" political, economic, social, and cultural existence than areas closer to the
coast.

Even though Native Americans

in the

Upper Ohio Valley continued

between the competing French and English colonial empires and remained
European-dominated
the migration to the

settlements, enabled

transatlantic

market system through trade

Upper Ohio Valley, away from
them

tied into a

beaver and deer skin,

the encroachments of European

to revitalize their societies. Furthermore, being situated

between the competing French colonial empire
the Great Lakes extended

in

to live

its

the British colonial empire

in

North America, which from north of

influence over the Ohio and the Mississippi river valley, and

which broadened

18

its

control from

its

colonies on the eastern

For the settlement locations of Ohio Indians in the eighteenth century see the map
"Indian Villages in Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York," in the Atlas of Early American

28

North

AlMriCM

leabOtrd, Indians

In a strategic position to turn the

in

Ihe

Upper Ohio Valley

frequently found themselves

competition between the French and British

to

then

advantage. Oftentimes the Anglo-French imperial rivalry
aided American Indians
efforts to maintain their sovereignty

Hade. Thus through

accommodation,
empirei

in

the

much of the

interaction,

and homelands as well as

Still, at

times, this balancing

rivalries.

attack by French backed Great

of Pickawillany on the Great Miami River

to punish this

group

of

Mianus

British, a relationship that the

1

of

and cultural transmission between Indians and European

could also ignite indigenous and impenal

village

the terms

eighteenth century, there existed a "middle ground"
of

Upper Ohio Valley.

example during an

impiove

to

then

in

A

cooperation

violent encounter occurred, lor

Lake Indian
in

game and

factions

on the Miami

June of 1752, an assault perpetrated

then tiade and diplomatic connections with the

foi

French and

their Indian allies feared could challenge their

''

position in the region.

History: The Revolutionary Era,

760- 1 790, eds. Lester Cappon

1

et al.

(Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1976), 21.
1

Ohio and its larger implications
see especially Michael Mc( onnell, A Country Between The Upper Ohio Valley and Its
Peoples, 1724-1774 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), chapter I; and
1
McConncll, "People 'in Between The Iroquois and the Ohio Indians, 1720-1768," in
Daniel Richter and James Merrell, cds. Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and
Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800 (Syracuse: Syracuse University
'

For a more extensive discussion of the migrations

to

:

and Peter Wood, "The Changing Population of the Colonial South
An Overview by Race and Region, 1685-1790," in Powhatan 's Mantle: Indians in the
Colonial Southeast, cds. Peter Wood, Gregory Wasclkov, and M. Thomas Ilatlcy
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 85-87. See also llmdcraker, Elusive
Press, 1987), 93-1 12;

Empire, 18-32.
tribal

I

"McConnel overemphasizes the communal and
migrations." He states that McConncll "underestimates.

Iinderaker argues that

cohesion of Ohio Indian's
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Native Americans. Africa ns. Europ ean s and Earlv
Colonization

By

the second half of the eighteenth century,
the geographic isolation that had
[

kept both Africans in the Eastern Cape and Native
Americans in the Upper Ohio Valley

I

protected from overwhelming white influence increasingly
broke down. The dangerous

I

coast and the semi-arid Karoo to the west of the Eastern
Cape no longer kept European
colonists out of this region.

North American coast and

The Upper Ohio Valley

its

that

was once

far

away from

the

white population centers also began to increasingly

experience colonial pressures from migrating Anglo-American colonists.

European encroachments

in the

Upper Ohio Valley and

the Eastern

Cape

led

Native American and African societies to experience dramatic changes, epidemic
diseases, the development of new trade networks, and territorial losses. Yet, despite
such

often devastating transformations, indigenous peoples attempted to revitalize their

As

societies.

the

Upper Ohio Valley and

the Eastern

Cape turned increasingly

of colonial expansion and cultural exchange, indigenous groups made

and

to contest the colonial orders that whites sought to

by trying

to maintain indigenous understandings

impose

into sites

efforts to shape

in their respective regions

and practices of diplomacy and

exchange.

At times such developments could lead

to the creation

meaning and accommodation between indigenous groups and
colonization and competition for resources, animosity grew

and European
and

settlers.

On both sides,

whites. Yet with increasing

among indigenous

peoples

these feelings were manifested through violent acts

struggles, leading to a reification of both white

for example, the extent to

of systems of common

which Seneca

and indigenous

villages in the

Indians from various backgrounds."

30

identities.

Ohio Valley were populated by

Trade and the Establishment of Two Colonial Regions
The expansion of international

trade networks and the advance of European

hunters into territories under Native American and African
control initiated the extension

of European empires

into the

Upper Ohio Valley and

the Eastern Cape. Yet, Europeans

did not create either the cattle and ivory trade in southern
Africa or the fur and deerskin
trade in North America. Instead these exchanges were built
on already existing and fluid

long distance trade networks established centuries before European
contact. Native

Americans and Africans quickly learned the value of goods and often
trade.

Moreover, American Indians and Africans used commercial interactions as a

means of establishing
In those areas

shaped as
as

set the protocol for

much by

political relationships with outsiders. 20

where exchange had been frequent, early

the expectations

trade relations

were

and experiences of Native Americans and Africans

by those of Europeans. Many Indian communities

in the

Upper Ohio Valley had

20

For a traditional interpretation of the North American fur trade see Eric Wolf, Europe
and the People Without History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1982), chapter 6. Richard

White

criticizes

Wolfs view on

the fur trade as too

White sees the early history of the fur trade not as exploitative as does Wolf.
White shows that throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century Indians in the Great
Lakes region played an active role in trade transactions, and points out that Native
Americans avoided exchanges when it was to their disadvantage. White, The Middle
Ground, chapter 3. For some suggestions on the history of American Indian trade
relations in the pre- and post-contact period see Salisbury, "The Indians' Old World;" see
also Shaffer, Native Americans Before 1492. For some suggestions on the role of trade
among the Khoikhoi see Emile Boonzaeier, The Cape Herders, 66-67, 76-79. For the
Xhosa see Peires, The House of Phalo, chapter 7. For a traditional interpretation of the
role of trade in the expansion of the Cape Colony see van der Merwe, The Migrant
simplistic.

Farmer. For some insights

into Africa's inter-regional

relations see D. T. Niane, "Relationship

and inter-continental trade

and the exchanges among the different regions,"

General History of Africa vol. IV: Africa from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century, D.
T. Niane, ed. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 631-634.
in
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participated in exchanges with Europeans since the
seventeenth century,

when they had

lived closer to the eastern seaboard before they
migrated westward. There

Native Americans
their

initially

is

evidence that

traded goods like glass beads, copper crystals, and
mirrors for

symbolic value rather than for

their material utility. Yet, over time Indians
also

traded for weapons and metal goods. Furthermore, for Native
Americans trade had a
strategic reason.

diplomatic

ties,

The

first

commercial
leader, Jan

their

It

was used

as

much

as a

means

as to obtain desired goods.

Dutch colonists

interests

on the

in the

and maintain reciprocity and

21

Cape likewise had

local populations.

van Riebeeck, was

to establish

difficulty

imposing

their

Throughout the 1650s, the colony's

first

frustrated with the Khoikhoi's reluctance to trade cattle

-

most valued possessions. Furthermore, van Riebeeck suspected the colony's African

translator of successfully enriching himself through the trade and of encouraging other

KJioikhoi to drive up the prices for those cattle they were willing to trade. 22

The dangers and drawbacks of being
emerged

for local peoples in southern Africa

tied into an international trade system

and North America over time and

to a

degree that varied across time and space. Eager to have adequate meat supplies, which
the

Cape colony needed

to serve as a provisioning station for the

Company, Commander Cornelis van Qualbergen complained
trade with the Hottentots has already so

In

little

the

21

more than

1668 that "the

issue see for

for cattle

had begun

to surpass

what the Khoikhoi

example White, The Middle Ground, 99-107
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cattle

declined that they seem to have vanished."

a decade after establishing a provisioning station in the

Company's demand

On this

much

in

Dutch East India

Cape

in 1652,

in the

Western

Cape were willing

As

to supply.

a result,

by the 1660s the

relatively peaceful interaction

between Khoikhoi and Dutch had ended. Over the following
decades, Dutch

trade

excursions increasingly turned into violent missions in
search of cattle, plunder, and
tribute.

23

The

traffic in cattle

was, however, not the only form of African-European
trade

the region. Despite repeated

excursions

left

Company

restrictions,

from the western parts of the Cape

in

hundreds of trading and hunting

to

go

to the Eastern

Cape throughout

the eighteenth century. Trade in such goods as ivory, ostrich
feathers, and valuable skins

aided

in the

reduction of game.

The decline of southern African

wildlife, reinforced

by

the expansion of colonial trade, deteriorated even further with the expansion
of white
settlement.

Cumming

A

somewhat

later

account by the popular Victorian writer and hunter Gordon

underscores these processes.

interior in the mid-nineteenth century

Cumming, who hunted

and was,

like so

many

in the

southern African

other European travelers,

stunned by the abundance of wildlife, was reminded by older colonists that the amount of

game had
farms,

greatly declined since they had

Cumming

first

arrived in the area. Looking around white

noticed that "the skulls and horns of hundreds of black wildebeest and

springbook are seen piled

in

heaps or scattered about." This process of over hunting had

gone hand-in-hand with colonial conquest

in the region.

A description of the early trade relations between Dutch and Khokhoi can be found in
the "Extracts from the Journal of Commander van Riebeeck," see The Record, 75-86.
23

On trade

with the Khoikhoi and their depleting cattle sources

of A Despatch from Commander Quaelbergen and Council
in

in the

to the

1

660s see "Extract

Chamber XVII" (1668)

The Record, 300-301.

24

For a comparative analysis of this issue see William Beinart and Peter Coates,
Environment and History: The Taming of Nature in the USA and South Africa (New
York: Routledge, 1995), chapter 2. On ivory hunters see O.F. Mentzel, A Geographical
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As

in southern Africa, the expansion

decline in the region's
century. Like the

skins, Native

trade system

game

Xhosa and

Americans

in the

Upper Ohio Valley,

the

in the

Khoisan

in the Eastern

Upper Ohio Valley

Cape who hunted

deerskins.

As

a result of the depopulating

Beaver Wars, the Upper Ohio Valley of the early eighteenth
century had

this natural wealth,

was given

for ivory and

also participated in an international

developed into a place inhabited by few people but abundant

observed that

led to a

resources throughout the eighteenth and early
nineteenth

by providing beaver pelts and

effects of the

of trade

in

David Jones, a Baptist missionary

in

game. Commenting on

in the region in the early 1770s,

Shawnee Scioto River meant "Hairy River." Jones argued

to the stream because

when

the

Shawnee

1720s and 1730s, "deers were so plenty, that
drink, the stream

would be

first

came

that the

name

to live in the area in the

in the vernal season,

when they came

to

thick of hairs." Yet, with the gradual Indian resettlement of

Ohio, a strain was put on the local deer and beaver population as Ohio Indians such as

Delawares and Shawnees provided an increasing supply of deer, beaver, and other animal
skins to predominantly Pennsylvanian traders.

become so severe among

the

By

the 1770s and 1780s, over-hunting had

Delaware towns on the Muskingum River

that Jones

observed a serious food shortage there.

and Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope, 1785-87, transl. G.V. Marais
and J. Hoge, ed. H.J. Mandelbrote (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1944), 126-127;
and Crais, White Supremacy, 37. On European hunting in the Cape in general see for
example R. G. dimming, Five Years of a Hunter 's Life in South Africa (New York:
Harper
25

On

& Brothers,

1850), quotation 122.

over-hunting and

its

implication for Ohio Indians see for example David Jones,

A

Journal of Two Visits Made to Some Nations of Indians on the West Side of the River
Ohio, in the Years 1772-1773 (New York: J. Sabin, 1865), 46, 60, 89, 100. See also
David Zeisberger, "History of Northern American Indians," in Archer Butler Hulbert and

Ohio Archaeological and Historical Publications, vol.
Heer, 1910), 14. For insights into the volume of Pennsylvania's

William Nathaniel Schwarze,
19 (Columbus,

OH:

F.J.

eds.
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The tremendous volume of the
the

fur

and deerskin trades not only led

Upper Ohio Valley's animal population, but

it

also changed social

to a decline

of

norms and

organization within Indian communities in this region.
"Hunting for the market," argues
Eric Hindcraker, gradually undermined

"some of the

ruling assumptions of earlier

hunting practices," which "emphasized the sacred qualities of
animals and the importance

of reciprocity and the propitiation of spirits." 26 For a significant
number of Ohio Indians,
hunting turned gradually from a means of subsistence to an activity
driven by market
incentives.

as

many

At

peak of trade

the

as 50 to

1

relations,

50 deer during a

was obtained when skins were

some

skillful Indian hunters

single hunting season, wasting

were willing

most of the meat

to kill

that

European backcountry hunters, who appeared

collected.

in

growing numbers west of the Appalachians by the second half of the eighteenth century,
had the reputation of being even more wasteful. 27

and deer skin trade

was largely supplied by Ohio Indians see Stephen
"Colonial Indian Policy As a Measure of Rising Imperialism: New York and
fur

that

Cutcliffc,

Pennsylvania, 1700-1755," The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 64 (1981),
,i
237-268.

Hindcraker, Elusive Empire, quotation 67.
Zeisberger, "History," 14.

On

the long distances that Delaware Indians had to travel as

of over hunting sec for example

a result

Edmund

de Schweinitz, The Life and Times of
Co., 1870), 80-81. My discussion on

David Zeisberger (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott &
Ohio Indians' connections to the transatlantic trade system

in the

eighteenth century

benefited from Eric Hinderaker's discussion of this subject

in his

study of colonialism

the

Ohio Valley. Hindcraker, Elusive Empire, chapter

1

and

2.

On

in

the wastefulness of

How the

West Was Lost: The Transformation of
Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry Clay (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
white hunters see Stephen Aron,

1996), 25.

For Delaware hunting

rituals see Zeisberger, "History/' 84.

It is

easy to either

dismiss or to romanticize the issue of Indian-animal relationships among Ohio Indians,
though there is evidence that such religious attachments existed. For a controversial
discussion on this topic

among

the hunter-gatherer

of the Game: Indian-Animal Relationships and the

Micmacs see Calvin Martin, Keepers
Fur Trade (Berkeley and Los

Angeles: University of California Press, 1978). For a
>
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critical cross-reference sec Indians,

Native Americans, Africans, and Early Colonization
Alien pathogens especially disrupted the
societies.

in

Though

reliable

numbers

life

of African and Native American

are impossible to obtain, the incursion of
Europeans

both areas led to demographic disasters. In the Cape, Khoisan
speaking peoples and to

a lesser degree the

Xhosa and other Bantu-speaking groups

epidemic diseases

to

certain areas of the

percent.

which they had

The Khoikhoi

later

Some

waves of

historians estimate that in

as fifty to sixty

Western Cape, for example, who had already been assaulted

in the

further ravaged

Continuous waves of smallpox also

The

immunity.

Cape disease caused population declines of as high

by colonial expansion, were

1750s.

little

suffered from

hit the

by a devastating small pox epidemic

in 1713.

Eastern Cape starting at least as early as the

outbreaks became more severe due to the ever-increasing proximity of

colonial settlement which reinforced the exposure to infectious diseases. 28

As

aforementioned, in the Mississippi and the Ohio River valleys disease

believed to have aided in the destruction of the moundbuilding centers.

It

is

continued to

haunt eighteenth century Eastern Woodland Indians. The use of disease infested blankets

by the

British,

handed

to

Delaware Indians who besieged Fort

Pitt in the

summer of 1763

as diplomatic "gifts," had a destructive impact on the military efforts of the Delaware and

other groups of Ohio Indians.

Animals, and the Fur Trade:

As

A

a result of this infamous incident Ohio Indians suffered

Critique of Keepers of the

(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1981).

More

Game,

ed.

Shepard Kreech

III

useful to understanding the

Ohio Indian farming societies is Gregory Dowd,
A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1 745-1815
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), chapter 1.
relationship between

power and

ritual in

36

from a raging small pox epidemic

Among Native

that significantly

undermined

their military efforts.

Americans, smallpox, as well as other epidemics, took

accompanied the expansion of the colonial
warfare, and an increasing

their

toll.

29

Disease

frontier that brought trade, imperial rivalries,

number of European

settlers across the

Appalachian

Mountains. Disease killed more Indians than warfare and intruded
into every aspect of

American Indian

life.

As with

the local peoples of the Cape,

hunting and social organization

and

instability.

exposed

among Native American

Such processes rendered

to epidemics.

it

undermined planting,

societies, leading to starvation

the local peoples of the

two regions even more

30

Colonial expansion in the Eastern Cape and the Upper Ohio Valley led to
significant changes in Native

due

to the

begun

among

European goods. Portuguese beads

Xhosa

for

Cape,

example were circulated widely

as a form of currency, accumulated, as historian Jeffrey Peires writes,

as equivalents to the highly valued cattle. Furthermore, there

of ivory, copper, and iron

Xhosa

culture. In the Eastern

connections between whites and local peoples, Africans had increasingly

to utilize

the

American and African material

in the Eastern

Cape,

all

was an increased

circulation

of which had been major trade items

society before the period of European encroachment. Over time, the

Xhosa

in

also

28

See for example Elphick, Khoikhoi, 234, 237-238; Elphick and Malherbe, "The
Khoisan to 1828," 22; Crais, White Supremacy, 41-42. See also South African

Commercial Advertiser,

Jan. 7, 1832.

29

See for example Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in
the Seven Years War in America (New York: Norton, 1988), 447-448. See also Elizabeth
Fenn, "Biological Warfare in Eighteenth-Century North America: Beyond Jeffrey
Amherst," Journal of American History 86 (March 2000), 1552-1580.
30

For a general study on Native Americans and epidemics see for example Thornton,
American Indian Holocaust. On disease in the Great Lakes region in the eighteenth
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adopted the use of European blankets, cloth, tinder
boxes, and iron pots into their daily
31

lives.

Similar developments occurred

among Native Americans

Mountains. Ohio Indians incorporated European

across the Appalachian

fabrics, kettle, guns,

and other material

items varying, however, from group to group and over time.
The Delaware and the

Shawnee, the two easternmost
at earlier points

largely

societies, incorporated

more European

material culture and

than other groups in region. In the early 1770s, an increasing
number of

Delaware Indians who had been converted by the Moravian church, arrived

Upper Ohio Valley. Invited by Delaware

Muskingum and Tuscarawas

leaders, these

Moravian Indians

started mission

towns

in the

to the

Moravians, as well as the influence of other agents of cultural change,

chicken, and pigs

towns by the

last

became an

increasingly

river valleys in

common

what

sight in

is

in the

today eastern Ohio.

Due

cattle,

many Delaware and Shawnee

decades of the eighteenth century. Likewise, some Ohio Indians

adopted European-style housing that could be seen standing alongside the traditional

wigwams.

32

century see for example White, The Middle Ground, 143-145, 217-218, 229-230, 233,
275, 460.
31

On

beads originating from Portugal and their use among the Xhosa see Henry

Lichtenstein, Travels in Southern Africa, 1803, 1804, 1805, 2 vols., transl. and ed. A.

Plumptre (Cape Town:

House of Phalo, quote

Van Riebeeck

Society, 1928-1930), 1:338, 369. See also Peires,

98, see also 95-103.

32

For the early adoption of livestock and European housing among Ohio Indians see
Zeisberger, "History," 17-18, 45-46, 86; Jones, Journal, 92, 95; David McClure, Diary of
David McClure, Doctor of Divinity, 1748-1820, ed. Franklin Dexter (New York: The
Knickerbocker Press, 1899), 50; William Newcomb, Culture and Acculturation of the
Delaware Indians (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), 13-30. C.A.
Weslager, The Delaware Indians: A History (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1972), 285-91; Emma Gray and Leslie Robb Gray, Wilderness Christians: The Moravian
Mission to the Delaware Indians (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), 48-50.
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The

among both

practice of gift giving helped to disseminate
European material culture
the

both peoples as

Ohio Indians and Xhosa.
fulfilling political

considered exchange an effective
outsiders.

They both saw

gifts as

colonial officials to provide

In addition,

exchange of gifts was seen by

and diplomatic purposes. Ohio Indians and Xhosa

way

to establish

and maintain friendly relations with

symbols of reciprocal social

them

as part

relations

and expected

of diplomatic exchanges and social

by making Europeans conform

Ohio Indians and Xhosa demonstrated
systems.

Significantly, the

to their political

customs such as

interactions.

gift giving,

a desire to maintain continuity in their political

33

Local peoples in the Eastern Cape and in the Upper Ohio Valley were receptive to
outsiders and

European

open

to search for

intruders.

means of cooperation and accommodation with

The Xhosa of the Eastern Cape, frequently provided refuge

to

Khoikhoi laborers who fled from the farms of their European masters, and sometimes

runaway whites who wanted
the

Xhosa were

individuals,

to or

who had

to

entire groups that

political

3

Over time such

had been conquered or who had established

tributary relations, could be incorporated into

this inclusion

escape from the colony. In the early years,

also inclined to adopt ship-wrecked Europeans.

and even

Xhosa

societies.

The Xhosa

of outsiders, just as they understood intermarriage and

means

to extend their social networks

On gift giving and Europeans'

to

and

partial adoption

gift giving. It

to ease social distance

of local customs

rationalized

in the

was a

between

conduct of

Cape see for example Lichtenstein, Travels, 1: 402. For the
Eastern Woodlands see for example Wilbur Jacobs, Wilderness Politics and Indian Gifts:
The Northern Colonial Frontier (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966); Dorothy
Jones, License for Empire: Colonialism by Treaty in Early America (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1982), chapter 1 and 2; James Merrell, Into the American Woods:
diplomacy

in the Eastern

Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier

(New York: Norton,

39

1999).

different groups. This strategy enabled the
continuity of Xhosa expansion while at the

same time lessening some of the pressures
Like Africans

in the Eastern

that

their

own

ranks. Thus,

As mentioned above, many Eastern

the adoption of war captives as a

means

to replace the deaths in

by the second half of the eighteenth century an increasing number

of Anglo-American captives, especially children,

Even though many Europeans eagerly sought
considerable

created for other societies. 34

Cape, Ohio Indians were also open to the

incorporation of outsiders into their societies.

Woodland Indians used

it

started to live in

Ohio Indian towns.

opportunities to return to their homes, a

number remained and became members of Native American communities. 35

Moreover, newly incorporated outsiders often functioned as

cultural brokers

who

slowly acquainted local peoples with European technology, tools, culture, customs, and
languages. Yet their incorporation reveals an even more telling issue about the local

communities

and

in the

Upper Ohio Valley and

the Eastern Cape.

identity to outsiders, both groups attempted to adopt

By

extending their culture

Europeans into

their

systems of

social order.

Increasingly, however, and as will be discussed in

growing number of indigenous people

in the

more

detail in later chapters, a

Upper Ohio Valley and

the Eastern

Cape

See Extract of Declaration of Ten Officers and Sailors of the Ship Stavenisse, 2d

The Record, 417-9. For British deserters who lived among the Xhosa see
for example "Colonel Collins' Journal" in Records of the Cape Colony, 36 vols., ed.
George Theal (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1897-1905), 7: 63-65. On the
diplomatic and political meanings and functions of the incorporation of outsiders and gift

March 1687,

in

giving see Peires, The

House of Phalo,

42-4.

35

McClure, Diary, 61. See also James Axtell, "The White Indians of Colonial America"
in The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 168-206; McConnelM Country Between,
215-216.
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rejected white territorial encroachments and
partial adaptations to European culture.
In
their efforts to resist colonial expansion,

that they

figures

imagined

to

separation from whites, and aided in the reification
of the

American Great Lakes

region, the Delaware prophet Neolin,

whose

and anti-European materialist preaching supported the uprising of an

of Great Lake Indians against the British
fact, the

and lifeways

of a growing number of indigenous people.

In the

"nativist"

cultural values

be traditional. Such messages were often proclaimed
by prophetic

who advocated

identities

many emphasized

in 1763,

was

certainly not

an isolated

alliance

case. In

Moravian missionaries David Zeisberger and John Heckewelder wrote about

number of prophets who were

active in the

Muskingum

river valley region alone.

though such prophets incorporated Christian symbolism, they also attributed the

power among Ohio Indian communities
culture.

By

revitalizing their

American prophets hoped

way of life and by

that

resources, and sovereignty.

to contact with

Ohio Indian

Anglo-Americans and

a

Even

loss

of

their

seeking separation from whites, Native

societies could regain control over their land,

36

For the Moravian missionaries' complaints about

rival prophets see for

Zeisberger, "History," 134; John Heckewelder, History, Manners,

example

and Customs of the

Indian Nations (Philadelphia: Historical Society of Philadelphia, 1881), 291-295. For

Ohio Indians' resistance to the adaptation of white cultural elements in the upper Ohio
valley see McConnell, A Country Between, 222-223. See also Anthony Wallace "New
Religions Among the Delaware Indians, 1600-1900," Southwestern Journal of
Anthropology 12 (Spring, 1956), 7-8; and Wallace, "Revitalization Movements"
American Anthropologist 58 (April, 1956), 264-281. For an insightful perspective on
these issues see also Gregory Dowd who argues that such local nativist movements did
not only have a revitalizing impact on individual Eastern Woodland societies, but that
they were in fact part of a larger "Indian Great Awakening" a "pan-Indian" resistance
Anglo-American colonialism. See Dowd, A Spirited Resistance. See
Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, & the British Empire
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
struggle against

41

also

Similarly,

War of

and as discussed

in

more

detail in chapter 5, in the years following
the

181 1-1812, in which British authorities pushed
the Zuurveld

Xhosa beyond

the

Great Fish River, prophets like Nxele and Mlanjeni
began to have an increasing appeal

Xhosa

society. Like their Native

American

messages were influenced by Christian
religious leaders

fit

counterparts,

Xhosa

prophetic-figures'

aspects. Yet, both African

and Native American

Christianity into their traditional world-views, choosing
the Christian

elements they considered compatible with their messages and
discarding the
religious syncretism,

were emerging

it

seems, was an attempt to come to terms with the

in their regions. In both the Eastern

prophetic leaders

in

condemned

material dependency

Cape and

in the

new

rest.

This

realities that

Upper Ohio

Valley,

the harmful effects of the European presence, indigenous

on whites, alcoholism, and

witchcraft.

37

Colonists and Indigenous People
In both North

America and

in southern Africa the material culture

of colonists

also changed, as Europeans adopted indigenous knowledge, material culture, and

subsistence. Like Eastern

"backcountry

settlers"

Woodland Indian

Anglo American

depended on agriculture and hunting as means of subsistence. 38

The ways of life of white migrants who

On this

societies, the so called

ways of

lived

on the colonial periphery and American

House of Phalo, chapter 5; Peires, The Dead Will Arise:
Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856-7 (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 1989); Dowd, A Spirited Resistance.
38

issue see Peires, The

On Ohio

Indians' subsistence see McClure, Diary, 89-90.

On Shawnee's

subsistence

see James Howard, Shawnee'.: The Ceremonialism of a Native American Indian Tribe

and

its

Cultural Background (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981), 43.

On Delaware

subsistence see Zeisberger, "History," 44-48, 55-75. See also Herbert Kraft, The Lenape:

42

Indians overlapped in so

many ways

Crevecoeur described backcountry
life"

French emigrant Michel-Guillaume de

that the

settlers as

"new made Indians" who

lived the "idle

of "half cultivators and hunters " 39 To Crevecoeur such
ways of subsistence were

clear opposition to

how

a farmer should live.

What Crevecoeur

failed to note,

was

in

40

that

mixed food production was due

less to

an alleged laziness and more to necessity. In order to survive in
what colonists called the
"backcountry," early Anglo American

settlers

had

to rely

on methods of subsistence not

unlike those of Native American groups in the region. This system was
based on farming,

hunting and fishing, gathering, and the raising of livestock. Furthermore, since
the
seventeenth century, backcountry settlers not only grew European crops but also
incorporated "Indian corn" and other Native American plants. Through decades of

observation and experience, backcountry settlers had learned that Indian farming and
subsistence were best adapted to their surroundings and situations.

Hunting had also become an increasingly central
backcountry
to that

settlers. In fact,

activity

among male

Anglo American hunters had adapted a

similar hunting dress

of Eastern Woodland Indians, had borrowed many hunting techniques from

Indian neighbors, and were tied into the trans- Atlantic skin and fur trade.

Archeology, History and Ethnography (Newark:
138-158; and

Newcomb,

New Jersey Historical

their

When game

Society, 1986),

Culture and Acculturation, 13-24.

39

Michel-Guillaume de Crevecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer,
Barton Blake (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1912), 47-49.
40

ed.

Warren

See also Charles Woodmason, The Carolina Backcountry on the Eve of the Revolution:
The Journal and other Writings of Charles Woodmason, Anglican Itinerant, ed. Richard

Hooker (Chapel

Hill:

University of North Carolina Press, 1953).
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became more sparse

in the east,

rich hunting grounds of the

white backcountry hunters also became attracted
to the

Upper Ohio Valley

Nevertheless, even though

from working

their land

members of the

and hunting

and

for

who moved

cultural systems

isolation

and for trade

41

early white settlers attempted to secure a living

meat and

for animal skins,

colonial elite of losing settlers to "savage" ways,

were not seeking complete
migrants

many

for their subsistence

from mainstream white

and despite

fears

Anglo American

society.

of

settlers

Many white

west of the Appalachians were eager to reconstruct the economic

of the east

in their

new

locations.

For instance, as John

Mack

Faragher demonstrates, Daniel Boone, the proverbial American pioneer was involved
with hunting animal skins for trade, land speculation, and river transportation. These

were not unusual business ventures

for white backcountry settlers.

and 1790s, Ohio's white farmers raised "hog crops"

that

As

early as the 1780s

were then driven and sold

to

slaughterhouses that were often weeks away from the farmers' homes. Ohio's early
colonists also raised cattle and sheep and sold the butter, wool, and meat they produced to

merchants

who

distributed these

goods throughout the Ohio and Mississippi River

systems. In addition, white farmers in the region raised corn and wheat not only for

personal consumption, but surpluses were distilled and sold as whiskey until the region's
infrastructure, strengthened

nineteenth century,

market.

made

it

by the buildings of canals

in the first

decades of the

profitable to sell corn and wheat harvests directly to the

42

41

My discussion of changes and adaptations among backwoodsmen has benefited from
Aron, How the West Was Lost,21-23; and John Mack Faragher, Daniel Boone: The Life
and Legend of an American Pioneer (New York: Henry

44

Holt, 1992), 17-23, 80.

As

in trans-Appalachia, the interaction

between Africans and colonists on the

early southern African frontier, led to changes in the
part adopted indigenous cultural

the region, the

subsistence

Dutch speaking

economy on

be most practical

in the

and economic

ways of life of whites who

practices.

many

Like

at least in

African societies

in

colonists, often referred to as trekboers, based their

the raising

of cattle and sheep, a form of production believed

Eastern Cape.

43

to

Their growing numbers and expansion into the

southern African interior, led to increasing competition with independent African
societies for land, cattle, and water. Trekboers

the hairy fat-tailed sheep from the Khoikhoi.

shifting

demand

farmers

in the

in the British

imperial

grew sorghum

Only

in the

like the

Xhosa, and adopted

1830s and 1840s, with the

economy from meat

to wool,

would

pastoralist

region begin to replace indigenous sheep with the heavily wooled Merino

sheep. Moreover, the seventeenth and eighteenth century trekboer diet, like that of
Africans,

was

largely based on the consumption of milk and meat.

used to make clothing, were often similar
similarities in

housing and living

styles.

to those

Many

The resources they

used by Africans. There were also

trekboers on the early frontier settled in

On

Boone's commercial involvement see Faragher, Daniel Boone, 260-263. For early
agricultural production in Ohio see R. Douglas Hurt, The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the

Old Northwest (Bloomington and

Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), chapter

8.

43

As with African

pastoralist farmers, the mobility of

Dutch speaking stock farmers has

been exaggerated by contemporary observers and scholars. Recently some historians
have come to reject the use of the term trekboer. They instead prefer to call them
veeboeren (stock farmers). See for example Susan Newton King, Master and Servants on
the Cape Eastern Frontier, 1760-1803 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
See also Elizabeth Elbourne, Blood Ground: Colonialism, Missions, and the Contest for
Christianity in the Cape Colony and Britain, 1799-1853 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-

Queen's University Press, 2002), 80.
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simple houses, often resembling African huts.
Others, to have greater mobility to follow
their herds, lived in their

wagons.

44

Similarly to the eighteenth century North
American frontier, the
colonists in the Eastern

apprehensive about a

German

traveler

Cape concerned many

new

class

officials

way of life of

and travelers who

felt

of white "nomad families." Henry Lichtenstein,
a

and employee of the Cape Governor, described the
trekboers as

way connected

in society with

to the situation

of savages." O.

any of their fellow creatures, so
F.

Mentzel, another

in

that they are almost

German traveler,

"no

sunk

reflected this

sentiment arguing that the stock farmers were themselves accustomed
"to such an extent
to the carefree life, the indifference, the lazy days

Hottentots, that not

latter."

much

difference

may be

and the association with slaves and

discerned between the former and the

45

Despite such charges, which reflected a certain elitism of many colonial

and

travelers, colonists in the Eastern

Cape,

like their counterparts in the

Valley, attempted to reproduce the social orders and

many of the

officials

Upper Ohio

institutions,

and

conditions of developed colonial society. The isolation of pastoralist farmers in the

eighteenth and early nineteenth century that Europeans travelers so often commented on

was

relative. Certainly, trekboer life required self-reliance,

and the Cape government was

largely ineffective in enforcing order as well as controlling colonists' expansion.

44

For housing and living conditions of white pastoralist farmers see for example John
Campbell, Travels in South Africa (Cape Town: C. Struik, 1974), 328. On the switch to
Merino sheep see for example Beinart and Coates, Environment and History, 57; South
African Commercial Advertiser, Aug, 25, 1832, Nov. 27, 1833.
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Nonetheless, the stock fanners of the Eastern
Cape had strong economic and cultural

ties

with the western parts of the colonial settlement.
Throughout most of the eighteenth

Cape Town remained

century,

farmers had to conduct

was a

solid

the only administrative center of the colony
and pastoralist

much of their administrative and

civil affairs there. Besides, there

and long-lasting economic co-dependence between the two

Susan Newton King's research shows

that colonists in the Eastern

parts of the Cape.

Cape were

the

principal suppliers of meat and butter for the colony in the
last decades of the eighteenth

They

century.

also traded soap

and candles. In exchange white

pastoralist farmers

obtained a wide variety of goods such as sugar, coffee, Flemish linen,
broadcloth, and
slaves.

Even on

their

wagons or

in their

modest

huts,

Dutch speaking colonists on the

colonial periphery tried to emulate the social and cultural

colony as

much

If they

as they could.

were able

life

of the western parts of the

46

to afford

it,

white settlers

in the

Eastern Cape also eagerly

purchased slaves, predominantly imported from parts of Asia and eastern Africa, as

workers

to satisfy their labor

were often based on

demands just

chattel slavery.

slaves in southern Africa lived in

most Eastern Cape

45

On the

But

like

western Cape landowners whose estates

in the early nineteenth century, eight out

Cape Town and

the arable southwestern district.

often

Thus

colonists did not have the resources to acquire slaves. Instead, they

living conditions

and on critiques of white

Lichtenstein, Travels, quote 2: 83, see also

1:

pastoralist farmers' lifeways see

446-7; Mentzel, Description of the Cape,

quote 115.
46

On the

economic connections between the Eastern and the Western Cape see for
example Sir John Barrow, An Account of Travels into the Interior of South Africa 2 vols.
(London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1801-1804), 1: 35, 67-68, 84-5, 204; Anders
Span-man, A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope, 2 vols., ed. V.S. Forbes (Cape Town:
Van Riebeeck Society, 1975), 1: 233. See also Newton King, Master and Servants,
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1

would attempt

to satisfy their labor

demands by employing Khoikhoi and

speakers, both coveted for their pastoral

skills.

later

Xhosa

Through much of the eighteenth and early

nineteenth century, the economic integration of
Africans frequently happened in a fashion
similar to that in indigenous societies, where clients
and servants maintained a degree of

economic

self-sufficiency.

It is

important to underscore though that Africans had

little

prospects of being accepted on an equal footing in white
pastoralist society, as trekboers
believed them to be culturally inferior.

The

potential threat of violence

remained an ever-

present component in this relationship. Moreover, as colonial records
of whippings and

other acts of racial violence in rural areas seem to indicate, the colonists'
hold on power

gradually increased, they pushed African laborers into more servile positions. 47
In both the

Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape, the surge

in

migration of

white settlers increasingly worsened indigenous/white relations and augmented the
potential for interracial violence as Africans and Native

Americans

tried to

stem colonial

advances. In the late 1760s and early 1770s, numerous Ohio Indian communities were
frustrated about the loss of land west of the Appalachian

mountain range. Contesting

white encroachments, Native American combatants attacked surveyors, hunters, and
settlers. Similarly,

Xhosa and Khoikhoi

Zuurveld with attacks,

which they secured "as

in

as they thought proper."

8; Crais,

"The Eastern
47

large a portion of their flocks and herds

At times, they also burned the houses of white stock farmers

who had abandoned them

chapter

fighters responded to the colonization of the

•

4R

in fear.

White Supremacy and Black Resistance, 30-32, 36-38; and Giliomee,

Frontier," 430-1.

African labor and trekboers see Switzer, Power and Resistance in an African
Society, 45-46; Elbourne, Blood Ground, 79; Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 25-26, 5

On
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Colonists in the Upper Ohio Valley and the
Eastern Cape responded in kind. Like

Native Americans and Africans, they attempted
to improve their situation by using
violence,

which became a means by which many whites
asserted

face of indigenous resistance.
the Eastern Cape, and

Commandos

Anglo American

staffed

militias in

by Boers and

their identities in the

their

Khoisan servants

in

North America, frequently struck

against indigenous groups in attempts to intimidate
them.

By
significant

participating in acts of violence against Native Americans
and Africans, a

number of colonists

indigenous peoples.

asserted views

which favored the subjugation of

49

In the Lancaster area in Pennsylvania, late in
1763, for instance, a

group called the Paxton Boys complained

that

Native American communities that lived

within or close to the colony posed a threat to white settlement. The group
of vigilantes
then attacked and brutally lynched several friendly Moravian Indians.

To

exert political

pressures on the authorities to pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing, the Paxton Boys began
to

march toward

Philadelphia. Colonial representatives eventually convinced the group to

disperse, but not without an official promise to publish the insurgents' grievances and to

discuss

them before

the Pennsylvania assembly.

50

For Indian attacks on surveyors and others see for example Dr. Hugh Mercer to Col.
William Preston, Jan. 8, 1774, in The Documentary History of Dunmore's War, 1774,
eds.

Reuben Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg (Madison: Wisconsin

Historical

Society, 1905), 1-2; and John Floyd to Preston, April 26, 1774, in ibid., 7-8. For African

violence on the Zuurveld see for example Stephen Kay, Travels and Researches

in

Caffraria (London: John Mason, 1833), 11.
49

My understanding that violent actions can be read as symbolic language has been

influenced by James Gilligan, Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic

Putnam, 1996), see especially chapter
50

3.

See Richter, Facing East, 201-6; Hinderaker, Elusive Empire, 157-61.
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(New York:

Some white

settlers in the

Eastern Cape also revolted against the
perceived

inaction and ineffectiveness of the colonial
state. Similarly to the Paxton
Boys, Boer
rebels during the Graaf-Reinet Rebellion
(1795-1796) criticized the British interim

government
insurgents,

for being unable to confront

saw

the

Xhosa

what they described

as an obstacle to expansion

Xhosa

as a

threat.

The Boer

and urged the government

decisively against the Africans, retake allegedly
stolen cattle, and to remove the

to strike

Xhosa

east of the Fish River. In 1799, another group of
Boer farmers unsuccessfully rose

against the British government, complaining about the
continued presence of the

up

Xhosa

on the Zuurveld. 51

The Colonial

State and Indigenous/White Relations

Colonial governments were however not as opposed to expansion as the
rhetoric

of some insurgent colonists suggests.

On

several occasions, the state in the

used violence to obtain indigenous lands and enforce
official position

To be

its

two regions

colonial projects, despite the

of respecting boundaries.

sure, Great Britain did issue the Proclamation

of 1763, which,

at least

de

jure, forbade the advance of Anglo-American colonists west of the Appalachians.

Likewise, in the

late eighteenth

and early nineteenth century British as well

colonial administrations in southern Africa were reluctant to

claims against various groups of Xhosa

who

lived

make

as

Dutch

decisive territorial

on the Zuurveld. These decisions came

For the Graaf Reinet Rebellion see for example H. Giliomee, "Democracy on the
Frontier: A Comparative Study of Bacon's Rebellion (1676) and the Graaf-Reinet
Rebellion (1795-1796)," South African HistoricalJournal 6 (1974), 30-51. For the 1799

example Noel Mostert, Frontiers: The Epic of South Africa 's Creation
and the Tragedy of the Xhosa People (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 289-290.
rebellion see for

50

in

response to indigenous groups' ability to
effectively challenge

encroachments

in the

two regions by

territorial

military means, rendering plans to
obtain

new

lands

too expensive for colonial administrations
to undertake.

Such

policies did not

mean, however,

changing the balance of power to

that colonial officials

were not interested

in

advantage when given the opportunity. British

their

administrators in North America assumed on several
occasions the role of agents of

Indian dispossession in the post-Proclamation of 1763
years.

Treaty of Fort Stanwix

in 1768, the

As

superintendent of Indian affairs William Johnson

supported a questionable Iroquois claim to sovereignty over the
south of the Ohio

by

right

river.

early as during the

The Iroquois Confederacy argued

of conquest, and were willing

territories

north and

that they possessed these lands

to sell the areas south

of the Ohio

to the British

-

an offer that gave the Anglo-American colonization of Kentucky a legitimate appearance.

The

Iroquois' declarations of territorial sovereignty and the land sale

was of course

contested by Native American groups in the region. But Iroquois and British diplomats
ignored, dismissed, and suppressed their protests. 52

The

volatile situation in the

Upper Ohio Valley erupted

a group of Virginians massacred an estimated twelve

Mingoes

settlement on the Yellow Creek. Their leader, Logan,

who

members

in the massacre,

colonists,

now began

however unable

and who had

to reject

to recruit

until this point

accommodation

much backing

in favor

for his plans

52

in early

May

in the vicinity

lost three close

1774,

when

of their

family

sought friendly relations with the

of militant resistance. Logan was

among

the Delaware and

most

See Jones, License for Empire, 31-4, 60-1, 75-80, 117-18. Jones overemphasizes the
sway that the Iroquois confederacy possessed over the Ohio Indians. For good

51

Shawnee, who were unwilling
neighbors.

Still,

the

to risk another outright

Mingo and some twenty

retaliatory strike against white settlements.

to forty

war with

their

Anglo-American

Shawnee warriors backed

his

Logan's campaign killed about thirteen

53
colonists and led several hundred to flee in
panic.

In response to the attacks, military officials
at Fort Pitt and the governor of

Virginia, Lord

Dunmore, saw

a need to chastise the Indians to impress "an
Idea of the

power of the White People, upon

thefir]

minds." Dunmore, a major land speculator and

adamant supporter of Virginia's colonization
victory against the

Anglo-American

efforts in

Ohio Indians would provide

colonists

who

To Dunmore

rising land values

profits.

and

better security for the estimated 50,000

lived west of the

Proclamation of 1763.

Kentucky, believed that a decisive

boundary established

in the

the land speculator, a stable situation

To Dunmore

the official,

it

would mean

would mean higher

tax

revenues.

Anglo-American troops struck decisively against Mingo and Shawnee towns.

They burned and plundered Indian
mouth of the Kanawha

river,

crops,

Dunmore 's

wigwams, and

cabins.

At Point Pleasant,

troops were challenged by 1000

warriors led by the previously neutral Cornstalk

who

Shawnee

feared an imminent attack on

Shawnee

settlements. After one of the bloodiest battles in the region's history, the

Shawnee

retreated,

and

their

at the

towns on the lower Scioto were destroyed by colonial

reassessments of this relationship see McConnel,

A Country Between;

White, The Middle

Ground; Hinderaker, Elusive Empire.

On

Yellow Creek and its influence on Logan see the Reminiscences of
Judge Henry Jolly, in Dunmore's War, 9-14. On the Delawares' and Shawnees' position
during Dunmore's War see the extracts of two letters from The Maryland Journal, June
18, 17774, in ibid., 28-30; and a letter from The Pennsylvania Gazette, July 13, 1774, in
ibid.,

the massacre at

66-7.
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forces.

The

decisive defeat of the Shawnees and Mingoes
led Cornstalk to sue for a

controversial peace

among

the

Ohio Indians

confined to the areas north of the Ohio river
resented.

in

which the region's

-a

first

people became

significant loss of territory that

many

54

Just as various groups of American Indians in the
reluctant to give

up

their lands south

of the Ohio River, the Gqunukhwebe, the Ndlambe,

and other smaller Xhosa factions continued
River prior to the

Upper Ohio Valley were

to

hold on to their lands west of the Fish

War of 181 1-12. Not all Xhosa resisted

British encroachments.

used the presence of whites to advance their goals. British

and the Ngqika Xhosa

officials

leader Ngqika, for example, pursued a loose alliance. Ngqika

Some

was increasingly

frustrated

about losing his grip on the western most Xhosa factions living on the Zuurveld, and

hoped

that a partnership with the British

would strengthen

his position in the rivalry

against his uncle Ndlambe.

Colonial authorities on the other hand pursued the objective to clear Africans

from the Zuurveld, a goal already pursued before the War of 181
upheavals by several Dutch speaking

responded

to

white

settler

Zuurveld by attempting

1

to 1812.

Following

settlers in the late eighteenth century, officials

complaints about the continued Xhosa presence on the

to "gently

push the [Zuurveld] Kaffirs back

into their

own

country." But the colony's efforts at removal backfired. In a united campaign in 1799,

Zuurveld Xhosa, "rebel" Khoikhoi, and runaway slaves pushed the Europeans as

far

west

54

See Lord Dunmore to the Earl of Dartmouth, Dec. 24, 1774, in Dunmore 's War, 368395. For the destructiveness of the Anglo-American campaigns of Dunmore's war see for
example Maj. Angus McDonald to Maj. John Connoly, in ibid., 151-4; Extract from Col.

William Fleming's Journal, in

ibid.,

281-91.
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On the battle of Point Pleasant see Fleming's

as the

Gamtoos

River. Hence, British officials had to
negotiate a peace that permitted the

various Zuurveld

Bushmans

Xhosa groups

to

"remain

at their

kraals

on the banks of Sundays and

River, or in other words in the situation in
which" the British had "found

them" before the war. 55

When the

British retook the

colony for a brief interlude

Cape from

the

in 1803, the attention

soon again on the Eastern Cape.

Dutch

in

1

killings.

chapters three and five, the situation escalated

September of 181

the

to focus

Many white settlers on the Zuurveld resumed to

"begging," "wandering," and for several

in

left

of colonial administrators came

complain about the presence of the Xhosa, who were blamed

of the Cape

806, after having

1.

As we

for cattle "thieving,"

more

will discuss in

when John Cradock became

Only a few weeks

after taking office,

detail in

the governor

he ordered the

removal of the independent African nations east of the Fish River. Khoikhoi,

colonial,

and British forces under the leadership of John Graham struck decisively against the
about 20,000 Xhosa living on the Zuurveld

who had

objected removal.

Though

major African leaders on the Zuurveld - Ndlambe and Chungwa - had pursued

the

two

at least a

moderate degree of peaceful coexistence with the Cape colony

in previous years, they

were

Xhosa were gradually

left

with

little

choice but to

forced to withdraw from the

them with some

resist.

In the ensuing war, the

Addo Bush whose

strategic advantages.

thick and dense growth had provided

Cape troops shot indiscriminately

at the

Xhosa,

killed the

Gqunukhwebe

leader

Account,

in ibid., 253-7.

My argument in this section has also benefited from Hurt,

Chungwa on

his sickbed, captured African cattle,

Ohio

Frontier, 55-60.
55

Ben Maclennan, A Proper Degree of Terror: John Graham and the Cape 's Eastern

Frontier (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986), 46-47. For a more detailed discussion on
the situation

on the Zuurveld

in the

1790s see Elbourne, Blood Ground, 85-89.
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methodically destroyed Xhosa
Africans into submission.

By

fields,

the

and carried off the harvest

end of the campaign

in 1812,

in

an effort to starve the

Governor Cradock

concluded that his forces had impressed "on the
minds of these savages a proper degree
of terror and respect." 56

Conclusion

Dunmore's War

Cape

failed to

in the

Upper Ohio Valley and

implement permanent colonial

the

racial orders in the

and Fish river boundaries between white and indigenous

two wars intended

to establish,

remained

and the United States would expand

all

in the

War of 181 1-12

The Ohio
of the

but unchallenged, and both the Cape Colony

decades to come. The two conflicts were

Though processes of inter-ethnic cooperation and

much of the

regions.

territory that the architects

staging points in the colonial transformation in the two regions

grounds.

two

in the Eastern

-

a history

rivalry,

of contested

which had shaped

pre-colonial and early colonial history discussed in this chapter, would

continue to influence race relations in the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape in the

following years, the balance of power increasingly shifted against the two areas'

indigenous peoples, especially as the

state, settlers,

and other

interest

groups attempted to

create colonial racial orders.

See Maclennan, A Proper Degree of Terror, for quote see frontispiece.
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PART II

CHAPTER 2:
CONQUEST, "CIVILIZATION," AND DISPOSSESSION: THE
TRANSFORMATION
OF THE UPPER OHIO VALLEY

During the American Revolution there existed not only a
growing struggle over

power and

control

among Anglo-American

between whites and Indians.

colonists and the British government, but also

In the contest in the

the 1810s, just as in the South African Eastern

Upper Ohio Valley from

Cape from

the 1770s to

the 1810s to the 1850s, the

colonizers developed increasingly racialized perceptions of differences
between whites

and indigenous groups.
colonizers disagreed

It is

important to reiterate though, that

among themselves and

at

in

both places, white

times chose conflicting strategies on

how

to deal with the local populations.

Unlike nineteenth-century colonists

more

in the

Eastern Cape,

whom we will

closely in chapter 3, white settlers in the Upper Ohio Valley committed

of unofficial violence against indigenous groups.
hostilities

were caused by white backcountry

Indians." Others

have challenged

conceptions of race

this

Some

settlers'

examine

many

acts

scholars have argued that such

racism and hatred for American

view. Elizabeth Perkins, for example, argues that

in the revolutionary

Ohio Valley were

ill

defined and that interracial

See for example Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and
Empire Building (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980).
1

56

violence between Anglo-Americans and
Native Americans "seems too personal,
too

immediate, too intimate" to be described as
"categorical racialism." 2
This chapter examines the impact played by
vigilante aggression as a force of

changing the balance of power
against Indians

in the region. Unofficial acts

by militant white Americans

in the last

of violence committed

decades of the eighteenth and

early nineteenth century, contributed to ethnic cleansing
and the eventual creation of a
racial order in the region. Inter-ethnic enmities

phenomena, but grew stronger
In contrast to settlers,

in the

and

racial

views were also not

static

decades that followed the Revolution.

American government

officials in the

Upper Ohio

Valley,

advocated a self-proclaimed benevolence toward Native Americans,
exemplified by the
United States' "policy of civilization." American administrators,

War Henry Knox

like the Secretary

(1789-1794) or President Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809), argued

their philanthropic

program would aid Native Americans

to

change to

fit

of
that

American norms

of "civilization." This would, they believed, "improve" the situation of the Indian. Yet,
is

it

also important to underscore that, like white frontier settlers, national officials were

interested in extending the United States' territory onto Native

so by violent

means

if

they

deemed

it

necessary. In

American

many ways,

as

land.

They did

Anthony Wallace has

argued, the federal government used the civilization program as a means to free up Indian
lands. Policy

makers hoped

that a switch

among Ohio

European farming would open up more land
officials

assumed

that the

Indian societies to

to white settlement.

modes of

Moreover, federal

economic transformation they advocated among Native

Americans, would force Indians to accumulate debts. These changing circumstances,

2

Elizabeth Perkins, Border Life: Experience and Memory in the Revolutionary Ohio
Valley (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 136-137.

57

officials believed,

through

treaties.

political issues,

worked

in

would make

easier for the United States to purchase
Indian lands

it

3

Therefore, despite their often disparate views
on both social and

on the objective of national expansion white

settlers

and national leaders

accordance with each other. 4 The active involvement
of the American

government and

its

national leaders might explain

emerged no powerful outspoken

settler elite in the

government of inaction and abandoning the

Conte^dJiro unds
At the

(Part

I):

why, unlike

Upper Ohio Valley

interests

The Revolution

in the Eastern Cape, there

that accused the

of its colonists.

in the

I

Upper Ohio Valley

outset of the Revolution, the issue of how to interact with Indians

central concern for the

young and

fledgling

American nation

became

a

as the country's

revolutionary elite had mixed views on the relations that their country should pursue with

Native Americans.

Some

influential leaders advocated that the rebellious colonies seek

rapprochement with Indians. In the Upper Ohio Valley, however, American
little

success in establishing closer

ties

officials

had

with Indians. Here the native peoples mostly

fought against the United States, and would continue their military resistance

until the

mid- 1790s. The Coshocton Delaware and the Mequashake Shawnee were the only groups
that established serious diplomatic ties with the Americans.

Yet even friendly

relations

with a relatively small fraction of the region's Indian population provided problems for

Anthony Wallace, Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). On this issue see also Bernard
Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973).
4

Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 185-186, 226.
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the Americans, since these contacts
were irreconcilable with the national
interests of

expansion and were an obstacle to military strategy

American

Officials

and the Indians

The American Revolution
States' political elite.

at the

at all.

Outset of the Revolution

led to a variety of responses

Numerous American

with Native Americans

among

leaders, for example,

the

young United

wanted no

interaction

Their opinions reflected popular revolutionary
rhetoric,

which generally depicted Indians as the natural
Hence, several prominent

in the region.

political figures like

allies

or even

pawns of the

British.

John Adams, who would become the

second president of the United States (1797-1801), shared the
animosities of a significant

number of rebel
Still,

vulnerability.

pose a threat
policies

colonists

American

who saw

officials

Indians as costly, dangerous, and unreliable

could not ignore the

The Continental Congress recognized

realities

of their military

that western Indian societies could

to the colonies in their efforts to obtain independence. Thus, in

emerged

in

which American

officials

5

allies.

1776 new

encouraged Native Americans to stay

outside the conflict pointing out that the revolution was a war between English and

American

brothers, of which they should take no notice.

6

The demands of some members of the revolutionary
most noticeably General George Washington and Thomas

As

early as 1776, they argued that

5

Richter,

military and political

Jefferson,

went even

American Indians would not remain

elite,

further.

inactive in the

Facing East from Indian Country, 216-19.

6

See for example Colin Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis
and Diversity in Native American Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1995).
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upcoming

conflict,

and should therefore be enticed

to fight alongside the

Americans

wherever possible. But unimpressed by or unaware
of American rhetoric and diplomatic
aspirations,

most Native Americans showed a reluctance

to get involved in the conflict

on

the side of the thirteen colonies. 7

United States-Coshocton Indian Relations during the
Revolution

The

largely unsuccessful attempts in the

Upper Ohio Valley

to obtain either

Native American support or non-participation in the revolutionary
struggle, were

implemented by the Indian Agent George Morgan and several other

officers at Fort Pitt.

United States diplomatic efforts focused especially on the Delaware factions
around

Coshocton

in the

Shawnee on
American

Muskingum and Tuscarawas River Valley and

the lower Scioto River.

settlements, and

Both groups lived

seemed keen on not

in close

the

Mequashake

proximity to Anglo-

getting involved in the conflict (see

chapter 4).

Early in the Revolution, official American rhetoric frequently affirmed the United
States' interest in maintaining the long-established "chain of friendship"

thirteen former colonies

Ohio Indians
against

all

that

between the

and Ohio Indians. American policy-makers promised

would remain

Enemies as long

friendly to the United States, like "their

as the

Sun or Moon

their "Brothers the Delawares," the Continental

shall shine

own

to protect

children

& rivers flow." In a speech to

Congress assured them of the United

On the

debate over congressional approval of the recruitment of Indian fighters see for
example Journals of the Continental Congress, 1 774-1 789, 34 vols., Worthington Ford et

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904-37), 4: 394-5. For Native
American views on this issue see Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country.
al.,

eds.
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States' determination "to cultivate peace

wanted the Coshocton Delaware
Americans provided guarantees

to pass

and friendship," a message

on

to other

Ohio

for trade and assured the Delawares
that they

In a treaty between the Coshocton Delaware,

many of the Mequashake Shawnee

two groups, and

in

an

who by

[of]

this point

and diplomatic

gifts

the

Coshocton Delaware

American

that the United States

become

Furthermore,

officials

part of their

would provide

it

invited the Coshocton Indians, pending

form a [Native American]

state

whereof the Delaware nation

though the treaty was never

ratified

note that the possibility of a

common

officials

sincerity of

its

trade

and protection from the encroachment of white

on approbation of

Congress, "to join the present confederation," of the former thirteen colonies "and

American

of the

such as "articles of clothing, utensils, and implements of war." The

treaty also provided territorial guarantees

settlers.

had also been

effort to consolidate the strength

the United States, signed on September
17, 1778,

They assured

would

taking their lands." 8

reiterated those points, but also offered the Indians an
opportunity to

union.

Congress

Indians. Furthermore, the

"prevent any of our people wronging them in any
manner, or

joined by

that

shall

by the Continental Congress,
political

and Native American

system was

leaders.

9

be head." Even

it

at least

to

is still

significant to

imagined by some

However, overall the United

States'

support of a Native American state has to be questioned.

See Gov. John Page to the Delawares, Sept. 18, 1777, in Frontier Defense on the Upper
Ohio, 1777-1778, eds. Reuben Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg (Madison:
Wisconsin Historical Society, 1912), 88-91; and Speech to Captain White Eyes, April 10,
1776, in Journals of the Continental Congress, 4: 269.
9

For the

treaty see Charles Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs,

Laws and

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904),
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2: 3-5.

Treaties, 3 vols.

Yet the

treaty also spurred controversy. Article
III of the

document posed a

clear

threat to the Council of Coshocton's
expressed desire not to get involved in the

revolutionary fighting. 10

It

required the Coshocton Indians to enlist
their

States forces and to allow the

Americans passage through

point American officers

to recruit

leaders

came

reminded the officers
bounds,

that "all

that the treaty

what

I

officers

with United

When

at a later

fighters, their

reminded them of Article

had been "wrote down

agreed to was to pilot the

Army

false."

'till

III,

one

11

Killbuck

beyond our

& my great Capt. White Eyes with several others to go before the Army &

convey them

to the

Enemy

to speak or treaty with

Delaware had agreed
Eastern

some of the Coshocton Indian

seemed dumb founded. After American

of their chiefs, Killbuck, argued

their territory.

men

Woodland

Brodhead seems

Morgan wrote

in order to

be of use

one another." According

to fulfill little

peoples.

12

more than

to Killbuck's version

their traditional role as

of the

treaty, the

mediators

among

A secret letter by Colonel Morgan to Colonel Daniel

to support Killbuck's claim

that "there never

villainously conducted."

to both Parties, in case they should desire

was

of the questionable nature of the

treaty.

a conference with Indians, so improperly or

13

For the treaty see Laws and Treaties, 2:3-5.
1

Randolph Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio

(Pittsburgh: University of

Pittsburgh Press, 1940), 17.

David Zeisberger to Col. George Morgan, Jan. 20, 1779, in Frontier Advance on the
Upper Ohio, 1778-1779, ed. Louise Kellogg (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society,
1916), 201-202; and John Killbuck to Morgan, Jan. 20, 1779, in ibid., 202-205.
13

For Morgan's description of the treaty conference see Morgan
Brodhead, in Frontier Advance, 216-217.
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to

Colonel Daniel

Furthermore, in asking the Coshocton Indians
to found the fourteenth

American

officials also left little

state,

doubt that the Indians had to change
their way of life. In

1776, for instance, the Continental Congress
announced to the Coshocton Indians that

would send "a

suitable minister,

Some of these developments had
the

and schoolmaster, and a sober man

to instruct you." 14

already been introduced by a group of
missionaries of

Moravian church, who had been invited by

their

the Council at Coshocton to

mission towns to the Tuscarawas and Muskingum
River Valley area

1770s.

it

An American commissioner who

visited the missions about

announcement by Congress, praised the missionaries'

move some of

in the early

two years

after the

efforts in bringing Christian

education and commercial agriculture to the their "converts."
The official also described
the

Moravian Indians

Indians should be like

as looking as peaceful as sheep,
15

this.

and expressed a desire

Thus the Moravian missionaries aided the American

strategy to change the Indians. But they also supported the

Upper Ohio Valley region
greatly

on

Congress,
15

more

intelligence information

Coshocton Indians.

Speech

in

direct ways.

American

American war

effort in the

officers at Fort Pitt relied

from the missionaries, as well as the Moravian and

16

to Captain
4:

that all

White Eyes, April

10, 1776, in

Journals of the Continental

269-70.

"Diarium von Lichtenau

am Muskingum vom

19ten August bis Ende des Jahres 1778,"

Sept. 6, 1778, in Herrnhutter Indianermission in der Amerikanischen Revolution:

Tagebuecher von David Zeisberger 1772-1781,
Wessel (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), 463.

eds.

Die

Hermann Wellenreuther and Carola

16

For the reconnaissance work of the missionaries, as well as that of the Moravian and
Delaware Indians see for example David Zeisberger to Gen. Hand, Sept. 23, 1777, in
Frontier Defense, 101-3; Brodhead to Zeisberger, Nov. 26, 1779, in Pennsylvania
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White Backcountry Violence and Government
Policy during the Revolution
Throughout the eighteenth century, colonial expansion
on the trans-Appalachian
frontier

had led

to raids

and attacks on one another by Anglo-American
colonists and

Native Americans. This tense situation was accompanied
by

which

violence, in

friends

and

foes.

At the time of the Revolution, the

Ohio Indians was
the

Ohio

river.

militant settlers often did not differentiate

further intensified

Some American

by

threat

many

acts

of unofficial

between Native American

of white vigilante attacks on

the creation of illegal white settlements north
of

officials feared that

white trespassers on Indian land,

who

could be found virtually everywhere "thirty miles up the branches
of the Ohio," posed a

"danger to the peaceable inhabitants," such as the Coshocton Indians. 17

Thus the "chain of friendship"
potential Indian allies

was frequently

that the

United States tried to maintain with

"stained."

As

frontier settlers in western Pennsylvania shot at a

Shawnee on

their

way

early as

Mingo

to treaty negotiations at Fort Pitt.

September 1775, white

leader and later at a

For American

attempted to gain support from various Ohio Indian factions,

and the Delaware, the actions of backcountry
to maintain

damage

control,

American

vigilantes

17

On white

who

Shawnee, Mingo,

were a severe blow. In an

effort

& Co.,

1852-6), 12: 192-3; Brodhead to

13, 1779, in ibid., 12: 197-9.

frontier settlers' fears

Col. John Gibson to Gen.

Hand, Sept.

officials

of Indians and

Edward Hand, Aug.

17, 1777, in ibid., 85-86.

a

officers assured the treaty participants that the

Archives, 12 vols. (Philadelphia: Joseph Severns

Washington, Dec.

like the

Mingo and

On

1,

how

this

spurred violent activity see

1777, in Frontier Defense, 35; Page to

illegal settlements north

of the Ohio river see

Brodhead to Col. David Shepherd, Oct. 10, 1779, in Frontier Retreat on the
Upper Ohio, 1779-1781 (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1917), 96-7; Brodhead
to the Delaware Chiefs, Oct. 1 1, 1779, in ibid., 97-8; Brodhead to Gen. George
Washington, Oct. 26, 1779, in Pa. Archives, 12: 176-177.
Col. Daniel
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perpetrators, if caught,

white frontier
strong

settlers

would be punished. But through

challenged the efforts of government officials

American position on

and assistance of at

American
settlers

least

the

Ohio

some of the

officials, similarly to

by

the continued use of violence,

frontier

depended on the

local Native

who

believed that a

neutrality, cooperation,

American groups. On such occasions

Ohio Indian leaders when blamed

their people, attempted to defuse tense situations

for violent attacks

by arguing

been committed by "very bad people." But they also maintained

that violence

on
had

that "the Sentiments

and

Conduct of your Brothers the White People" should not be judged
"from those of a few
Wretches among them." 18
Unofficial violence by backcountry settlers and attempts by the
federal

government

to maintain

some degree of control

problems for American policy-makers. Some
curtail settler activity

treacherous

in the

Upper Ohio Valley caused

serious

officials believed that their inability to

exposed the United States "to the shameful reproach of being as

& perfidious as the worst of savages."

19

In

May of 1778, Timothy Pickering,

an official with the military, was looking for solutions on

committed by the "wild ungovernable race" of white

how to

prevent acts of violence

frontier settlers. Since

many of the

unsanctioned acts of aggression against Indians were committed by militia units staffed

by backcountry

1

settlers,

Pickering advocated that only regular forces should be used in

o

See Treaty

at Pittsburgh, Sept. 15, 1775, in

The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 1775-

1777, eds. Reuben Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, (Madison: Wisconsin Historical
Society, 1908), 27-9; see also Col. Dorsey Pentecoast to Capt. William Harrod,

November

12, 1776, in ibid., 219-220.

For arguments

that the

United States could not

hold the Delaware nation accountable for the action by some renegade individuals see

Delaware Chiefs
19

Page

to

to Congress,

Hand, Sept.

May 29,

17, 1777, in

1779, in Frontier Advance, 352.

Frontier Advance, 85-86.
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the area.

But the United States laeked the means

to replace militia

with regular forees in

the region.

The precariousness of the
clear during the

fall

leader

Randolph

at

Point

to join the British. Allegedly fearing
that the

would give up

Americans, the commanding officer

When anti- American

visit to Fort

especially

of 1777. Cornstalk warned the Americans
that an

number of Shawnee planned

Mequashake Shawnee

some days

Upper Ohio Valley became

Mequashake Shawnee leader Cornstalk's

Pleasant (Kentucky) in the
increasing

situation in the

his friendly disposition

at the fort arrested

Indians murdered a

later, the situation escalated.

toward the

Cornstalk and his companions.

member of the

militia in the vicinity of the fort

A mob of local militia stormed the fort and

ransacked the prison-cabin, slaughtering Cornstalk and his three
companions. These

murders dealt a blow
neighbors.

It

to the

American chances of reducing tensions with

pushed an even larger number of Ohio Indians

which by 1778 included a majority of Native Americans
Acts of unofficial violence by white frontier
Indians, continued unimpeded.

members of a
Americans
allies at the

About a year

after the

Council

at

camp,

21

even against friendly Ohio

murder of Cornstalk, some

frontier militia unit killed the influential

as a scout.

northern

into the anti-American

in the region.

settlers,

its

I

White Eyes while he served the

The Delaware leader had been one of the United

States' strongest

Coshocton. American officers, remembering the earlier impact of

Cornstalk's killing, kept White Eyes' murder a secret. They claimed instead that he had

20

Pickering to Washington,

May

19, 1778, in

21

Frontier Advance., 55-56.

See Capt. Matthew Arbuckle to Hand, Nov. 7, 1777, in Frontier Defense, 149-50;
"Narrative of Capt. John Stuart," in ibid., 157-62; and "Deposition on the Murder," Nov
10, 1777, in ibid., 162-3; Hand to Gov. Patrick Henry, Dec. 9, Mil, in ibid., 176.
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died of smallpox.
settler

In the spring of 1779, in response
to the arrest of a white frontier

who had been

vigilantes assembled

convicted for the murder of a friendly
Delaware, a group of white

and threatened

traveling through Pennsylvania

Philadelphia.

were several

to

murder a group of Coshocton chiefs who were

on a diplomatic mission

The Indians were rerouted
parties

made up

to destroy

fighters

who had

them."

In the

fall

kill

assisted Colonel Daniel

raiders.

of 1780, a group of western
a band of around forty

Brodhead

1782,

when more

of

settler violence

during

pinnacle during the infamous Gnadenhuetten massacre of

than ninety pacifist Moravian Indians were killed by western

Pennsylvania militiamen
settlements.

in the defense

A massacre was only averted

through swift interference by a guard of regulars. 24 Backcountry
its

in

23

Hannastown against anti-American Ohio Indian

the Revolution reached

Congress

several times during their travels since
"there

Pennsylvania militiamen and their officers threatened to

Coshocton Indian

to the Continental

who

accused them of raiding and stealing from white

25

Like backcountry

settlers,

many American

officers

prejudices against Indians. During his service at Fort

Pitt,

and

officials

had

their share

of

Colonel Brodhead, for instance,

had grown increasingly frustrated about reports and rumors of Coshocton Indians leaving

22

See for example Clinton Weslager, The Delaware Indians: A History (New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1972), 306-7; and Richard White, The Middle Ground, 385.
23

Killbuck to Brodhead, April 28, 1779, in Frontier Advance, 296-8; Brodhead to

Washington,

May 3,

in ibid., 384-5;
24

Brodhead

to

1779, in

Washington
Reed, Nov.

ibid.,

to

2,

306-7; Pres. Joseph

Brodhead,

May 21,

Reed

1779, in

1780, in Pa. Archives,

8:

to

Brodhead, July

ibid.,

8,

1779,

332-3.

596.

Heckewelder, Narrative, 310-325; and Relation of Frederick Lineback, Pa. Archives,
9:

524-5.
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the

Muskingum and Tuscarawas

in 1781,

Brodhead asserted

colour, for

believe

I

any Indian to be

it

"that

much

civilized."

river valleys to join the anti-American
resistance. Early

much

confidence ought never to be placed in
any of the

easier for the

most

civilized Indian to turn

Savage than for

26

A good number of revolutionary policy makers blamed Indian violence
Americans on

British administrators, agents,

Ohio Indians. For American
acting as the

officials

pawns of the crown

States as being motivated

it

was

against

and "scalp buyers," who had misguided

easier to argue that Native

Americans were

rather than to see their involvement against the
United

by American actions and

policies. This belief ignored the

impact of decades of Anglo-American encroachments onto Native
American lands and
the United States' inability to provide supplies to Indians,
both of which encouraged

many Ohio
The

Indians to seek an alliance with the British. 27
interests

of maintaining friendly relations with Native Americans

Upper Ohio Valley became, however, increasingly secondary
American

officials.

if

in the

not irrelevant to

A growing number of officers argued that militia men in units with

Native American scouts had threatened to leave their companies as they objected to

26

27

Brodhead

As

to

Heckewelder, Jan. 21, 1781, in Frontier Retreat, 321.

early as in the

summer of

argued that the British

1

776, American officials and the Moravian missionaries

up Indian aggression. See for example "Diarium von
Lichtenau am Muskingum vom Juli 1776 bis 21 ten Juni 1777," in Herrenhutter
Indianermission, passim. In contrast, Sosin and Stevens argue that the Wyandots and
Mingo attacks on American settlements during the summer of 1776 occurred without
British encouragement. See Jack Sosin, "Use of Indians in the War of the American
stirred

Revolution" Canadian Historical Review 46 (1965), 1 19-20; and Paul Stevens "'Placing
Proper Persons at their Head:' Henry Hamilton," The Old Northwest 12 (1986), 284. For
later

American claims

that

blame Indian attacks on the

British see for examples

Hand

to

the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1777, in Frontier Defense, 88; Page to the Delawares, Sept. 18,

1777, in ibid., 88-91; Brodhead to Indian Penn., Dec. 2, 1780, in Frontier Retreat, 299.
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cooperating with Indians/ 8

American

efforts to seek

As

the Revolution in the

rapprochements with

Upper Ohio Valley progressed,

at least

some Ohio

Indians

became

increasingly difficult with the changing military
strategies of the United States in the
region. General

Edward Hand,

1778, for example,

the

commanding

was concerned with how

officer at Fort Pitt

"to preserve"

from 1777

to

August

Ohio Indian "friendship" with

small parties of militia on active duty in Indian country
that would not "stay clear of the"
friendly Indians.

scalps

29

by several

Furthermore, Colonel Brodhead feared that bounties offered for
Indian

state

governments

in

1780 would lead to the random killing and

scalping of Coshocton Indians by militia. 30

Like backcountry

settlers,

American administrators embraced violence

as a tool to

obtain their strategic goals. United States officials advocated that "offensive operations

can alone produce Defence
country. "Savages must be

violence

it

was a

agt. Indians,"

managed by working on

viable strategy to maintain

required total warfare. In the

soldiers

fall

was especially planned

29

to Jasper Yeates,

31

For American

stability in the region

officials,

- even

if

of 1779, the American Allegheny campaign of 600

late

and drew a 400-mile long destructive

summer of 1780 and again

Col. John Gibson to Gen. Hand, Aug.

Hand

to strike "terror" into Indian

their fears."

some order and

for harvest time,

path through Indian country. In the

28

and that troops had

Aug. 25, 1777,

1,

in 1782,

General

1777, in Frontier Defense, 35.

in Frontier Defense., 48-49.

Hand

to Delawares,

Sept. 17, 1777, in ibid., 86.
30

May

and Brodhead to the
Delawares, May 27, 1780, in Frontier Retreat, 183-4; "Diarium von Schoenbrunn und
Gnaddenhuetten am Muskingum von November 1779 bis in August 1780," Jun. 1, 1779,

Brodhead

to

Reed,

18, 1780, in Pa. Archives, 8, 249-50;

in

Herrnhutter Indianermission, 524-5.

31

Gov. Patrick Henry

to

Gen. Edward Hand, July 27, 1777, Frontier Defense, 30-31
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Clark marched with about 1000

men to

Such

Ohio Indians

and

attacks led anti-American

destroy

enemy Shawnee towns and their harvests.

to

grow more dependent on

British supplies

to relocate their villages further to the northwest, to gain greater distance

potential

American

from

way, American forces achieve the ethnic cleansing of

attacks. In this

significant parts of what is today southern and eastern Ohio. 32

Contested Grounds (Part

When

II):

the British sued for peace with the

of the Upper Ohio Valley were
Britain ceded

all

consulting

Native American

its

America's First Colony. 1782-1812

far

Americans

in 1783, the Indian peoples

from defeated. Nevertheless,

allies.

area's native groups.

States' first colony.

Northwest Territory

This development enabled United States officials

From

Thus the

where

32

would be contested by

trans- Appalachian

West became

the United

the 1780s to the early decades of the nineteenth century, the

(a region delineated

the south, Pennsylvania to the east, and

state created out

of Paris,

lands east of the Mississippi River to the United States without

to declare territorial sovereignty over the region, a claim that

many of the

in the Treaty

by

the Mississippi to the west, the

Canada

of what historians today

Ohio

river to

to the north) as well as Ohio, the first

call the

"Old Northwest," became

the United States attempted to implement a colonial racial order.

the

first

place

33

on the American campaigns see Brodhead to Washington, Sept. 16, 1779, in
Pa. Archives, 12: 155-6; Brodhead to Washington, Aug. 21, 1780, in Frontier Retreat,
249-50. Henry Wilson, "The Account of the Campaign Against the Shawnee Indians by
For

details

Henry Wilson,"

in Collections

of the

Illinois State Historical

Illinois State Historical Library, 1912), 8:

Library (Springfield:

476-484.

American colony
For Ohio and the Northwest Territory ("Old Northwest") as the first
The St. Clair
see St. Clair's Address, May 29, 1795, in William Henry Smith, ed.,

33
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The post-Revolution years saw a continuation
of the tensions between United
States officials

and backcountry

settlers.

Recurring acts of unofficial violence by

frontiersmen continued to worry some government
34
administrators.
At the same time,

many backcountry

settlers

were

critical

of the federal government and saw

policies as only benefiting large speculators.

The United

argued, failed to represent their interests. Backcountry
federal officials

More

whom

they viewed as

pompous and

importantly, however, and despite such

the early nineteenth century, national expansion

American

settlers

and federal

officials. In the

land

States government, they often

men

also often ignored or

intrusive.

ill

its

35

feeling,

between the 1780s and

became increasingly

the goal of both

Upper Ohio Valley, the

the tools of conquest, treaties, and a policy of "civilization,"

mocked

became

state,

by applying

the major agent of

Native American dispossession.

Papers: The Life and Public Services ofArthur St. Clair,... With His Correspondence
and Other Papers, 2 vols. (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 2: 356; I.W

Andrews, "The Beginnings of the Colonial System of the United States," in Ohio
Archeological and Historical Publications, vol. 1 (Columbus: Fred J. Heer, 1900),
Knepper, Ohio and Its People, 49. Watts, An American Colony.

1-9;

34

See for example Report of the Secretary of War to Congress, July 10, 1787, in
Clarence Carter, ed., The Territorial Papers of the United States, 28vols. (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1934-75),
ibid., 2:

89-91; John Cleves

2: 31; St. Clair to

Symmes to Jonathan

Dayton,

May

Knox,

Jan. 27, 1788, in

18-20, 1789, in Beverly

The Correspondence ofJohn Cleves Symmes (New York: Macmillan, 1926),
78-79. Knox to Washington, June 15, 1789, American State Papers: Indian Affairs, 2
vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1832-34), 1: 12-14.

Bond,

35

ed.

Andrew Cayton, '"Noble

Actors' upon 'the Theatre of Honour:' Power and Civility in

the Treaty of Greenville," in Cayton and Fredericka Teute, eds., Contact Points:

American Frontiers form the Mohawk Valley to
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 243.
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the Mississippi, J 750-1 830 (Chapel Hill

Tensions Continued: Squatters, Settlers, and
Government Officials

Many United
leaders like

States officials

were advocates of national expansion.

George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and Henry
Knox on

level, as well as

such regional figures as the

territorial

governor Arthur

Rufus Putnam, an early leader of Marietta and judge,
advocated

had

to

that the

Clair and

Old Northwest

Washington and John Cleves Symmes, the proprietor of the Symmes

purchase (an area of several hundred thousand acres

in the

were also major land speculators on the trans-Appalachian
interest in national expansion. Security in the

the

St.

the national

be developed into a region viable for commercial agriculture.
Several early

national figures like

attract

Political

more

settlers

and would lead

to

federal officials

frontier,

prices. In this endeavor,

central issue with

to contend.

who had an economic

Northwest Territory, they knew, would

an appreciation of land

Ohio Indians' hold on the land became a

American national expansion had

southwestern corner of Ohio),

which advocates of

At the same time,

as discussed earlier,

were concerned about white squatters who moved north of the Ohio

River and whose numbers increased noticeably throughout the 1780s.
Federal officials,

backcountry

settlers,

many of whom

condemned

shared eastern society's negative perceptions of

squatter settlements and argued that they threatened to

undermine the government's Indian policy,
speculation.

treaties,

and

Government bureaucrats often described

a "lazy" and "lawless set of fellows,"

who

the United States' position in the West.

in the

promotion of land

squatters as "illegal" settlers

and as

defied authority and could seriously threaten

In order to avoid chaos on the frontier,

some

policy makers argued, Congress needed to ban unauthorized settlements or run the risk

36

New Haven

Gazette and Connecticut Magazine, Oct.

72

5,

1786.

that the

Northwest Territory would "not only remain

wou'd become a prey

to lawless banditii

profitless to the

and adventurers." 37 As a

United

result, politicians

rushed to pass the Northwest Ordinance of
1787, the constitution of the
effort to

promote social order and

to spur the

States, but

an

territory, in

development of commercial

agriculture.

Federal efforts to control illegal settlements,
which were considered to increase
the possibility of tensions with natives in the

throughout the 1780s. For instance,

Upper Ohio Valley, remained

in the spring

of 1785

limited

Mingo Bottoms,

at

prior to the

passage of the Northwest Ordinance, federal troops clashed
with the squatter leader

Joseph Ross. Ross defied the authorities and told the commanding
officer Ensign

Armstrong

that

"he was determined

house he would build six more
arrested.

The remaining

move back

to

hold his possession, and

in the course

illegal settlers

should destroy his

of a week." After a long argument Ross was

were ordered

to destroy their properties

and

south of the Ohio. Yet federal officers like Armstrong also realized the

of their mission, as they saw squatters migrating
fifties" in

if I

defiance of Congressional orders.

to "the unsettled countries

Many of these

by

intruders already

to

futility

forties

and

had been

previously removed from public lands. But with only two to three hundred soldiers
stationed throughout the entire Northwest Territory in the 1780s, federal officials were in

no position

to enforce their authority.

38

Delegates to Gov. Benjamin Harrison, Nov.

Members of the

1,

1783, in

Edmund Burnett,

ed., Letters

of

Continental Congress, 8 vols. (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie

of Washington, 1921-36), 7: 365. See also Washington to James Duane,
September 7, 1783, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of George Washington

Institution

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), 27: 133-6.
no

Ensign John Armstrong

Ohio

in the

to Col. Josiah

Harmar, April

12, 1785, in

Archer Hulbert,

ed.,

Time of Confederation, (Marietta: Marietta Historical Commission, 1918),
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Many administrators
settlers,

continued to believe that white squatters,
as well as legal

could threaten their Indian policy through
acts of unofficial violence. Several

observers of the Ohio frontier pointed out
that illegal settlements along with
violent

provocations by backcountry settlers from
Kentucky and Pennsylvania, spurred
aggression by Native Americans. In the

summer of

1787,

Henry Knox described

this

volatile situation in a report to the Continental
Congress:

The deep rooted

prejudices, and malignity of heart, and conduct,
reciprocally entertained and practiced on all
occasions by the Whites and

Savages will ever prevent their being good neighbours.
The one side
anxiously defend their lands which the other avariciously
claims.

With
minds previously inflamed the slightest offence occasions
death - revenge
follows which knows no bounds. The flames of
merciless war are thus
39
lighted up which involve the innocent and helpless with
the guilty.

As Knox

indicated, chronic small scale warfare between

American Indians and whites

continued to haunt the Ohio valley throughout the early national period.

American

settlers'

image of Native Americans served

of unofficial violence and ethnic cleansing.

settlers' acts

imagined the Upper Ohio Valley,

Henry Harrison,
its

"state

in the

promote and justify the

A considerable number of them

words of Indiana

territory

governor William

as "one of the fairest portions of the globe" that had to be uplifted from

of nature, the haunt of a few wretched savages."40 Furthermore, many

Americans throughout the revolution and
threat. Settler

107; see also

the early national period

saw Indians

as a

views of Native Americans would become increasingly racialized

Harmar

to the President

and Harmer to Knox, July
39

to

Report of the Secretary

of Congress,

May

1,

1785,

St.

in the

Clair Papers, 2: 3-5;

12, 1786, in ibid., 2: 14.

War to

Congress, July 10, 1787, in TPUS, 2: 31. See also St.
Clair to Knox, Jan. 27, 1788, in ibid., 2: 89-91; and Symmes to Jonathan Dayton, May
18-20, 1789, in
40

Quoted

in

at

Symmes, 78-79; Knox

John Sugden, Tecumseh:

to

Washington, June 15, 1789, ASPIA,

A Life (New
74

2, 1: 12-14.

York: Henry Holt, 1998), 215.

first

the

decades of the nineteenth century. For
many white

settlers

by

this point,

American writer Herman Melville, "the red
man" had become "a

behalf mercy were not wisdom; truce

To

the concern of

some

creature, ,n

particular,

in their

whose

not vain; he must be executed."41

is

Americans as they had done during the American

Revolution. During one of many campaigns, Kentucky
militiamen killed

Piankashaw Indians

to

federal officials, backcountry militia in
the 1780s struck

as indiscriminately against Native

friendly

according

in their village

on the Wabash

wrote Secretary of War Henry Knox

attachment to the United States."42

Two

in

river.

at least nine

These Indians

in

ii

June of 1789, had "prided themselves

years earlier, in the

summer of

1786, and

without the approval of the federal government, General
George Rogers Clark and

Colonel Benjamin Logan led two independent expeditions against
American Indian

towns and villages north of the Ohio

who were

The two missions

infuriated federal officers,

unable to stop them. Logan and some 900 backcountry fighters from Kentucky

led an especially destructive

attack

river.

campaign

on Mequashaketown on the

Mad

into

Shawnee

river,

territory that year.

which humiliated

Logan ordered an

federal officials.

The

town's chief, Moluntha, had been friendly with the Americans, and had signed the Great

Miami

treaty in late January of the

unawares. Militia

men

same

year.

Moluntha and

his followers

were caught

destroyed their crops, burned the town, and shot several of the

1

For Melville quote see White, The Middle Ground, 389. On this issues see also
Perkins, Border Life, 173-174; and Elise Marienstras, "The Common Man's Indian: The
Image of the Indian as Promoter of National Identity in the Early National Era," in Native

Americans and the Early Republic, 261-296.
42

Knox to Washington, June 15, 1789, in ASPIA, 1: 12-14. See also Major John
Hamtramck to Josiah Harmar, August 31, 1788, in Gayle Thornbrough, ed. Outpost on

the Wabash, J 787- 1791 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1957), 114-117.
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who were

villagers

negotiations, but

Miami

treaty.

Even

fleeing in shock.

Moluntha

was shot down holding on

to

massacre through

an American flag and a copy of the Great

43

after the decisive defeat

of an alliance of Ohio Indian groups by U.S.

military in the 1790s, which, as discussed in

undermined Native Americans' capacity

made by

tried to avert the

more

detail later in the chapter, significantly

for military resistance in the region, pledges

federal representatives that they will "punish any
white

or in any

manner

injure

Man, who

shall.

1

790s and

1

citizens

game and

livestock of Indian neighbors, and illegally occupied their lands. 45

robbed and sometimes murdered Native Americans, recurrently

Acts of unofficial

Indians

43

who

settler

violence increased again during the

to

often not directed against anti-American factions

Knox, Nov.

15, 1786, in St. Clair

Papers,

detailed discussion of the treaty negotiations at the Great
44

See Dearborn

to

Buckongahelas, January

10, 1803,

Relating to Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, (microfilm
75, National Archives,
45

2:

Turner,

May

1 1,

St.

the

who

Ohio

lived in

For a more

see chapter 4.

Records of the Secretary of War

Ml 5),

301-2, Record Group

roll 1,

Washington D.C.

See for example Secretary Sargent

Papers,

among

2: 18-19.

Miami

killed

War of 1812.

sided with the British. Instead they targeted Native Americans

Colonel Harmar

kill

800s as some

American

was

.

any of his red Children" were often empty promises. 44
Unofficial

white violence in the region continued throughout the

Vigilante activity

.

to

Judge McMillan, September

328; Sargent to Pierce, September

8,

1794, in

ibid.,

327;

8,

1794,

St.

St. Clair to

Clair

Judge

25, 1795, in ibid., 2: 351; The Centinel of the North-Western Territory, 4,

25 July, 1795 and 5 September 1795; General Wayne to St. Clair, June 5, 1795,
Clair Papers, 2: 374-375; St. Clair to Wayne, June 11, 1795, ibid., 2: 375-377; St.
18,

Clair to

James Smith, June

4, 1800, ibid., 2:

the Territorial Legislature at the

November
6, 13

5,

495-496. "Address of Governor

Opening of the Second Session

1800, ibid, 2: 503-504; Scioto Gazette, 21, 28

August 1804, and June

4, 1807;
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Clair to

at Chillicothe,"

May

1803, 4

The Western Spy, 20 July and

17 April 1807.

St.

1

,

25 June 1803,

August 1803, and

the vicinity of white settlements in the
in detail in chapter
4,

had pursued

Upper Ohio Valley and who,

strategies

post-Treaty of Greenville years. Several

for reasons explored

of accommodation with the Americans

letters

by American

citizens in the region

in the

had

praised the "improvements" of "civilization" that
had occurred in these Indian towns,

and contended

that such native

Frontier Inhabitants."

Over

against the Americans

communities had become "a watchful safeguard

three thousand of these

when

hostilities

American

settlers

our

Ohio Indians did not take up arms

broke out in 1812. In

United States' war effort as informers, scouts and

to

fact,

many

assisted the

soldiers. Despite these actions,

used the turmoil created by the war to target these Indians. 46

During the War of 1812 many American

When

United States

some

other groups to

officials relocated

Miami County,

settlers feared

members of the

friendly

the white public there

Native American attacks.

Delaware nation and of

was outraged. Over

fifty

signers of a petition lobbied Ohio's wartime governor Return Meigs to intervene
on their
behalf, charging the Indians with being able to pass on information to the enemy, which

put "the people of the neighbourhood ... in a dangerous situation."47 In
Philadelphia, in the

Muskingum

fighting, a significant

Settlers

New

river valley region, a considerable distance from the

number of white

settlers

of the Frontier Counties of Ohio

to

was concerned

that the

impoverished

Madison, September 25, 1808, Letters

Received by the Secretary of War, Registered Series (microfilm M221), roll 25, 8147,
Record Group 107, National Archives, Washington D.C. See also Citizens of Dayton to

Edmunds, '"A Watchful Safeguard to Our
Habitations:' Black Hoof and the Loyal Shawnees" in Native Americans and the Early
the President, ibid, roll 27, 8933; and R. David

Republic, 162-199.
47

Uriah Blug

et. al.

to

Meigs, February

3,

1812, Return Meigs Papers, Ohio Historical

Columbus. For Indian scares in other communities see for example Petition of
the Inhabitants of the Town of Danbury, County of Huron, June 3, 1812, ibid.
Society,
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Moravian mission of Goshen, the home of no
more than twenty

Indians,

a staging ground to attack the surrounding
American settlements. In the

many of New

Philadelphia's citizens were keen "to embrace
the

destroy" the mission and
left for

military duty.

kill

first

would be used

summer of

as

1812,

opportunity to

the Christian Indians before the
detachment of local militia

Though no bloodshed

mob

occurred, a

insisted

on searching the

settlement despite repeated reassurances by the
missionary, Benjamin Mortimer, that no

enemy

Indians were be harbored at Goshen. Mortimer
explained white resentments and

threats directed against the mission as being
motivated

however," the missionary continued "that
spirit against the Indians in general,

it

by

proceeds also

fear. "It

in part,

cannot be denied,

from the blood

by which many persons appear to be actuated."48

Despite repeated assertions and acts of friendship by those Ohio
Indians
refused to join the anti-American alliance, distrust, fear, and land
hunger led

American

settlers to strike against

squatters onto the lands of friendly

1812.

49

Militia detachments

friendly Native

Americans -

them. The

illegal

who

some

movement of Anglo American

Ohio Indians increased noticeably during

and American
at

thirsty

the

settlers also attacked several parties

times killing, wounding, or arresting them.

War of

of

One of the

Indian agents in the region, John Johnston, admitted that he had increasingly "great
difficulty in preserving the lives of those

who had come

to

me

for protection."

He was

Benjamin Mortimer to Meigs, August 1, 1812, Return Meigs Papers, Ohio Historical
Society, Columbus; Mortimer to Meigs, August 8, 1812, in ibid; and Mortimer to Meigs,
August 21, 1812, in ibid.
49

See for example Benjamin Stickney

Major General John Gano, December, 1813 in
Quarterly Publication of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, 18 (1923), 1011; John Johnston to Thomas Worthington, January 3, 1812, Thomas Worthington
Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus.
to
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also forced to send speeches to
friendly

Ohio Indian

factions warning that white

settlements constituted no safe places
for Indians. Ohio Indians
States forces as scouts and soldiers
militia

was

injured during a failed assassination attempt

States militia sacked several friendly Native

fields,

and

They

stole horses.

50

trailblazers for territorial

States, the

by

Shawnee chief Black Hoof,

a white soldier. Furthermore, United

American towns and

villages, destroying

also killed or seized friendly Indians' cattle

Such

acts

the United

were frequently targeted or threatened by
American

men. For instance, while serving the United

cabins and houses.

who joined

of vigilantism functioned

in

and hogs, destroyed

many ways

as

expansion in the early national period, a goal pursued
with

growing efficiency by succeeding federal administrations, which
implemented a policy of
conquest, treaties, and "civilization."

Conquest, Treaties, and "Civilization:" U.S. Indian Policy (1780s-1812)
Like American

settlers, federal officials

supported

territorial

expansion. For

much

of the 1780s, however, several key American policy makers morally opposed the violent

means used by frontiersmen
demands. As a solution

to force

to the

American Indians

dilemma, these

indigenous peoples through negotiations and

officials

treaties.

to accept white territorial

advocated dispossession of

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787

affirmed this understanding by stating that "the utmost good faith shall always be

observed toward the Indians. Their lands and property

50

Johnston to Eustis,

May

12, 1812,

Ml 5, roll 46,

shall

never be taken from them

quote 1064-6, National Archives;

Worthington to Eustis, June 24, 1812, ibid., 49, 3921-3; Worthington to Eustis,
September 11,1812, ibid., roll 49, 4105; Stickney to Armstrong, July 8, 1813, M221, roll
57, 1201-6, National Archives; see also Edmunds, "A Watchful Safeguard," 186-187.
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without their consent." 51 At the same
time, as Erie Hinderaker points out,
the ordinance

demonstrated the United States' commitment

to land acquisition

and to undermining

Native American sovereignty. 52

The processes of colonization and dispossession
accompanied by a

rhetoric of good intentions shaped

which dominated Indian-white
policy

relations

in the

Upper Ohio Valley were

by the policy of "civilization,"

from the 1780s

to the 1810s.

was promulgated by such high ranking government

officials as

The

civilization

George

Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Henry Knox. As Bernard
Sheehan and Anthony

Wallace argue, these men believed

that

by changing the circumstances under which

Native Americans lived, by educating them
"civilized culture," Indians could

in

what American administrators described

become incorporated

into white society.

as

At the same

time, both authors emphasize that such publicly stated benevolent
visions played an

ambiguous

role in the construction of racial order in the

federal policy-makers proved quite willing to

authorized by Congress,"

when they grew

Upper Ohio Valley. For one,

make use of "just and

frustrated with

lawful wars

Ohio Indians'

cessions and the expansion of white settlement in the early

1

resistance to land

790s. Secondly, and despite

the government's assurances of its benevolence, treaties and civilization policy

became

the primary tools for transferring indigenous lands to white ownership. 53

For the text of the Northwest Ordinance see for example Peter Onuf, Statehood and
Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1987), 60-64.

Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 242-244.
53

Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction; Wallace Jefferson and the Indians.
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American Indian policy northwest of the Ohio
River was

especially confusing in

the years immediately following the
Revolution. Officials argued that the United
States

had legitimately obtained the area between the
Appalachian Mountains and the
Mississippi through the Treaty of Paris
(1783) from Britain.

Still, to

give their territorial

claims greater legitimacy, American policy-makers
attempted to convince Ohio Indian

groups to cede their land through various

Shawnee

leaders gave into

treaties.

American pressures and signed

1785 and the Great Miami treaty of 1786. These
the territory of the

modern

Some Delaware, Wyandot, and

state

of Ohio

to the

the Ft.

Mcintosh

treaties transferred

treaty of

about two thirds of

Americans, leaving only the northwestern

corner of the state to Native Americans. The border between the two
peoples was
delineated by the Treaty of Greenville

As discussed more

later

54
(1

795).

extensively in chapter 4, Native Americans in the Upper Ohio

Valley saw the United States'

territorial

demands

as non-binding because they considered

themselves undefeated by the Americans. In their efforts to strengthen their claims to
sovereignty, factions

among

the

Miami, the Delaware, the Shawnee, the Wyandot, the

Iroquois Confederacy, and several Great Lakes Indian groups established an Ohio Indian

Confederacy, which advocated resistance against white settlement expansion north of the

Ohio River. Due
1790s,

it

military

to the

would take

campaigns

United States' weak military position

the federal

1780s and early

government almost another ten years and three major

to secure the borders

it

had demanded

Great Miami.

For the two

in the

treaties see Kappler, Treaties, 2: 6-8, 16-18.
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at Ft.

Mcintosh and

at the

Officials like

legal

had

Henry Knox

ownership over the western

to

be compensated for

that "policy

insisted that

territories,

even though Native Americans had no

they

contended that "the dignity and

interest

at

to use these lands,

and

other bureaucrats maintained

peaceful negotiations with Indians. They

of the nation," obliged the United States

benevolent on these issues and that "blood and
nation."

had a right

Knox and

this "custodianship."

and justice" required an attempt

still

injustice,

would

be

to

stain the character

of the

55

From

the 1780s to the 1810s, the policy of civilization
played an integral part in

Indian-United States relations. Through difficult and patient

efforts,

American

officials

believed, white reform efforts could help to change and "uplift"
a "barbarous race."

Knox, whose

beliefs

presume

American Indians could not conform

that

To

were shaped by Enlightenment thought and ethnocentric values,
to the "superior"

to

way of life of Anglo-

Americans, was "to suppose the human character under the influence of such stubborn
habits as to be incapable of melioration and or change

-

a supposition entirely

contradicted by the progress of society from the barbarous ages to
perfection."

to provide

56

Knox wrote

them with

to

Ohio Indians

"all the blessings

in April

of civilized

the Indians that he

would send missionaries

cultivate the earth,

and

its

present degree of

of 1792 that the United States wanted
life."

to teach

The Secretary of War promised

them

raise corn; to raise oxen, sheep,

Christianity and

how

"to

and other domestic animals;

build comfortable houses, and to educate your children, so as ever to dwell upon the

Knox

to

Washington, 15 June 1789, inASPIA,

Knox

to

Washington, July

7,

\7S9, ASPIA,

82

1:

1:

12-14.

52-54.

to

land."

57

Furthermore, United States policy-makers
believed that a switch to

agriculture

more lands

and the raising of livestock among Native
American

societies

ow

pi,

would open up

to white settlement. 58

Early in 1789, in an effort to avoid a costly
war, Secretary of War Henry

Knox

attempted to revitalize treaty negotiations with
Ohio Indians over the border between the

United States and Indian country.

He

ordered American officials once again to attempt
to

convince Ohio Indian groups to sign a treaty that would
confirm the boundaries
established

by the

treaties

Indians accepted the Fort

of Fort Mcintosh and the Great Miami. Predictably, some
Ohio

Harmar Treaty of

1789.

compensations and signed the document. But

They took

a majority

the government's gifts and

of the Upper Ohio Valley's

I

Native American groups remained again absent from the negotiations,
and refused to
accept the legitimacy of the treaty. Their resistance, argued Knox,
would lead to war but

now

"the evils of it

may be justly

charged to the Indians." 59

The opening of the land north of the Ohio River
Northwest Ordinance, led

to

an increase in retaliatory Native American

caused a growing number of members of officials

subdue the Indians

to

Knox

to the

to white settlers through the

in the region.

60

to

Ohio

4, 1792,

tribes,

which

advocate the use of coercive means

Federal policy-makers reminded

Northwestern Indians, April

argument see also Washington
Washington, 35: 194-5.

to

strikes,

ASPIA,

governor

230. For a similar

1:

Nov. 29, 1796,

territorial

in Writings

of George

CO

See for example Wallace, Jefferson and the Indians; Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction.
59

Secretary of War to

St.

St. Clair,

January

5,

1789, in

St.

Clair Papers, 2: 107-108. See also

Clair to the Secretary of War, January 18, 1789, in ibid., 2: 108-109.
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Arthur

St.

Clair that "every exertion must be

combinations
resistance.

among

the tribes" to

As many Ohio

federal policy-makers

to the

made

to defeat all confederations

undermine Ohio Indians' capabilities for
military

Indians continued to stay

came

and

away from

to argue that a military strike

was

treaty negotiations,

more

the only viable option left

United States to obtain Indian lands. 61 Secretary
of State Thomas Jefferson also

supported a military strike against the northwestern
Indians.

"I

hope we

shall

drub the

Indians well this summer." 62 Hence, American
policy-makers concluded that a decisive
attack had to be directed against the

Ohio Indian Confederacy. Only an aggressive

intervention by the state, believed a growing

number of officials, could

establish the

desired transfer of land in the region.

The two major
failures for the

mostly

military expeditions in the early 1790s turned out to be
humiliating

Americans. In the

fall

of 1790, Colonel Josiah Harmar and 1500

militia, set out to destroy the Indian settlements in northwestern

Indiana.

American troops succeeded

and towns

at the

head of the

been evacuated by

in

Maumee

their inhabitants.

soldiers,

Ohio and

parts of

burning and destroying Native American crops

river in Indiana.

But the communities already had

A coalition of Indian

fighters

from the region, on the

other hand, succeeded in leading two detachments of Harmar's troops into ambushes. The

0

On

Indian violence against whites see for example Harmar to the Secretary of War,
July 12, 1786, St. Clair Papers, 2: 15; Major Hamtramck to St. Clair, April 19, 1790,

John May, The Western Journals ofJohn May: Ohio Company Agent and
Business Adventurer, ed. Dwight Smith (Cincinnati: Historical and Philosophical Society
of Ohio, 1961), quote 64, see also 38, 49, 94, 105, 144, 147-148, 150-151.
ibid., 2: 135;

61

Secretary Charles Thomson's instructions to

the Secretary of War, July 16, 1788,

War, September
62

St.

St. Clair,

ASPIA,

Clair Papers, 2: 58;

St.

1: 9.

See also

St.

Clair to

Clair to the Secretary of

14, 1788, ibid., 2: 89.

Jefferson to James Monroe, 17 April 1791, in Paul Ford, ed., The Writings of Thomas

Jefferson, 10 vols.

(New York: G.

P.

Putnam's Sons, 1892-99),

84

5:

319.

American troops suffered almost 200
aspirations to

Clair

casualties and withdrew. 63

undermine Ohio Indian resistance rested with
the

- a highly decorated

previous year,

St. Clair's

A year later, American

territorial

forces consisted largely of poorly trained
militia. Moreover, St.

Ohio Indians' military

the fourth of November, the poorly guarded

camp of St.

capabilities.

fled in panic. St. Clair

and his regular forces attempted

to escape

from the

On the morning

Clair's advancing forces

overrun in a surprise attack by an estimated 1000
fighters. Struck by

were eventually forced

St.

general during the Revolution. But like
Harmer's troops in the

Clair like Harmar, underestimated

men

governor

to

battle field using a

terror,

most

of

was
militia

defend the camp, but they

breakout charge. For the

second time an outnumbered force of Ohio Indian warriors had defeated
a major

American

military expedition.

soldiers, the

With over 600 dead or missing and almost 300 wounded

United States had experienced

American Indian

force.

its

biggest defeat yet at the hand of an

64

After two dramatic defeats, federal policy-makers resumed promoting
negotiations with Native Americans as a

Upper Ohio Valley. They took

means

to obtain their territorial

demands

in the

pains, however, to assure their Indian foes that their

"desire for peace has not arisen in consequence of the late defeat of the troops under

Major General
rhetoric, "the

St. Clair." It

was

rather, according to officials

most decisive proof of the justice and

liberality

who used

benevolent

of the United States toward

the Indian tribes." Whatever the reasons, and as elaborated in chapter 4, between 1792

See Ebenezer Denny, Military Journal of Ebenezer Denny: An Officer in the
Revolutionary and Indian Wars (New York: Arno Press, 1971), 140-149.
64

2:

campaign see St. Clair to Knox, November
262-267; and Denny, 163-171.

For

St. Clair's

85

9,

1791, in

St.

Clair Papers,

and the spring of 1794, the War Department
sponsored several diplomatic missions

to

negotiate with the Ohio Indians. But
reassured by their earlier successes,
native leaders

continued to insist on the Ohio to serve as a
dividing-line between white and Indian
settlements.

To American

officials

who were

eager to obtain

new

territory, this

boundary

was unacceptable. 65
If nothing else, the diplomatic missions
gave the federal

reorganize

its

efforts to

government time

conquer the lands north of the Ohio River. At the same
time as

Americans were negotiating with the Ohio Confederacy, they
were
fight another

to

also getting ready to

campaign against them. This time the command of the American
troops

Anthony Wayne. Unlike

called his "Legion," an

Wayne

to

his predecessors,

army of 3,000

Wayne

regulars

and

disciplined and drilled

militia

men,

for over

fell

what he

two

years.

also strengthened and expanded the existing infrastructure of
forts in the

Northwest

territory, to

summer of
and crops.

guarantee efficient supply lines for his campaign. During the

1794, Wayne's Legion brought destruction to Ohio Indian towns, villages,

On August 20,

at

a place remembered as Fallen Timbers, a heavily

outnumbered Ohio Indian force challenged the American advance. The Indians faced a
disastrous defeat, and retreated in panic to the British Fort

assistance

from

their allies.

The

British,

arms and goods and had encouraged
help. British officers in

who had

Miami

in

hopes of obtaining

supplied the Ohio Confederacy with

resistance to United States expansion, refused to

North America had been ordered

to

avoid any escalations with

the Americans because negotiations were underway between Britain and the United

"Speech from the Secretary of War, to
in ASPIA, 1: quote 230. See also ASPIA,

the

all
1:

Sachems and Warriors of the

146, 166, 169, 230, 319-320, 323.
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Tribes...,"

States that eventually led to Jay's
Treaty and a British promise to
withdraw troops from
territory

claimed by the United

As we
marked

will explore in

more

66

detail in chapter 4, the Battle

the end of native resistance in the

Abandoned by
had

States.

little

their British allies

and

Upper Ohio Valley

militarily defeated

of Fallen Timbers

for over a decade.

by the Americans, Ohio Indians

choice but to submit to United States demands.
Thus, in July and August of

1795, Ohio Indian representatives gathered at Fort Greenville
for treaty negotiations with

General

Wayne who was

For American

the leading government representative at
the talks.

officials, the Treaty

of Greenville was not only a tool to obtain

Native American land and to subjugate native groups
north of the Ohio River, but
also integral to

was

American policy makers' perceptions of their benevolence. Historian

Andrew Cayton observes
river,

it

"American

that in their efforts to extend their control north

officials genuinely believed that their

of the Ohio

triumph was incomplete without

the defeated tribes' public acknowledgement of its essential justice." 67

The American government used
obtain the territorial demands

it

the negotiations at Greenville as a

had made

in the treaties

way to

finally

of the 1780s. The "foundation"

of the Treaty of Greenville was the Treaty of Fort Harmar (1789), which according

Wayne had been "founded upon the
territorial losses that

Ohio

opened up

all

principles of equity

and justice." Yet for

but the northwestern corner of the

to white settlement as well as significant parts

modern

their

state

of Indiana, American Indian

66

to

of

tribes

For an account of the battle of Fallen Timber see Wayne to Knox, August 28, 1794,
Richard Knopf, ed., Anthony Wayne: A Name in Arms (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1960), 351-355. This paragraph is drawn from the letters in this volume.
67

Cayton, '"Noble Actors upon the Theatre of Honor'," 239.
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received a mere $20,000 "beyond" the
previous $9,000 received as compensation
in
1789.

The

in goods.

federal

But

government also promised Ohio Indians annuities
of $9,500

to reinforce the apparent tensions

during the negotiations,

Wayne

left

it

to the

and

rifts

to

be paid

displayed by the Ohio Indians

American Indian nations

to

work

out on

how

to divide these spoils. 68

The crushing of Ohio Indian

and the Treaty of Greenville had multiple

resistance

implications for United States' Indian policy. Increased
security spurred the migration of

white
the

settlers

north of the Ohio river, which soon strained existing
land resources, and led

government

to purchase

more Indian land through

efforts to "civilize" the Indians took

"civilization"

had been an

on a new

intrinsic part

life

several

as well,

new

treaties.

American

even though a discourse about

of official rhetoric for

at least

a decade. With the

dramatically changed situation north of the Ohio River, the "civilization
program" to

change the Indians could be moved from theory

into practice. Annuities, to

goods, services, and livestock, became the main tool to achieve

As

this objective.

the nineteenth century began, officials of the Federalist Party were

increasingly replaced by supporters of Jefferson. Unlike Federalists

degree of disdain for squatters and backcountry
idealized picture of them.

frontier settlers

farmers.

68

be paid in

They believed

settlers,

who

Jeffersonians painted a

that with the easy availability

would become members of a

self-reliant

expressed a

more

of land, white

and prosperous class of yeoman

69

For the negotiations

at the

Treaty of Greenville see ASPIA,

69

1

:

562-583

See for example Andrew Cayton, The Frontier Republic: Ideology and Politics
Ohio Country, 1780-1825 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1986), 51-67.
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in the

But

in

terms of federal Indian policy

power gradually

shitted

War Henry Knox
1

from the Federalists

in earlier years,

Thomas

little

substantive change occurred as political

to the Jeffersonians.

Like the Secretary of

Jefferson, president of the United States from

801 to 1809, asserted the United States' commitment to "civilization." In

had supported many of the

earlier policies. Like other

fact, Jefferson

Enlightenment thinkers Jefferson

ignored the existence of agriculture in Eastern Woodland society, work that was mostly

performed by native women, and argued
state." Therefore,

had remained

that the Indians

in "the hunter's

he believed, "humanity enjoins" the United States "to teach" American

Indians "agriculture and the domestic arts." Jefferson assumed that such efforts would

bring Native Americans "to that industry which would enable them to maintain their
place in existence and to prepare them in time for that state of society which to bodily

comfort adds the improvement of the mind and morals."

70

Missionaries became a major instrument for spreading "civilization"

Native Americans, functioning in

many ways

as agents of colonial expansion. According

to official rhetoric, missionaries should serve as "friends

Americans. David Zeisberger wrote
Indians, establish schools

instruct

them

that missionaries

among them,

to live a quiet

and fathers"

life in all

to

Native

needed "to preach the gospel

inculcate habits of industry

and peaceable

among

and

sobriety,

to the

and

godliness and honesty."

Missionaries such as the Moravians, Quakers, Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists, and a

Second Inaugural Address, in James Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 20 vols. (New York: Bureau of National
and Weas, January
Literature, 1897-1917), 1: 368; Jefferson to the Miamis, Potawatomis
70

Jefferson's

7, 1802,
71

M15,

roll 1,

142-143, National Archives.

David Zeisberger, Benjamin Mortimer and John Heckewelder

1798, in

St.

Clair Papers,

2:

433-434.
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to St. Clair,

October 28,

.

variety of other denominations

worked

to bring the

Husbandry and some of the most necessary
also

damaged

arts

Ohio Indians "a knowledge of

of civil

life."

the fabric of Native American
societies. This

72

However,

became

their efforts

especially the case in

the Northwest Territory after 1795, where
Native Americans faced increasingly
limited
options. Furthermore, and as

Henry Bowden and George Tinker argue,
missionaries

labored with a fervor on the assumption of
their Christian cultural superiority,
and argued
that

American Indians had

to "assimilate" to

Anglo-American standards. 73

Yet, despite a dramatically changed balance of
power, American Indians did not
blindly

told

succumb

to

missionary pressures. The Wyandot chief John Hicks,
for example,

John Stewart an African American missionary

at

Upper Sandusky

in the 1820s:

myself called upon to rise in defence of the religion of my
fathers; -- a system of religion the Great Spirit has
given his red children,
as their guide and the rule of their faith, and we are not
going to abandon it
so soon as you might wish; we are contended with it because it
suits our
conditions and is adapted to our capacities. Cast your eyes abroad
over the
world, and see how many different systems of religion there are in it.
I

for one, feel

.

say this

is

work of the Lord. No, my friend, your declaiming so
our modes of worshipping the Great Spirit, is, in my

not the

violently against

opinion, not calculated to benefit us as a nation;

we

are willing to receive

good advice from you; but we are not willing to have the customs and
institutions which have been kept sacred by our Fathers, thus assailed and
abused.

72

Philip

74

Thomas

to

Thomas Worthington, November 20,

1

808,

Thomas Worthington

Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus.
73

Henry Bowden, American Indians and Christian Missions: Studies in Cultural Conflict
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), see especially 163-178. See also
George Tinker, Missionary Conquest: The Gospel and Native American Cultural
Genocide (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), see especially chapter 1.
74

For Hick's quote see Joseph Mitchell, The Missionary Pioneer, or a Brief Memoir of
the Life, Labours, and Death ofJohn Stewart, (Man of Colour) Founder, Under God of
the Mission among the Wyandots at Uppper Sandusky, Ohio New York: J.C. Totten,
1827), 31-32.
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Furthermore, several Indian leaders
welcomed the presence, advice, and
assistance of the
missionaries in their peoples' continuing
efforts to shape the colonial
racial order

Ohio region

The
different

in the

post Treaty of Greenville years in
the Upper Ohio Valley.

realities

when

in the

behind the lofty rhetoric of "civilization"
policy proved

to

be quite

they played out on the ground. United
States officials repeatedly failed to

deliver plows, hoes, guns, or to provide the
services of blacksmiths, which they
had

agreed to furnish the indigenous peoples of the
Old Northwest as part of their annuities.
Native American leaders too, complained about
the poor quality, as well as damaged
and
belated goods, which they received from the
government in accordance with the treaties.

Moreover, American Indian leaders grumbled

that

United States policy-makers gave

them fewer annuities and horses than promised. 75
For Jeffersonians, acquisition of indigenous lands had become
a crucial

component of the

"civilization" policy. Throughout the

States officials purchased even

transfers

it

decade of the 1800s, United

more Indian land north of the Ohio

were made possible through

communities who found

first

a series of treaties, signed

River. These land

by Native American

hard to subsist on their shrinking land base with the small

annuities provided by the United States government. Native Americans groups like the

Wyandots of Upper Sandusky, who remained opposed

to selling their lands,

soon

felt

the

diplomatic pressures of American officials to cede land. The Wyandots reminded United
States policy-makers that they had complied with

75

American demands. They had made

Buckongahelas and others, Jan. 10, 1803, Ml 5, roll I, 301-2, National
Archives; Dearborn to Little Turtle and other Indian Chiefs, Jan. 7, 1802, ibid., roll I,

Dearborn

to

135-7; Little Turtle to Dearborn, Jan.

June

3,

1809,

ibid., roll

7,

1802,

2,438.

91

ibid., roll 1,

138-143. Eustis to Johnston,

"improvements" on

their land,

had

built "valuable houses,"

the plough." Pointing to the hypocrisy
in
that "if you really

want

American

to ameliorate our condition.

and had "learned the use of

officials'

.

.

let

demands they pointed

out

us have the land given to us." 76

Despite Native American complaints,
United States officials continued to mask
the acquisition of Indian land in a
humanitarian language. For instance,
Jefferson

explained to the
to

Miami

chief Little Turtle that he "always
believed in an act of friendship

our red brethren whenever they wished to

buy whether we wanted them or

not,

sell

a portion of their lands, to be ready to

because the price enables them to improve the
lands

they retain, and turning their industry from hunting
77
to agriculture."
American strategies
for Indian dispossession

territorial

were more shrewd than Jefferson suggested. In a

governor of the Indiana

letter to the

William Henry Harrison, in February, 1803,

territory,

he wrote that "we shall push our trading houses, and be glad to
see the good and
influential individuals

that

lop

when

among them

these debts get

[Native Americans] run into debt, because

we

observe

beyond what the individuals can pay, they become willing

to

them off by a cession of land." 78

As with

previous conflicts in the Upper Ohio Valley, the

only accompanied, as discussed

earlier,

violence against Native Americans.

by

unofficial, but also

As American

War of 1812 was not

by

officially sanctioned

administrators increasingly predicted

76

Wyandots to the President and Congress, Feb. 5, 1812, in ASPIA, 1: 795-796;
Wyandots to Hull, Sep. 30, 1809, in ibid., 1: 796. For some of the abovementioned
treaties see ibid.,
77

1:

687-696, 747.

Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, 169.
Jefferson to Harrison, Feb. 27, 1803, in

Logan Esarey,

William Henry Harrison, 2 vols. (Indianapolis:
69-73.
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Messages and Letters of
Indiana Historical Commission, 1922),
ed.,

1

the likelihood of war with Britain,

some policy-makers came

of militant factions among the Ohio Indians
as a
instance,

militant

Governor Harrison wrote

Shawnee

who

of War William Eustis about the

along with his brother, the Shawnee
prophet

Tenskwatawa, was building an anti-American
pan-Indian confederacy,
of those

uncommon geniuses which

growing number

threat to United States expansion.
For

to the Secretary

leader Tecumseh,

to see the

that he

was "one

spring up occasionally to produce
revolutions and

overturn the established order of things." 79 Harrison
decided to strike against the pan-

Native American alliance in early November 1811,
months before the outbreak of the war
with Britain in June of 1812. With over 1,000

Prophetstown on the Wabash

river.

80

soldiers,

he staged an attack on

Throughout the War of 1812, the American

government followed the recommendations of the

federal Indian agent in Ohio,

John

Johnston, that the United States should attack and destroy the fields
and towns of enemy
native groups "to cut off their

last large scale

possibility

federal

means of subsistence." 81 Such

military actions crushed the

pan-Indian effort of resistance in the Old Northwest, eliminated the

of large scale

government

to

British military assistance to Native Americans,

push for a white dominated

and enabled the

racial order in the region.

Conclusion

The years
the

79

80

81

that followed the

Upper Ohio Valley,

at

spurred the creation of a racial order in

as United States policy-makers continued to marginalize and

Harrison to Eustis, Aug.

For Battle

War of 1812

7,

181

1,

in Harrison,

1:

549.

Tippecanoe see Harrison to Eustis, Nov.

Johnston to Eustis,

May

12, 1812,

Ml 5,

roll 46,

93

18, 181 1,

ASPIA,

1

:

776-9

1064-6, National Archives.

dispossess indigenous peoples through
additional treaties. Furthermore,
white opposition
to at least a partially multicultural
society that included Native

increasingly entrenched in the region.

blame the Indians'

inability to

More and more now, American

change

to white

norms

policies. Federal administrators argued that
they

what they perceived as

cultural shortcomings

their lands. Gradually, the idea

would be seen
American
there

was

little

made

room

it

had

officials

would

for the implementation of their

to protect

Native Americans from

and from pressures of white settlement on

of removing Ohio Indian groups west of the
Mississippi

as the only remaining

rhetoric

Americans became

way to

solve the "Indian problem." Official

increasingly clear that within the social order
of the region

left for

American

Indians.
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CHAPTER 3
HUMANITARIANS, SETTLERS AND THE STATE: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF

THE EASTERN CAPE

In the southern African Eastern Cape,
as in the

North American Upper Ohio

Valley, territorial expansion, the dispossession
of African land, and indigenous resistance
to colonization

first

played a central

role.

But unlike

in the

Upper Ohio Valley, where

decades of the nineteenth century a society emerged

Americans, local and imperial

interests in the Eastern

that

in the

excluded Native

Cape demanded

the economic

incorporation of Africans whose labor the colony needed.
This chapter examines

how

different white interests groups debated strategies to take
over African lands and the

terms under which black South Africans

As

in the

in the

Eastern Cape would labor for whites.

Upper Ohio Valley, violence became a major

the construction of a system of colonial racial order that

nineteenth century. For instance, as discussed in chapter
colonial forces

tool in the Eastern

became established by
I,

removed independent African nations from

in the

War of

on the eastern side of the

of the Cape. To achieve

river,

which colonial

this goal, officials like

"terrifying" Africans "into

good behaviour."

Quotes

in

As

181 1-12

Cape

Xhosa would

Colonel John Graham were keen on

1

in the

in their efforts to create a

Upper Ohio Valley

Maclennan, A Proper Degree of Terror, 131, 135-136.
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the mid-

authorities declared the official border

Violence was not the only strategy advocated by whites
colonial racial order in the Eastern Cape.

in

the area east of the Fish River

called the Zuurveld. British administrators wanted to be assured that the
stay

Cape

in the late

eighteenth and early nineteenth century,
the

Cape saw

first

half of the nineteenth century in
the

several competing ideas as to what
kind of colonial system should be
created.

This contest was part of a larger ideological
debate among white
officials, missionaries,

settlers, administrators,

and observers of the Cape, who quarreled
over what kind of

colonial racial order should be established.

As

in the

the views that drove this debate were
anything but
the years. Furthermore, in both the Eastern

groups resisted these colonizing

Upper Ohio Valley, the dispute and

They changed

static.

Cape and

the

significantly over

Upper Ohio Valley, indigenous

efforts as they attempted to maintain
their sovereignty.

African and Native American resistance will be discussed
in more detail in Part

III.

A group known as the humanitarians, similarly to Jeffersonian government
officials in the

Upper Ohio Valley, argued

that their policy proposals

toward Africans. The humanitarian movement
director of the

settlers

Cape consisted of men

London Missionary Society (LMS), John

leading missionaries of this organization.

Dutch

in the

and

travelers,

Advertiser John Fairbairn,

It

was

were sympathetic
like the

Philip, as well as several other

also supported

by some English and

such as the editor of the South African Commercial

Thomas

Pringle,

and Andries Stockenstrom,

who had been

influenced by the ideology of liberal humanitarianism. Especially in the 1820s and 1830s,

humanitarians proposed a policy of colonial expansion based on

treaties,

and campaigned

against slavery and coercive labor. In the political discourse of the South African Cape

and of the British empire, humanitarians petitioned

for the rights

white peoples. But as with the Jeffersonian policies

in the

of indigenous and non-

United States discussed in the

previous chapter, the strategies of humanitarians for interacting with indigenous
populations proved quite harmful to them. Despite their rhetoric of good intentions,
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humanitarians aided in the creation of a
colonial racial order in the region
by pushing for
African dispossession and by assisting in
driving the Cape's non-wh,te
population
(consisting of Khoisan, Xhosa, and slaves
from Asia and other parts of Africa)
into labor

agreements that ultimately worked

to their disadvantage. 2

Most members of Eastern Cape
position. For instance, prior to

especially in the western

speaking

settler society

challenged the humanitarian

and during the period of emancipation

Cape where slavery was more prominent, numerous
Dutch

settlers attacked the

humanitarians for their efforts to abolish slavery and
to

reform the colonial labor system, which these farmers saw as
a

pillar

production and wealth. Furthermore, in the years that followed
the
English settler

which

elite in the

in the aftermath

in the early 1830s,

Eastern Cape and

its

of their economic

War of 1834-35,

mouthpiece the Graham

of the conflict saw the Xhosa as a

's

Town

threat, increasingly

the

Journal,

demanded

the military subjugation and the territorial dispossession of Africans.
English colonists,

who

as adherents to a free labor ideology opposed slavery, nonetheless

implementation of harsh labor laws

The

state

and

its

to control

demanded

non- white workers. 3

official representatives

played a crucial role in the creation of a

colonial racial order in the Cape. Several colonial officials, a disproportionate

whom were military officers
sympathetic

2

On this

to,

the

serving as administrators,

demands of the

the

became

allies of,

number of

or were at least

colonial settlers. Settler and humanitarian advocates

example Andrew Bank, "Liberals and their Enemies: Racial
Ideology at the Cape of Good Hope, 1820 to 1850," (Ph.D. Dissertation: Cambridge
University, 1995); Keegan, Colonial South Africa, chapter 4.
issue see for

Crais, White Supremacy', Bank, "Liberals and their Enemies;" Lester, Imperial

Networks.
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attempted to influence both the colonial

state in the

Cape Colony and

the metropole in

Great Britain through their lobbying.
Nevertheless, officials often followed
their

agenda with regard
frontier policy,

and

to issues relating to indigenous

and non-white peoples,

to land, labor,

to the colonial racial order they
aspired to create. Thus, for

the first half of the nineteenth century, the
Eastern

Cape did not witness

own

much of

the emergence of

strong consensus on territorial expansion between
government officials and settlers as

it

occurred in the Upper Ohio Valley. Such developments
led members of the English
settler elite in the Eastern

Cape

to

accuse Great Britain of abandoning the interests
of its

colonists.

Humanitarians.

Settlers,

and the

State: Colonial

Labor Policy

Colonial labor policy toward non-white people
the battle

in the

Cape was a

between humanitarian and pro-settlement ideologues.

central issue in

A close examination of

4

labor policy also underscores the central role of the state in the Cape in
eventually

implementing a colonial

racial order

by the 1850s. The passage of the Caledon Code of

1809, the Ordinance 50 of 1828, and the Master and Servant Ordinance of 1841

demonstrate

how

the state pursued

its

own

interests in creating a colonial racial order in

the region.

Changing an Old Order: Land Tenure, the Caledon Code, and Circuit Courts
British authorities, as several historians point out, sought to create

believed to be an acceptable social order
the nineteenth century. This

was

when

what they

they took over the Cape colony early in

especially the case with the Eastern Cape. Here, British
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officials intended to transform

m

the region. Administrators

and wanted

to

what they perceived as
"disorderliness" and "lawlessness"

were especially concerned about
potential African attacks

change what they saw as the
"primitive" ways of Boer

These

settlers.

perceptions reflected British stereotypes
toward the Dutch speaking settlers
of the Cape .«

One key component of the
was

to

British plan to transform the former

Dutch settlement

change the land tenure system. For most
of the eighteenth and early nineteenth

centunes, as mentioned

,n

chapter one, landholdmg

The loan farm system, allowed

,n the

Cape was based on

colonists to register a land
claim with

little

for the state. British officials believed that
this system of land distribution,
lax to them,

had led the colony

to

expand too qu.ckly and uncontrollably.

frustrated British administrators like

complained

that

it

Governor

reinforced laziness

among

Sir

loan farms.

compensation

winch seemed

It

also

John Cradock (181 1-1814), as they

colonists,

who

allegedly wasted land by

practicing pastoralism instead of European-style
agriculture. British officials also

believed that the existing land tenure system provided
British officials introduced a system based on quit rent

landholders to

make

little

revenue

payments

yearly payments in cash to the colony.

to the colony. Instead

that required

By charging

colonists for

their land, colonial administrators believed, the colonists'
agricultural practices

improve, which, along with the introduction of British
"progressive civilization" and

"common

institutions,

would

would bring

defence" to the eastern parts of the colony. 5 But,

4

These negative perceptions of the region and the Boers were shaped by several late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century travel accounts. See for example John Barrow,
Travels into the Interior of South Africa, 2 vols. (London: Cadell and Davics, 80 );
Andries Sparrman, Travels in the Cape, J 772- J 776, 2 vols. (Cape Town: Van Ricbceck
Society, 1975-76).
1

1

the British failed to realize that
their preferred

correspond with the environmental

modes of agricultural production

realities in the

did not

Eastern Cape, which was a region
more

favorable to herding. Boers on the
periphery of the colony were
irritated by these changes
in the land tenure system,

The Boers were
the Cape,

effect.

even though they were only poorly
enforced.

further antagonized

which had profound

Two

changes

social

British efforts to regulate labor
relations in

and cultural implications beyond

in particular reflect a

the auspices of the colonial state.

by

new

effort to put

economic

master servant relations under

The Caledon Code of 1809

held over Khoisan and slave labor.

their

limited the

power

colonists

A system of circuit courts was established to

implement the law. Official involvement

in these issues were, at least in
part, the result

of

humanitarian lobbying, which for some time had
condemned the harsh treatment of nonwhite laborers.

Dutch-speaking agrarians

in the Eastern

Boers wanted to retain sole authority
state's interference as a violation

Cape

in their dealings

of their

rights

largely

opposed these interventions.

with non-white labor. They saw the

"and an intolerable usurpation of

tyrannical authority." This level of government involvement ran
counter to their interests.

The growing resentment

led

some Dutch speaking

colonists to join the Slagtersneck

rebellion in 1815, a highly disorganized and unsuccessful uprising against
British rule
that

5

was

relatively quickly defeated

See Maclennan,

by the

authorities.

A Proper Degree of Terror,

6

quotes 139-144. See also Crais, White

Supremacy, 58; Leslie Duly, British Land Policy at the Cape, J 795- 1 844: A Study of
Administrative Procedures in the Empire (Durham: Duke University Press, 1968),
chapter 3; Mostert, Frontiers, 398-399.
6

My interpretation in the two paragraphs above has benefited from Thomas Pringle,

Narrative of a Residence

in

South Africa, ed. A.M.L. Robinson (Cape Town: C. Struik,
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Despite the

new

regulations, as

many

historians explain,

Khoisan laborers

obtained few benefits from the
Caledon Code and the circuit courts.
Though both had the

appearance of providing better protection
protest the mistreatment

movement,
colonists.

to

own

to

non-white laborers, by allowing them to

by an employer and by providing
them with greater

officials rarely intervened

on

their behalf

While offering a measure of protection,

land and required them to carry passes

liberty

of

and generally sided with the

the code also denied Khoisans the
right

when

traveling.

It

therefore legally

bolstered the differential treatment of non-whites
based on racial grounds. Furthermore,
in 1812,

Cape

authorities passed a law that children born
to

Khoisan farm laborers must

be apprenticed to farmers for ten years. Thus, the
Caledon Code and the apprenticeship
laws passed by the colonial

non-white labor.

New

Creating a

state effectively aided

white farmers

in their efforts to recruit

7

Colonial Labor System

During the following decades, the problem of coercive labor and slavery
continued to preoccupy political discussions in the Cape. For instance, John Philip of the

London Missionary Society (LMS), whose
Khoisan populations

in the

organization had been active

among

slave and

western and eastern parts of the Cape since the early

nineteenth century, strongly

condemned

the treatment of non-white labor in the colony

1966), quote 67, see 66-75;Testimony of Andrew Stoffel, June 27, 1836, BPP 538/1836,
586-588; Crais, White Supremacy, 58-60; Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 54-56.
7

Elbourne, Blood Ground, 207-208; Maylam, South Africa

Maclennan,

A Proper Degree of Terror,

Crais, White

's

Racial Past, 70-71;

152-153; Keegan, Colonial Soutth Africa, 54-56;

Supremacy, 58-60.
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throughout the 1820s and early
1830s. Philip was a firm believer

He

called

on the government

[d]o

in

London and Cape Town

in free labor ideology.

to

away with

oppression; allow the people to
have a fair price for their
lab °rerS in any art of the Colon
P
y they may choose
for th.
their abode, and the natives
themselves will prefer the advantage
of a
residence among the inhabitants as a
free people to their present
straightened condition at our missionary
settlements, where they must

Ta ^ ^I

always find

it

difficult to find the

means of subsistence." 8

John Fairbairn, the editor of the South
African Commercial Advertiser and Philip's
son
law,

was another leading humanitarian voice

and the treatment of Khoisan

labor.

paid, labor shortages and desertion

in the

in

Cape Colony who denounced slavery

Like Philip he argued that unless higher
wages were

would remain an

issue in the colony. 9 This line of

reasoning acknowledged the point that low wages
paid by white farmers were not
attractive to workers.

But even though Philip and Fairbairn advocated
Khoisan

citizenship rights and fair labor practices, they

mainly

to recreate their idealized version

-

like

most other humanitarians - desired

of Britain's metropolitan social order

in the

Cape. This was a system based on nineteenth-century British middle-class
values and
ideals,

one that challenged African societies
In fact, the

LMS had send Philip to the Cape to clean up its

and colonial administrators

criticized

James Read. Unlike

van der

thrive

among

at their political, social,

Philip,

two of its missionaries, T.

Kemp believed that a

image
van der

Christian

after colonists

Kemp and

community would

slaves and Khoisans only if they were protected from the harmful

South African Commercial Advertiser, Aug.
9

J.

and cultural core.

South African Commercial Advertizer, Feb.

15, 1829.

7,

1829. See also South African Commercial

Advertizer, Jan. 3, 1829. For settler complaints about labor shortage see for example

evidence of Major Dundas and Colonel

Wade BPP 538/1836,

102

128, 290.

influences of metropolitan and
colonial society. This view ran
contrary to
colonists' interests.

many

Farmers complained when the
missionaries preached a message of

equality to slaves and Khoisans.

They

also

saw

the missions as competitors for

Khoisan

labor and charged missionaries
with providing safe havens on their
stations for Khoisan
"laziness and idleness." Furthermore,

some

LMS

missionaries and officials clashed over

the abuses of Khoisan laborers and the
mistreatment of Khoisans active in the
military.

and Read

many

Members of white Cape

society also leveled personal accusations
against

for the relationships they maintained
with non-white

white

settlers, this

Philip

women. According

Kemp
to

was disorderly conduct. 10

and the newer generation of missionaries, on the
other hand, readily

embraced the view

that they

civilization," "free labor,"

volume work

Cape

in

which he

had

to aid the British

Empire

in spreading "Christian

and "free trade." In his Researches
tried to raise

in

South Africa, a two-

awareness about the situation of non-white

laborers in the Cape, Philip wrote of the benefits that
missionaries brought to the
"civilising mission"

of the British empire.

While our missionaries, beyond the borders of the colony of the Cape of
the Good Hope, are everywhere scattering the seeds of civilization,
social
order, and happiness, they are, by the most unexceptionable means,
extending British

and the British empire.
Wherever the missionary places his standard among a savage tribe, their
prejudices against the colonial government give way; their dependence
upon the colony is increased by the creation of artificial wants; so
confidence is restored, intercourse with the colony is established, industry,
interests, British influence,

and agriculture spring up; and every genuine convert among them
made the Christian religion becomes the ally and friend of the colonial
Government."
trade

10

Elbourne, Blood Ground, 211-212, 230-233; Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 83-88.
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2

Such

rhetoric also suggests that
humanitarians implicitly believed that
Africans could

change

to British

the South African

norms of "civilisation." "We know
of nothing," wrote John
Commercial Advertiser, "of which an
Englishman

Fairbairn in

capable of which

is

they are not capable. They have the
same powers of mind, the same virtues,
the same
vices." Like Jeffersonians in

humanitarians
family.

it

was

in Britain

As with

America who adhered

and South Africa believed

to environmentalist theories

humans belonged

that all

Jeffersonians in the United States,
humanitarians in the

the indigenous people that had to change
to the

more

of race,

to the

same

Cape thought

that

ways of the

"civilised"

colonizers, a transformation that could be
accomplished through their adoption of the

Christian faith, and one that

Many

would

aid the imperial agenda. 12

historians argue that the promulgation of the
Ordinance

50 of 1828 by

Lieutenant-Governor Richard Bourke was one of the high points
of humanitarian
lobbying

in the

Cape. The ordinance removed

Khoisan workers by the Caledon Code.

many of the

restrictions

imposed on

allowed Khoisans the right to

It

political

own

as well as to

purchase land, abolished the pass system, and forbade the forcible apprenticeship
of

Khoisan children. These provisions have

led

some

milestone in the history of the Cape. They see
blind," British colonial policy.

11

John

Philip,

Researches

in

it

scholars to describe Ordinance 50 as a

as evidence of an enlightened, "colour

13

South Africa, 2vols.

(New York: Negro

University Press,

1969), 1:IX-X.
1

South African Commercial Advertizer, April 3, 1830. For a direct trans-Atlantic
connection see for example John Philip to J.B. Purney, May 1832, in Letters of the

American Missionaries, 1835-1838,

ed. D.

J.

1950), 28-38.
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Kotze (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society,

Other historians, though certainly
agreeing
rights to the

Cape's non-white working

economic advances which meant
position.

left

Khoisan laborers and

that

(after

that

Ordinance 50 granted certain

class, note that legal

improvements led

most non-whites remained

to

few

in a disadvantageous

emancipation in the early 1830s) freed
slaves were

with few options in the Cape economy
but to

sell their

labor to white farmers.

Exploitation of workers continued after
1828.
In addition, there

is

disagreement over

how much

credit to give humanitarians for

the passage of Ordinance 50. Critics
argue that Ordinance 50 was, at least in
part, the

brainchild of colonial officials

who

believed that

its

passage would alleviate the colony's

"labor shortage" by granting Khoisan workers
greater mobility. Several administrators
also argued that the

Cape should

attract

African laborers from the interior as a

way of

aiding the colony in attracting more labor. Their
arguments spurred the passage of

Ordinance 49 of 1828, which attempted

to regulate the

migration of African workers

from outside the colony. 14
Ordinance 50,

like the state-ordered

emancipation of slaves in the early 1830s,

faced significant protest and opposition from colonists. The missionary James

Kitchingman, for example, observed a

and missionaries

in general,"

"spirit

because white

of persecution directed against Dr. Philip

settlers

blamed them

for the passage of the

13

See for example H.J van Aswegen, South Africa to 1854, (Pretoria: Academica, 1990),
204. See also De Kiewiet, History of South Africa, 46; and J.S. Marais, The Cape
Coloured People (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1962), 157.
14

My analysis in the two paragraphs above benefited from W.M. Macmillan,

The Cape
Colour Question (London: Faber and Gwyer, 1927), 211-213; Susan Newton King, "The
Labour Market of the Cape Colony, 1807-28," in Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial
South Africa, 197-200; and Robert Ross, Beyond the Pale: Essays on the History of
Colonial South Africa (Hanover: University of New England Press, 1993), 102; Keegan,
Colonial South Africa, 103-107.
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new

rules.

15

these laws,

result

it

Dutch-speaking agrarians appealed

which they saw

was harder

to get

as contrary to their

many Dutch speaking

own

throughout the Cape to alter

interests.

They complained

that as a

non-whites to work for them. The
white farmers never

attributed such hardships to the
to the inherent "idleness"

to officials

low wages

that they paid

of Khoisan and former slave

colonists

"The whole Colony loudly

on

this issue, the

non-white employees, but rather

laborers. Reflecting the

views of

Zuid-Afrikaan advocated in an editorial:

calls for certain Rules, or

Legal enactments, whereby

idle

persons, thieves, and vagabonds, are
prevented from living upon the hard earnings
of the
laborious, and are then consequently
indirectly compelled to seek for service,
and for

work." Thus

many Dutch

their efforts to break

"vagrancy" and

Though

to

settlers

demanded

that the colonial state

should aid colonists

in

non-whites from their "idle habits" by passing
legislation against

impose labor

largely

opposed

discipline.

16

to slavery, English settlers in the Eastern

Cape

also

lobbied on the issue of vagrancy. For the most part,
these colonists belonged to a group of

more than 4,000

settlers

who

arrived in the Eastern

Cape

in 1820. Initially, their

settlement and agricultural efforts were disastrously disorganized.
settlers

were ill-prepared

to

Many

of the English

farm in the Eastern Cape and suffered from droughts and the

unpredictability and harshness of the climate.

years following their migration,

They

many became

also lacked essential supplies. In the

craftsmen in the emerging towns in the

James Kitchingman's Journal, 20 July- 31 August, 1830, in Kitchingman Papers:
Missionary Letters and Journals, 1817 to 1848, eds. Basil leCordeur and Christopher
Saunders, (Johannesburg: The Brenthurst Press, 1976), 101-102.
16

De Zuid-Afrikaan, May 3,

1

839, in Afrikaner Political Thought: Analysis

&

Documents, vol. 1, 1780-1850, eds. Andre du Toit and Hermann Giliomee,(Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 75.
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Eastern

Cape or switched

merchants

who

to pastoral

forms of agriculture. Others
became traders and

participated in profitable business
interactions with Africans living

beyond the border of the colony.

The Graham

's

1

Town Journal, founded

in

183

the views of the English settlers
in the Eastern Cape.

1

by Robert Godlonton,

The newspaper

articulated

retroactively

attacked the passage of Ordinance
50 and lobbied the Cape government
under Governor

Benjamin D'Urban (1834-1838)

to pass the

Vagrancy

Law

of 1834. The Cape needed

vagrancy laws, wrote the Graham s Town
Journal, because Khoisan laborers had an
"insurmountable aversion to labour" and preferred
a "wandering kind of life." These
"evils" of "idleness" caused "losses to
which our farmers are subject

by bands of vagrants

which roam unmolested and unquestioned about
the country." Financial damages reached
"in the aggregate an

amount which

absence of vagrancy laws led

is

truly alarming."

to social disorder

18

English

settlers

believed that the

and labor shortage. Hence, the

"enactment" of such laws would be the "salutary measure,
which should secure

to the

19
industrious, whether white or black, the fruits of their
labour."

Even though

the Colonial Office in

Law of 1834,

Vagrancy
employers

London eventually

the following decades

to tighten their control over their

saw

struck

down

the Cape's

the passage of legislation that enabled

non-white employees. The unsuccessful

See for example W. Bird, State of the Good Hope in 1822 (Cape Town: C. Struick,
1966), 178- 183; see also RCC, XVII: 221. For a detailed discussion of this issue see also
Crais, White Supremacy, 87-95; and Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 61-74.
18

19

Graham

's

Town Journal, Nov.

Graham

's

Town Journal, June

Vagrancy

Law

1,

1832. See also Ibid., June 27, 1831, Sept. 11, 1834.

12, 1834.

For a humanitarian critique of the 1834

see for example the South African
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Commercial Advertiser, Aug.

9,

1834.

Vagrancy Law foreshadowed the
passage of the Masters and Servants
Ordinance of 1841
and the Master and Servant Act of
1856, both of which increased white
farmers' power
over their ex-slaves and African
laborers. The Masters and Servants
Ordinance of 1841
did so, for example, by tying workers
more closely to their employers through
contracts,
a breach of which

would be considered a criminal

Servants Act was even more severe.

It

offense.

The 1856 Masters and

established five-year contract periods,
and

subjected workers to severe punishment for
"laziness," desertion, and "disobedience."

Furthermore,

it

allowed employers

to utilize the labor

language of the two legislative pieces did not

of their employees' children. The

utilize racially exclusive language, yet

several historians point out that they nevertheless
aimed at subjugating non-white labor. 20

The
state

pursuit of harsher labor laws

became an increasingly popular

strategy in a colonial

endeavoring to establish a system of colonial racial order.

Contested Grounds (Par t

I):

The Cape Colony and

the Xhosa. 1812-1834

Colonial labor policy was not the only or even most contentious issue that
pre-

occupied the political debate between humanitarians,

settlers,

and government

officials in

the Cape. Territorial expansion and the colony's so called "frontier policy" were
arguably

an even more controversial source of disputes among the Cape's
In the

John

first

political interest groups.

four decades of the nineteenth century, humanitarian critics such as the

Philip, colonial

commentators such as John Fairbairn, and

LMS's

travel writers such as

Saxe Bannister, Attorney General of New South Wales between 1824 and 1826, who had

See for example Robert Ross, "Pre-Industrial and Industrial Racial Stratification in
South Africa," in Racism and Colonialism, ed. Ross (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), 85-87;
Crais, White Supremacy, 140, 194, 196;

Maylam, South Africa 's Racial Past,
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73.

also traveled extensively in

Canada and southern

Africa, attacked the

colony expanded and acquired land
from African groups

condemned

the government's use of warfare
and colonial

colony's African neighbors.

By

like the

way

Xhosa.

commandos

the mid- 1830s their criticisms

21

the

Cape

They

also

to intimidate the

would generate a

consolidated response by pro-settlement
ideologues as they criticized the
humanitarians'
positions and

demanded

further territorial expansion and the
military subjugation of the

Xhosa

Frontier Policy in the Eastern Cape, 1812-1834

During the

first

half of the nineteenth century, the Cape's
governors were the

main shapers of frontier policy with

the mostly

Xhosa speaking groups who

eastern border of the colony. Governors were predominantly
military
rulers over

whom

the Colonial Office in

London had only tenuous

lived

men and

control.

on the

autocratic

Such early

governors as John Cradock (181 1-1814) and Charles Somerset
(1814-1826) advocated
territorial separation

"civilisation"

of whites from the Xhosa

and "barbarism." In

spite

in the

form of a

of this, eastern border

line

of partition between

officials

and colonists

continuously complained about Xhosa coming into the colony. 22 To intimidate Africans
into not crossing the line

of partition, Colonel Graham

who had

led the military

campaign

Saxe Bannister, Humane Policy, or Justice to the Aborigines of New Settlements
Essential to a Due Expenditure of British Money, and to the Best Interests of the Settlers,
with Suggestions How to Civilise the Natives by an Improved Administration of Existing
Means (London: Dawsons, 1968).
22

See for example Lord Charles Somerset to Earl Bathurst, April 24, 1817, in RCC, XI:
303-309. See also Maylam, South Africa 's Racial Past, 74; and Keegan, Colonial South
Africa, 43-44, 47.
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against the

Xhosa during

against Africans

who

the

War of

181 1-12,

implemented "a system of retaliation"

violated the Cape's boundaries.

[Because (hey

never cease to avail themselves
of every Opportunity
to comm.t murders and
depredations, think the most effectual
measure
which could be dev.scd to check them,
would be to pursue parties of
plundering Kaffirs to the kraal (hey
belong to, and ifpossiblc, burn thenhuts and destroy every man Kaffir
it contains. Two
or three such examples
would m my opinion entirely put a stop to
their incursions. Lenity and
mild measures with these bloodthirsty
savages have by long experience
been found to produce effects exactly
contrary to those desired
lowever
repugnant to humanity a superficial
consideration of rigorous measures
may at first appear, my recommendation of their
adoption arises rom
considerable experience and much reflection." 23
|

will

I

I

f

On numerous
against

occasions this policy led colonial

Xhosa communities across

commandoes

to strike indiscriminately

the Fish River in retaliation for border
crossings and

cattle thefts.

Governor Somerset eventually concluded

were

insufficient.

He argued

that the

that these small scale military missions

Xhosa would remain

a threat to the colony as long

as they maintained their independence. Thus Somerset
underscored the importance of
violence, warfare, and continuing efforts "to overawe the
restlessness of our hostile and
24

wily neighbours" and to exert pressures on the Xhosa

Violence was not the only means available

to the colonial state in its efforts to

create a system of colonial racial order in the region.

strategies

Government

of limited accommodation with some Xhosa

factions.

1817 between Governor Somerset and the Ngqika Xhosa
the

23

Ngqika leader paramount chief of all

the Xhosa, a

in

Quoted

in Lester,

Imperial Networks, 20.

110

pursued

At a meeting early

faction, British officials

title

in

named

actually reserved for the

Maclennan, A Proper Degree of Terror, 147-148

Quoted

officials also

Gcaleka's leader Hintsa,

who

lived further to the east

beyond the Great Kei River. In

return for their support,
British officials pressed Ngqika
to stop the
livestock, telling

him

that he

was

to

Xhosa from

be held responsible for any future

stealing

cattle thefts

and

border violations. Ngqika gave Cape
administrators his assurance that he
was willing to

punish cattle thieves among his people
but pointed out that he had "no
control over other"
factions of the western Xhosa. British
administrators

because they believed

that,

saw

this as a short-term

problem

with their support, Ngqika would
increase his power

among

groups like the Ndlambe and Gqunukhwebe
which had been recently removed from the
Zuurveld, and would thus be able to control
them. The British seemed especially

concerned about Ngqika's uncle Ndlambe whose
followers colonial authorities blamed
for

many of the
The

cattle thefts within the colony. 25

strategy failed.

As discussed

in

more

bolster Ngqika's position had the opposite effect.

increasingly

saw Nqgika

as a

pawn of the

British,

detail in chapter 5, British efforts to

A growing number of western Xhosa
which raised Ndlambe's popularity and

increased his support. Indiscriminate raids by colonial

commandoes

also contributed to

the growing anti-colonial feeling

among many Xhosa. The

and Ndlambe factions reached

highpoint at the Battle of Amalinde in October of 1818,

in

its

which Ngqika was decisively

rivalry

between the Ngqika

defeated.

Colonial administrators demanded swift intervention on behalf of Ngqika, which
led the colony to

meddle even

further with internal

Xhosa

affairs.

By December

1818, a

25

Lord Charles Somerset to Earl Bathurst, April, 24, 1817, in RCC, XI: quote 313, see
also 303-329; Major Rogers to Lt. Col. Brereton, Sept. 4, 1818, in ibid., XII: 38-45;
Secretary Bird to Rev. John Brownlee, Dec. 30, 1818, in ibid., XII: 1 18-124. Thomas
Pringle, Narrative of a Residence in South Africa, A.M.L. Robinson, ed., (Cape Town:
Struick, 1966), 272-277.

Ill

C

commando unit nnder the
attack against

were given

leadership of Lientenant Colonel
Brereton staged a large scale

Ndlambe and his

followers and captured 23,000
cattle

to Ngqika. Brereton's attack

on the Ndlambe and

- 9,000 of which

their allies escalated the

crisis

In retaliation for this attack,
colonists, their slaves, servants,

army staged

Xhosa

and raiding

and British soldiers as well

Cape

villages

officials

On April

fields

artillery

22, 1819, a western

The

Xhosa

attackers suffered

and the superior firepower of Khoisan

as the colonists. In the end, the

effort to

Xhosa

forces had to retreat.

push the Xhosa beyond the Keiskamma River,

were attacked and destroyed and Xhosas were

of the war, colonial authorities moved

Keiskamma

26

were outraged by what they saw as a challenge and
demanded a

campaign. In an

and

cattle.

a full fledge daylight attack on Graham's
Town.

heavy casualties induced by the town's

retaliatory

parties raided the colony, attacking
soldiers,

annex the

to

territory

shot.

27

their

In the aftermath

between the Fish and the

River. However, officials not only ordered the dispossession
of their enemies

but also their supposed Xhosa

allies

strong humanitarian sympathies

- the Ngqika. Thomas

who had

settled in the

Pringle, a British writer with

Cape

for

some time

in the 1820s,

wrote:

The war was

finished by an act quite in character with the

mode

which
had been conducted. It was commenced upon the pretext of supporting
our ally Gaika [Ngqika]: it ended in a convention by which that chief was
in

it

Major Rogers to Lt. Col. Brereton, Nov. 1, 1818, in RCC, XII: 52-55; Major Fraser to
the Landrost of Uitenhage, Feb. 4, 1819, in ibid., XII: 134-136; Major Rogers to Lt. Col.
Brereton, Feb. 12, 1819, in
27

See Somerset

ibid.,

to Bathurst,

XII: 138-139.

May 22,

1819, in

Sept. 24, 1819, in ibid., XII: 319-322.
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RCC,

XII: 193-202; Somerset to Bathurst,

-

f
t

SUITender

f

emto4°

°

The land between
Even though

Xhosa and

the F,sh and

this land

the Cape,

was intended

it

A mutual

1

830s. In

whom

March

officials

fmeSt PF0VinCeS

Keiskamma became

°

f

in

"Ceded

to serve as a non-settled
"neutral

to alleviate the tensions

little

1

Territory

zone" between the

between the colony and the

mistrust persisted throughout the
1820s and in the

822, for example,

Cape

first

half of the

forces staged a surprise attack against
Ngqika,

accused of having warned Ndlambe about
a raid planned by colonial

villages, ostensibly to capture

some more

K° Sa [Xh0Sa]

the so-ealled

forces to retrieve cattle. Throughout this
period, colonial

Xhosa

^

soon attracted colonists. 28

The War of 1818-19 did
Xhosa.

^

detail in chapter 5,

commandoes continued

and reclaim livestock and horses. As we

some Xhosa

to raid

will discuss

resisted these efforts. Others, however,

aided troops in recovering cattle and horses from
neighboring groups. Furthermore,

during these years, Xhosa continued to enter the colony.
Here they were sometimes
arrested or shot. In return, African livestock raiders
committed violence and murders

against colonists.

29

Government Frontier
Even
colony and

Quote

Policy

at the time, the

and

its

Critics

border policy was criticized both by administrators

in the Colonial Office in

London. Some

officials

who were

in the

sympathetic to

Pringle, Narrative, 288.

29

See for example Justus, The Wrongs of the Caffre Nation (London: James Duncan,
1837),107-108; Graham 's Town Journal, April 13, June 29, Aug. 17, Nov. 8, 15, Dec.
13, 1832, July 4, 13, 28, 1833. See also Lt. Col. Henry Somerset to Major Dundas, Aug.

19, 1829, in

BPP 252/1835, 46-47.
113

humanitarian views, took a

critical stance

toward the

commando

units,

used

to enforce

order on the frontier. Charles
Lennox Stretch, for example, a mid-level
administrator

played an active and often controversial
role
called

it

in

Cape

who

affairs in the nineteenth century,

a policy of "unremitting plunder"
which achieved

little

else than "provoking

and

injuring" the Xhosa. Stretch maintained
that the white
inhabitants

who had advanced

into the

ceded

had only to
of the loss of cattle, and immediately
without examination the patrols were set in
motion and brought back to
the complaining farmers anything they
wanted; if they could not find the
cattle, which m many instances had
never been stolen,
complain

territory

to the military station

they brought other
beasts instead and frequently at the rate of
two or three Caffre oxen for
one of the colonists on the plea that the colonial
cattle

were of much

greater value than those belonging to the Caffres.

Stretch believed that

provoke" the Xhosa

"some persons
30

to war.

interpretation, arguing that

in the

colony" deliberately called in commandos "to

Several administrators in

commando

London shared

Stretch's

raids led to unnecessary killings.

They argued

Dutch and English farmers used the commandoes "as a means of gratifying

that

the[ir]

cupidity and vengeance." 31

Other colonists and Cape
untrue. Sir

Lowry

Cape Colony
[i]t

Cole,

in the late

may

suit the

officials,

who sympathized

however, dismissed such contentions as
with the colonists and was Governor of the

1820s and early 1830s, wrote to London that

views of some writers

to

hold up the local government

and the colonists to the detestation of mankind, as the authors and abettors
of a system of most diabolical atrocities, and to represent the native tribes
as the most injured and innocent of human beings; but those who have had

30

C.L.R. Stretch, The Journal of Charles Lennox Stretch, Basil leCordeur,

Longman,
31

ed.,

(London:

1988), 17-20.

Secretary Stanley to General

Lowry

Cole, Nov. 13, 1833, in

114

BPP 252/1835,

62.

211

diff™
Like

many of his

"

^ takin§ 3 diSpaSSi ° nate Vi£W 0f the sub ect
J

™" J^ge

predecessors, Cole favored a military
approach to the Cape's interaction
i:

with the Xhosa. He, along with
other administrators and numerous
white
that the

Xhosa

as the root

numbered

"character" had an inherent
"disposition to plunder." Critics

of the "depredations.
in the thousands,

Journal wrote "for the

Yet

.

became with

.

committed by" the Xhosa, claimed

alleged

who saw

this

that stolen cattle

and demanded harsher punishment as
the Graham

Town

's

of injuries." 33

infliction

in the early 1830s, as

Xhosa held by

settlers,

some

historians

have pointed

out, the

views of the

the supporters of settler interests were
not as harsh and monolithic as they

the

War of 1834-35.

settler attitudes in the Eastern

mouthpiece of English

That conflict was an experience that altered
English

Cape.

34

Before the war, the

Graham 's Town Journal,

settler interests in the region, utilized
rhetoric

the

not unlike that of

humanitarians. The paper wrote, for example, that "[w]e
do not view the Caffres as a

enemy' but

'perpetual

rather as a people with

whom

it is

greatly in our interest to

maintain friendly relations." 35 Over the years, the "frontier trade"
with Africans in ivory,
hides, leather skin,

English settler

and ostrich feathers had become a lucrative business venture

elite in

Graham's Town. The Graham

Cole to Stanley, Nov.
33

15, 1833, in

Cole to George Murray, June

1830,

ibid.,

52-54;

Graham

's

BPP 252/1835,

14, 1829,

's

Town Journal endorsed

34

Feb.

7,

a "mild

63.

BPP 252/1835, 42-43;

Town Journal,

for the

Cole to Murray, Jan.

1833.

Crais, White Supremacy, 125-141; Bank, "Liberals and their Enemies, chapter 4;
Lester, Imperial Networks, 54-63.
35

Graham

f

s

Town Journal, June

27, 1833.
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2,

.

and humane policy" toward the
Xhosa "to secure

tranquility in the Colony,

and the

extension of our inland trade." But
again the business concerns of
English settlers in

Graham's Town shaped

their position.

The newspaper

be given to the about 100,000 Xhosa
"at our doors.
supplied." Thus Graham's

Town merchants,

the so-called humanitarian policy
as a

.

.

asserted that special attention

who

will require to

in the years prior to the

good opportunity

to

make

must

be clothed and

War of 1834-35 saw

a profit.

36

Humanitarians on the other hand believed that the
main task of the British empire

was

to

pursue a lofty policy of "civilisation" toward
indigenous people

the influence of its rule.

The

editor of the South African

Fairbairn, for example, supposed that the colonies
free

"we become

elevate the

human

Commercial Advertiser, John

were "portions of the great family of

men." But as "offshoots and dependencies of a

wrote,

who came under

free

and enlightened Empire," he

the depositories of those Principles of Justice

and Humanity which

race to their proper rank in the Scale of Being, and the channels
by

which the blessings of Civilisations may be conveyed
corners of the earth."

37

to the

most

distant

and barbarous

Humanitarians argued that Christian and moral commitments

required the citizens of the British empire to bring "civilsation" and "progress" to

indigenous peoples within and beyond

missionary activities
the United States

that education

Graham

's

among

who

was

the

Xhosa

its

borders. This mindset led to an increase in

starting in the 1820s. Like

American

advocated a civilization policy, humanitarians

in the

officials in

Cape believed

the key to turning a "rude barbarian" into a "polished citizen

Town Journal,

.

.

.

and.

Jan, 17, April 17, June 27, Sept. 5, Oct. 24, Dec. 5, 1833.

South African Commercial Advertiser, July 21, 1832.
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.

man of commercial

enterprise."

was a key component

To

in this process.

plow farming, which challenged

women

38

teach European

ways of agriculture

to Africans

Humanitarians believed that the introduction
of

the gender dynamics of many
African societies where

farmed, and the building of "houses"
would bind Africans to the land and would

convince them to "accumulate property."
Such developments would also increase African

"dependency on the colony, and multiply the bonds
of union and the number of securities
of the preservation of peace." Thus, and as
discussed
humanitarian agenda was

economic, and

political

Humanitarians
territorial

at

odds with the desire by

autonomy.

in the

more

many

detail in chapter 5, the

Africans to retain their social,

39

1820s and 1830s were

critical

of the Cape's policy of

expansion, and the treatment of independent African nations
like the Xhosa.

They held negative views of many of the
-

in

settlers, especially the

reflecting the general negative attitudes that

many

Dutch speaking

British held toward the Boers

according to the missionary Stephen Kay, had a tendency to look
superior species of animals, but not men!"

Kay and

encroachments by white

lands,

settlers

on Xhosa

colonists

at

Africans "as a

other humanitarians also

and believed

- who,

condemned

that the "unrighteous

conduct" of colonists proved a "serious and destructive" threat

to the

Xhosa.

40

Furthermore, supporters of humanitarianism condemned the Cape's frontier policy and
the actions of colonial

commandos. Humanitarians argued

that the British frontier policy

reduced Xhosa landholding, and that military patrols often struck against the Xhosa

Philip, Researches, 2: 316.
39

40

Philip, Researches, 2: 72-3. See also

Kay, Travels and Researches, 80

Kay, Travels and Researches, 118, 240,
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indiscriminately, leading to desolation,
unnecessary deaths, and retaliation. 41

To

ease the

tense situation on the eastern
frontier and to create a colonial
racial order there,

humanitarians advocated the sending of
missionaries and the "civilising" of the
Xhosa.

Thus, like Jeffersonians and

humanitarian agenda

in the

many of the

missionaries in the Upper Ohio Valley,
the

Eastern Cape embraced empire as an ideal.
Humanitarians

believed, though, that their strategies would
do

"more towards

'savage beast' and establishing permanent
peace, than

all

effectually conquering the

the sanguinary terrors of war

could possibly" achieve. 42

The establishment of the Kat River

settlement in 1829 provides a glimpse at the

differing views of empire and frontier policy

Cape colony. The lands near
controversial

by Ngqika

chapter

I,

Territory,"

in 1819. This

of Maqoma.
the Right

"Ceded

the Kat and

Keiskamma River juncture had been

inhabited by a

Ngqika

part of the

faction under the leadership

according to Xhosa laws of succession discussed in

this office after his father's death in

however, ruled the Ngqika Xhosa

until

from the Xhosa and turned

it

December

1829.

Maqoma,

Sandile reached manhood. Under the proposal of

Andries Stockenstrom, a Dutch speaking Cape
territory

groups in the

an older brother of the young Nqgika paramount chief Sandile,

Hand son of Ngqika who,
had inherited

interest

which colonial authorities claimed had been surrendered

was an area

Maqoma was

among contending

into a

official, the colonial state

took the

Khoisan settlement. Cape administrators

believed that the Kat River settlement would serve as a military buffer zone between

41

Quote see South African Commercial Advertizer, Nov. 9, 1833. See
Commercial Advertizer, Dec. 8, 1832; Dec. 7, 1833, Feb. 22, 1834.

42

also South African

Kay, Travels and Researches, 92. South African Commercial Advertiser, Dec.

1832.

118

15,

colonists

and Xhosa. Maqoma's removal, however,
led

numerous humanitarians, who saw
acquisition from the

Xhosa by

the

this territorial

to strong disapproval

annexation as another act of illegal land

Cape colony. To assuage

criticism,

Cape

officials

argued that the Kat River settlement would
provide homes and opportunities
landless Khoikhoi. Furthermore, they
maintained that

occupy the Kat River basin due

among

Maqoma had

to

many

lost the right to

to his provocative behavior,
including

an alleged attack

against a neighboring African community. 43

Despite their

initial criticism,

humanitarians quickly came to idealize the Kat

River settlement. During the 1830s and 1840s, they
came

to

imagine the community as a

successful experiment in creating a "most peaceable
and loyal subject"

among Africans.

Humanitarians described the settlement as an exemplar of the
benefits that colonialism

and

free

markets could bring to African

societies.

They praised

the building of irrigation

systems and schools as well as farming and timber businesses as
major steps toward
"civilization."

Contested Grounds (Part ID: Frontier Policy. 1835-1853

The

ideological struggle

among white

colonial racial order of the Eastern

interest

groups over the shape of the

Cape became increasingly

intense after the

War of

1834-35. In the aftermath of this conflict, the debate between humanitarian and prosettlement ideologues went into

full

swing.

Still,

though

their political pressures certainly

influenced colonial policy by appealing to sympathetic British colonial officials, the state

See for example Andries Stockenstrom, The Autobiography of the Late Sir Andries
Stokenstrom, ed. C.W. Hutton (Cape Town: C. Struick, 1964), 1: 347.
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continued in

many ways

to pursue

its

own agenda

in regards to creating a

system of

colonial racial order in the region.

Humanitarians and Pro-Expansionist Ideologues - the

War of 1834-35 and Its

Aftermath
Xhosa-white relations
dispossession. Continuing

escalated

when

Xhosa

-

commando

colonial forces shot at

the chief. Predominantly

in retaliation

in the Eastern

Cape

raids only

deteriorated after the

made

things worse.

The

Xhoxho - one of Ngqika's sons -

Ngqika and Ndlambe forces attacked

a strike that in conventional histories began the

situation

lightly injuring

the colony in

December

War of 1834-35. The

struck against white settlements, destroyed white properties, and seized livestock.

The Cape government
offensive in western

Xhosa

horses, and shooting at

children.

retaliated.

territory

Xhosa

By May

1835, colonial forces had taken the

and were destroying huts, capturing livestock and

fighters

and non-combatants including

women and

"These cruel and merciless savages," wrote Col. Harry Smith, the

charge of the campaign against the Xhosa, to Governor
"will

Kat River

now be

officer in

D 'Urban, without a hint of irony

taught [that] their treachery, murders, and devastations will be punished by
44

the most rigorous and relentless hand."

British forces also turned against the territory of the Gcaleka

east of the

the

Kei River. Cape

officials

Ngqika and Ndlambe, an

Xhosa who

lived

accused them of aiding the anti-colonial resistance of

alliance that authorities

seemed

to

have exaggerated. Yet,

to the Kaffir
Smith to D'Urban, Feb. 16, 1835, in G. M. Theal, ed. Documents Relating
See also
War of 1835 (London: Government of the Union of South Africa, 1912), 68-70.
Smith to D'Urban, June 7, 1835, in ibid., 205-207.

44
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the mission provided an
opportunity for colonial forces to
strike against the most

powerful of the Xhosa factions. Military

come

to negotiate the return

officials invited the

of tens of thousands of colonial

Gcaleka leader, Hintsa,
cattle allegedly

to

harbored by

the eastern Xhosa. Although guaranteeing
his safety, military authorities
detained him for
several days in hopes of exchanging
Hintsa for the cattle

demanded by

the Cape.

When

Hintsa attempted to escape, he was killed
and mutilated by members of the colonial
forces.

45

By September

1835, the all-out campaign conducted by colonial
forces had

pressured the western Xhosa to agree to peace.
D'Urban estimated the number of Xhosa
deaths at 4,000, compared to less than 100 English
losses. The Xhosa had been
"chastised," the governor believed "not extremely,
but perhaps sufficiently."46

As mentioned

earlier,

widened the ideological

rift

and as several

historians point out, the

War of 1834-35

between pro-expansionists and humanitarians

in the colony.

In an increasingly heated debate, English settler ideologues,
like Godlonton, accused

humanitarians of being complicit

Now,

the

supported

futility

in the violence

Graham 's Town Journal argued
earlier.

committed by "bloodthirsty savages."

against the "civilisation policy" that

The newspaper maintained

that the

Xhosa

it

had

attacks demonstrated the

of the "policy which has been of late adopted towards the Native Tribes." Instead,

the English settlers

now saw

the

Xhosa

as "incorrigible plunderers"

who have committed

"a catalogue of crimes and offences" against the colony. The Xhosa were

45

now viewed as

Harry Smith, The Autobiography ofLieutenant-General Sir Harry Smith (New York:
E. P. Dutton & Company, 1902), 2: 32-49; Stretch, Journal, 95-96.
46

D'Urban

to Glenelg,

Nov.

7,

1835,

BPP 279/1836,

121

89.

possessing "a combination of vices
perhaps scarcely surpassed by any
nation or people

under heaven."
"to pronounce

with feelings of deepest regret

"It is

I

am compelled - wrote Godlonton,

them treacherous, merciless savages."47
Furthermore,

the

Graham >s Town

Journal attacked the South African
Commercial Advertiser and humanitarian
writers "for
defending" their "darling Kafirs." At a time
of increasing ideological tensions,
Godlonton
also wrote a

book

called

The Irruption of the Kaffir Hordes

to counter

what he described

48
as the false narratives of humanitarian
writers.

The colony's success during

the

War of 1834-35

accumulation of new territory among English
note of rich lands in the Ohio Valley and

in

led to expectations for the

settlers. Just as

western

American

New York state

soldiers

made

during the American

Revolution, military campaigns into Xhosaland had
acquainted settlers in the Eastern

Cape with lands

that

Keiskamma and

the Kei river, wrote one

would make superb sheep farms. The region between

runaways as the Kaffirs."49

By the

settler,

was

"far too

good

the

for such a race

of

1820s and especially the 1830s, wool production from

newly introduced Merino sheep had begun

to increase in the

decades, and until the mineral revolution in the

production would become the pillar on which

last third

of the nineteenth century, wool

settler capitalism in

47

Graham 's Town Journal, Dec. 25,
among English settlers in reaction to

Cape. In the following

1834, July 3, 1835.

On the

South Africa was

built.

changing attitudes

war see Crais, White Supremacy and Black
Resistance, 125-141; and Bank, "Liberals and their Enemies," chapter 4; Lester, Imperial
the

Networks, 54-63.
48

Graham 's Town Journal, June

19, July 3, 1835.

See also Robert Godlonton, A

Narrative of the Irruption of the Kaffir Hordes into the Eastern Province of the Cape of
Good Hope, 1834-1835 (Cape Town: C. Struick, 1965); and John Chase, The Cape of

Good Hope and the Eastern Province
49

Quoted

of Algoa Bay (Cape Town: C.Struik, 1967), 84-86.

in Mostert, Frontiers, 701.
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Furthermore, this gradual shift to
wool production required not only

new pasture

lands

but also herders to tend the stock,
and laborers to wash and shear
wool, as well as to

grade and pack

it

for sale

- work

largely performed

by Africans. 50

Governor Benjamin D'Urban (1834-1838)
proved
settler interests in the colony. In
a controversial speech,

to

be a strong

ally to white

he proclaimed the Xhosa

"irreclaimable savages" with an "inherent
propensity to rob and pillage," and
blamed

them

for causing the war. 51 Following
the successful military

Xhosa beyond

the Kei river,

the territory mostly for sale to

who wanted

naming

it

pushed the

Queen Adelaide Province. D'Urban earmarked

members of the English

significant profits during the

settler elite in

war by trading supplies

Graham's Town,

to the military,

and

these lands to expand their wool production
businesses.

D'Urban's Queen Adelaide project was not only an

government

that

the Kei, he annexed an area of about
7,000 square miles between the

Keiskamma and

who had made

campaign

to gain

new

territory

on the eastern

control over the various western and

still

frontier,

effort

by the Cape

but also an attempt to impose

its

independent Xhosa factions. Colonel Smith,

whom D'Urban appointed as the head of the Queen Adelaide province in the aftermath of
the war, planned to actively undermine

Xhosa independence by

authority of magistrates and missionaries. Smith,

who

insisted

putting

them under the

on being called "Inkosi

Inkulu" (Great Chief) by the Xhosa, believed that the Xhosa wished to "come out of the

bush" to become "real Englishmen." Smith eagerly "entered upon the task

50

For

of what he

impress the importance and potential benefits of wool production see
for example Graham 's Town Journal, March 28, April 4, May 2, 1833.
51

articles that

Graham's Town Journal,

Sept. 17, 1835
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described as "rescuing [the Xhosa]
from barbarism" in an effort to
bring them under
British rule. In various meetings
with

Xhosa

leaders,

he advocated a view similar

to that

of many humanitarians, arguing that
the Xhosa could become "civilised"
by adopting
Christianity,

European

Smith believed

dress,

and "habits of industry." 52

that this transformation could
only

happen

if the

Xhosa would

give up what he called "witchcraft" and
the "eating up" system, forms
of social control
internal to

Xhosa

colonization, as

society.

Smith saw both as potential sources of
resistance

means used by

and as undermining English
observers

the

Xhosa

elite to

efforts "in introducing a

much of the Xhosa's

commoners

pressure

traditional religion

new

to white

into subordination,

order of things."

To

English

and cosmology was based on

"witchcraft." Smith believed that "diviners," "witch
doctors and rain makers" were strong
allies

of the

threat.

chiefs,

He also

and

like "Inquisitors" persecuted

any "poor wretch" they saw as a

strongly opposed the practice of "eating up." Through
this system, chiefs

could levy judicial fines and tributes
their subordinates. This practice

in

form of cattle, thus "eating up" the livestock of

was an important

in

maintaining a leader's power and

patronage, and administrators like Smith and D'Urban wanted
their goal

of undermining the authority of the

Unlike pro-settlement
violence

was

the cause of the

activists

who

chiefs.

it

ended

in order to realize

53

believed that the Xhosa's inherent desire for

War of 1834-35,

humanitarians blamed the conflict on

government policy toward the Xhosa. The South African Commercial Advertiser,

52

See for example Col. Smith's meeting with Xhosa, Sept.
253; Smith, Autobiography, 2: 72-73.
53

Smith, Autobiography,

2:

72-78.
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17, 1835,

for

BPP 503/1837, 250

example, severely eritieized Durban's
"irreclaimable savage" speech, the

territorial

annexation of Queen Adelaide Province,
and the removal of the Xhosa from
territory

between the Fish and the Keiskamma
River

19. "[I]n the

much of the

m the aftermath of the War of 1818-

course of sixteen years," the newspaper
wrote, the Xhosa "have been

deprived by the British Government of eleven
thousand square miles of Territory, and the

whole nation
is

not the

is

now compressed

means of subsistence

Commercial Advertiser

into a corner of their ancient
possessions

for

also maintained that "[t]he terms 'savages'
and 'barbarians' as at

men; and unless they

neglected

men

do."

are treated as

London

Select

men, they

for a reversal of the

to

in

raids

from 1828

critics,

and torment us as injured or

frontier policies.

territory lobbied hard

During hearings of the

condemned

their treatment

by white

Andries Stockenstrom, the commissioner general

to 1833,

who

testified in

by colonial forces and demanded

nations through a treaty system.

56

settlers.

in the eastern

London, strongly denounced the commando

that the

Xhosa should be

treated as independent

Stockenstrom not only argued for the abandonment of

South African Commercial Advertiser,
55

Our neighbours

1835 and 1836, humanitarians raised concerns about

the colony's policies toward Africans and

district

will harass

nothing.

annex the Queen Adelaide

Cape colony's

Committee on Aborigines

Like several other

fact, signify

55

Opponents of D'Urban's plan
in

there

one half of their number." 54 The South
African

present used amongst us, explain nothing, and, in
are

- where

May

South African Commercial Advertiser, Oct.

125

30, 1835.

7,

1835.

the

Queen Adelaide Provinee

but also suggested that the

Xhosa should be allowed

to

reoccupy the lands between the Keiskamma
and the Fish River. There they should
"be
domesticated" through a "civilisation
program" supported by the "cordial
co-operation"

of missionaries and the government. 57

Lord Glenelg, the secretary of state

London

in

in the

mid- 1 830s,

who was

lobbied

by British parliamentary evangelicals with
humanitarians leanings on the Queen Adelaide
issue,

seemed

blamed

the

partial to this strategy.

War of

Like D'Urban's opponents in the Cape,
Glenelg

1834-35, on decades of ill-guided policy toward
the Xhosa, through

which the colony had unjustly dispossessed

the Africans of their land.

He

also

complained about the harsh conduct of colonial troops
during the war which, Glenelg
argued, led to "the loss" of the Xhosa's "food, the
spoiling of their
their dwellings, the expulsion

war

to

burning of

of their wives and families from their homes, [and] the

confiscation of their property."
the

cattle, the

The

secretary of state believed

Xhosa

resistance during

be justified, as the colony's conduct had violated "the great principles
of

morality." Accordingly, the Colonial Office in

Adelaide proposal.

It

also

moved

London overturned D'Urban's Queen

the colony's border back to the Great Fish River and

permitted the Xhosa to reoccupy parts of their former

territories.

Furthermore, Glenelg

followed Stockenstrom's suggestion of introducing a treaty system and advocated
revitalizing the earlier strategy of using

Xhosa

chiefs to

See for example Stockenstrom, Autobiography,
Stockenstrom, Aug. 14, 1835,
19, 1835, ibid., 83-90;
57

BPP 538/1836,

Testimony John

Stockenstrom, Autobiography,

1

:

Philip,

246.
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1:

undermine

cattle raiding.

Not

298, 366-366; Testimony of

43-45; Testimony of Stockenstrom, Aug.

June

15, 1835, ibid.,

554-558.

surprisingly, the secretary of state
appointed Stockenstrom as Lieutenant

Cape and put him

in charge

Governor of the

of the treaty policy. 58

Despite these seemingly progressive
accomplishments, as Timothy Keegan

emphasizes, the mid- 1830s policies and
humanitarian rhetoric from members of
the
Colonial Office
that British

in

London should be approached

government administrators

like

critically. It is

Glenelg were as

important to underscore

much preoccupied

with

considerations of the costs and benefits of an
expansive frontier policy, as they were with

"humanitarian impulses." They especially feared that
a costly overextension could be
detrimental to the future of the British empire. 59
In the Cape, however, Glenelg's decision angered
pro-expansionists,

opposed the

treaty policy

and

who

the annexation of their territories.

the

Keiskamma

rivers,

and those

increasingly favored the subjugation of the

Even though white

who had moved

allowed to retain their lands, advocates of settler
"gained their object

in

"England," wrote one white

born and bred

in

and oppression."

to

felt

settlers living

.

Xhosa and

between the Fish and

Queen Adelaide Province, were

interests

persuading our countrymen.

English colonists in the Eastern Cape
state.

who

.

that

argued that humanitarians had

we

are monsters."

Numerous

betrayed and abandoned by the metropolitan

settler "instead

of protecting

us,

accuses us,

who were

her bosom, and have the like feelings as the rest of her sons, of cruelty
60

The Graham

's

Town Journal exclaimed

that those

who

favored

Stockenstrom' s treaty policy, had "too often overlooked the most insidious and

58

59

Lord Glenelg

to

D'Urban, Dec. 26 1835,

BPP 279/1836,

59-72.

Keegan, Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order, 149.

60

Quotes John Bowker, Speeches, Letters and Selections From Important Papers (Cape
Town: C. Struick, 1962), 2, 7. See also Graham 's Town Journal, Aug. 4, Sept. 29, 1836.
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dangerous designs upon our essential
white community under
"Philanthrophy.

.
.

Town

threat,

may be

interests."

The newspaper painted a

picture of a

abandoned by the metropolitan government

in

a mere matter of speculation in
Europe," stated the

Journal, "but to those

who

live

on the verge of civilisation, and

in

London.

Graham 's

immediate

proximity to savage and barbarous communities the subject of this sympathy

of significant import, and embraces topics
which

may be

fun to you but

it

is

death to us."

to

is

a term

them are of the highest moment.

.

.

It

61

In the years that followed the war,
pro-expansionists in the Eastern

Cape

aggressively attacked humanitarians and their
policies, a challenge that was accompanied

by a harshening
"civilisation"

racial discourse.

62

The Graham

's

Town Journal,

for

example, decried the

and "treaty policy" envisioned by humanitarians, arguing
that "[w]e have

not changed the Kafirs' nature yet, and
political activism

I

doubt

if

we

ever will change them." 63 The

of pro-settlement ideologues went however beyond aggressive

rhetoric.

For instance, colonists and pro-expansionist administrators repeatedly defied
and

undermined Stockenstrom's
Furthermore, in 1844,

of the humanitarian

in

authority,

62

his dismissal in 1838.

Graham's Town and Beaufort, white

activist

settlers

burned the effigy

and London Missionary Society director John Philip

protest over the treaty system.

01

and brought about

64

In 1846, after trying for

Graham 's Town Journal, May

7,

Graham

21, 1836. See also the

Town Journal, Apr.

some time

in

to get political office,

1837, June 6, 1839.

"famous springbok speech" in
Bowker, Speeches, 125; Crais, White Supremacy and Black Resistance, 125-141; and
Bank, "Liberals and their Enemies," chapter 4; Lester, Imperial Networks, 54-63.
63

's

Graham 's Town Journal, Nov.

13, 1836,

May 22,

128

1837.

several hard-line pro-settlement
activists like Robert Godlonton,
J.C. Chase, and T.H.

Bowker gained

several key positions in the colonial
65
administration.

Pro-expansionists especially attacked the
treaty system which, they
argued,

proved unable
colonist,

Graham

to protect colonists against the

were "thieves from
's

Xhosa. The

the principal chief to the

Town Journal reported

cattle raids

latter

according to one English

meanest of the nation." 66 The

by "Kafir Banditti" on "poor exposed

farmers" almost on a weekly basis. 67 The newspaper
even blamed the Great Trek, a

migratory

movement of some of the Dutch-speaking

colonists out of the

Cape

into the

southern African interior, on the failure of the
colonial state and the British empire to
actively defend the interests of its settlers

on the

frontier.

68

By

focusing so

much

attention

on the issue of "Kaffir depredations," pro-settlement ideologues
lobbied hard to change
public opinion and to increase their political support.

Even though

officials like

Stockenstrom and his successor John Hare, as well as D'Urban's successor,
Governor

George Napier, who arrived

in the

Cape

in 1838, accurately dismissed the colonists'

claims of Xhosa aggression as overblown,

James Read Sen.

to

James Kitchingman,

settler political

lobbying had some success.

Sept. 30, 1844, in

69

Kitchingman Papers, 252.

65

Tony Kirk, "The Cape Economy and the Kat River
and Society in pre-Industrial South Africa, 241.
66

Graham

's

Town

Journal,

May 2,

Settlement, 1846-53," in

1839. See also George Nicholson

Colonists: With Hints to Settlers In 1848 (London:

,

Economy

The Cape and Its

Henry Colburn, 1848), 171-176.

67

Graham 's Town Journal, Dec. 15, 1836. See also Graham 's Town Journal, Sept. 29,
1836, March 30, Aug. 3, 1837 Feb. 1, 1838, May 2, 1839; J. Hare to Napier, April 24,
1839,

BPP 424/1851, 46-47;

Graham 's Town
69

People of Tarka to Hare, April

Journal, Feb. 2, Aug.

3,

12, 1839, ibid, 48.

1837.

See for example Le Cordeur, Cape Seperatism, 102; and
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Peires, Phalo, 156,

In the early 1840s, for instance,
and as discussed in
officials pressured the

Xhosa

to accept treaty

more

detail in chapter 5, colonial

changes that would provide colonists
and

military forces with the authority to
search for stolen cattle in

Xhosa

territory

and forced

leaders to cooperate even further in
the prosecution of livestock theft. 70
Still it is

own

Xhosa

important to underscore that the colonial
state continued to follow

its

policy agenda. Governor Napier, for example,
resisted English settler pressures for a

consolidated military strike against the Xhosa.

He saw

such retaliation for

cattle thieving

as foolish and too costly, and prided himself
on his non-confrontational approach, which

had kept the colony

The Graham

at

's

peace for his six years in

Town Journal, on

office.

71

the other hand, remained critical of the

government. The newspaper was unimpressed by the changes
it

in the treaty system,

which

argued did not address the main problem. "[T] he only effectual
remedy for the existing

evils,"

wrote the paper, was

*

dominions."

72

To

to include the

Graham 's Town Journal blamed

only on the Xhosa, but also on "those

thrown up the

the circle of the British

pro-expansionist settlers this meant the military and economic

subjugation of Africans. Furthermore, the
theft not

Xhosa "within

reins to

who

in legislating for this

violence and

colony have

untamed barbarians." 73

Proclammation by Governor George Napier, Dec. 7, 1840, BPP 424/1851, 70-72;
Napier to Lord John Russel, July 10, 1841, BPP 424/1851, 87-88; Treaty Negotiations,
Aug. 6, 1 842, BPP 424/1 85 1 131-134; Russell to Napier, Dec. 31, 1840, BPP 424/1 851,
,

263.
71

See for example Mostert, Frontiers, 841.

Graham
73

's

Town Journal,

Jan. 14, 1841.

Graham 's Town Journal, May

12, July 1,8, 1841.
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Several English settlers in the
Eastern Cape urged that colonization
needed the

strong support of an imperial
government. Borrowing from the rhetoric
of humanitarians,

they advocated that the Cape should
be considered the staging ground for
introducing
"universal benevolence" to the areas
of "degrading barbarism" in Africa. 74 But
the
benefits of empire and "civilisation" could
only be brought to Africans through their
military defeat.

'The conquest must be ultimately complete,"
wrote

Journal, "the dominant power of the stronger
party must be

fragments of the weake
the form, and

[sic] will

felt

the

Graham 's Town

while the broken

be scattered to the winds, or be moulded as to
assume

become homogenous, with

the

power by which they have been subdued." 75

A shift toward racial conservatism occurred not only among English settlers in the
Eastern Cape, but as historian

throughout

much of the Cape and

emergence of what Bank
all

Andrew Bank

the British empire in the 1840s and 1850s.

calls a "conservative

Changing Victorian

shaped by the gradual

rise

attitudes

consensus" in Great Britain, the Cape, and

toward indigenous peoples were

in part also

of scientific racism, and an increasing erosion of faith

humanitarian "civilising mission."

75

The

over the British Empire was spurred by increasing indigenous resistance to

colonization.

'

observes, colonial racial discourse changed

in the

76

Graham

's

Town

Journal,

Graham

's

Town

Journal, Feb. 14, 1846. See also J.M.

March

10, 1843, Jan. 25, 1844.

Bowker to Lord Redeshale,

August, 1846, in Speeches and Letters, 237; and Bowker to

C

—

,

Aug.

19, 1846, in ibid.,

243.

For an extended discussion of these issues see Andrew Bank, "Losing Faith in the
Civilizing Mission: The Premature Decline of Humanitarian Liberalism at the Cape,
1 840-60," in Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern, eds. Empire and Others: British
Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600-1850 (Philadelphia: University of
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This change

in racial attitudes certainly
influenced the

views of the

representatives of the colonial and
metropolitan state, and led to a gradual
alteration of
the Cape's frontier policy.

The Graham

's

Town Journal welcomed

the hardening of

metropolitan attitudes:

cannot be otherwise than satisfactory to find
that sound sentiments with
regard to Colonies and Colonization in
general, are rapidly becoming
more and more prevalent among our leading public
It

men

Country.

It is

in the

Parent

seen that the British Empire

is made up of Colonies- that
England is merely the metropolis of the Realm a Realm so various as
embrace every clime; so extensive as that the sun
never ceases to shine
upon some part or the other of its wide circumference." 77

In the

Cape Colony

conservative views.
that Africans

as well, a

A

Civil

growing number of officials began

Commissioner

"would soon part" with

productive race,

who would

Clifton Crais describes

how

state aided

lands,

their land

openly assert racially

Eastern Cape, for example, maintained

and would make "place

to a

more

convert the wilderness into a field of superabundance."
colonial administrators and the state aided in the

establishment of the rural capitalist

was based on

in the

to

to

economy

in the

Eastern Cape. This transformation

the creation of a white landowning class that

employed black

laborers.

white landowners in their desires to obtain labor by taxing Africans for

by requiring African

fields to

The

their

be fenced, and by violently expelling African

"squatters" living in independent African settlements. Along with the aforementioned

Masters and Servants Ordinance, which tightened employers' control over their non-

Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 364-383; and Bank, "Liberals and their Enemies," conclusion

See also Lester, Imperial Networks, chapter

6.

"7*7

Graham

f

s

Town Journal,

Sept.

1

1,

1845.
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white workers, the Cape government
also contemplated the passage
of a "Squatters

Ordinance"

to help farmers

By the

more

78
actively with their "labor shortage"
problem.

1840s, influenced or intimidated by the
conservative surge, several

humanitarians also steered increasingly clear
political issues like the

1

of,

or even actively supported, contentious

wars with the Xhosa and the Masters
and Servants Ordinance of

84 1 The editor of the South African Commercial
Advertiser, John Fairbairn,
.

instance,

now

focused his attention on issues like the security
of colonists.

for

A

humanitarian stance and pro-expansionist attacks, the
editor feared, could threaten the
future of his newspaper. Fairbairn also

Dutch speaking white
and African."

settlers

who,

came

in his

to

embrace white unity between English and

words, "do not stand apart, like the European

Timothy Keegan reminds us

that "the general

aggressive and expansionist policies towards the Xhosa"

Cape colony should not come

as too

much of a

stampede

in favor

among humanitarians

of

in the

surprise. "After all," the eventual

"acculturation and incorporation of the native peoples as a dependent
class, was always
the humanitarian vision, and if that could not be achieved

by moral suasion, then

conquest and dismemberment of African societies might be presented as a logical
alternative to the

Crais, White

same end."

80

Supremacy and Black Resistance, quote

168; in general see 164-170.

Keegan argues that Crais overemphasizes "the strength and resolve of the state" in the
making of the colonial order in the Eastern Cape. See Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 14.
70

Quote from South African Commercial Advertiser, September
"Losing Faith in the Civilizing Mission," 376.
Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 107.
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20, 1848; Banks,

Within the ranks of the

LMS,

the racial views of missionaries

conservative by the 1840s and 1850s.

James Read called "a
of the

LMS

political,

little taint

Many LMS

81

Racial stereotypes

working with "a number of youths.
[as a] full missionary.

.

.

among

.

missionaries also undermined the

James Read

for

who know more

.

example observed

than

I

knew when

I

more

that he

was

was received

but because of their skin they must be kept upon
the

The mid- 1840s signaled

a dramatic shift in the Cape's policy toward the Xhosa.

discussed in more detail in chapter

1

missionaries had developed what

82

background."

in

more

economic, and cultural mission of empire than
the previous generation of

missionaries.

governor

also

of colonial feeling." They became even
more supportive

effective use of non-white missionaries.

As

became

5,

Peregrine Maitland,

who

replaced Napier as

844, further undermined the treaty system and reintroduced the

commando

system. Maitland complained that the "daring outrage, attended with murder"
committed

by the Xhosa on the colonists were
colonial government.

to

who

measures

to

82

The new governor believed

It

act toward

were an ineffective

tool

had become "imperative," argued

increasingly favored the interests of the settler

elite, to

take active

punish the offenders," and "to overawe" the Xhosa "into submission." 83

James Read

Read Sen.

and a defiant

that the treaties

end the "depredations" committed by the Xhosa.

Maitland

81

violations of the treaties

to

(sen.) to

James Kitchingman, Feb.

Kitchingman, Dec.

2,

16, 1841, in

Kitchingman Papers, 219.

1840, in Kitchingman Papers, 218.

83

Governor Peregrine Maitland to Lord Stanley, March 31, 1846,
Maitland to Stanley, Nov. 17, 1845, ibid., 3-5.
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BPP 786/1847,

82-83;

The Emerging Colonial Racial Order and

the State:

The War of 1846-47 and

the

War of 1850-53
The pressures exerted by
renewed

conflict

the officials of the colonial state

between 1846 and 1847. Governor Maitland
used the

Xhosa prisoner accused of stealing an
5, as a justification to

for a quick success

shaped by

on the Xhosa led

remained

detail in chapter

unfulfilled.

The War of 1846-47,

like

previous wars, was

and the destruction of crops. The conflict remained
inconclusive

Xhosa

and the densely bushed

comply with Cape

more

of a

order an attack against the Xhosa. Yet, the
hopes of British officials

cattle seizing

for a long time, as

axe, an incident discussed in

liberation

to

resistance centered in the hard-to-penetrate

river valleys. Yet, eventually, the

officials'

demand.

Xhosa had

Amatola Mountains
to surrender

and

84

The War of 1846-47 was followed by a de

facto reintroduction of the

D'Urban

system, which the former Governor had tried to impose during his
failed Queen Adelaide

Province experiment.

A

statement by the colonial secretary Earl Grey of Howick in

London, reflected the changing

and

in

attitudes of the state's representatives both in the

Great Britain toward the Xhosa.

and enlightened regard
longer be

left in

at pacifying

He

Cape

instructed colonial officials that "sound policy

for the welfare of the colonists required that the Kafir tribes

possession of their independence." The state's

and subjugating the Xhosa up

to the

Kei

river, to

no

new postwar policy aimed

acquaint them with the

For a more detailed discussion of the war see Basil Le Cordeur and Christopher
Saunders, eds. The War of the Axe, 1847 (Johannesburg: The Brenthurst Press, 1981), 15th
19; Buck Adams, The Narrative of the Private Buck Adams 7 Dragoon Guards on the
Eastern Frontier of the Cape of Good Hope, A. G. Brown, ed. (Cape Town: Jan Van

Riebeeck Society, 1941)

,

1

14-220; Peires,

House ofPhalo, 150-158;

855-935.
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Mostert, Frontiers,

"Arts of Civilised Life," to reduce
the power of the chiefs, and to
put the Africans under
the control of white magistrates. 85
These dramatic changes were to be
implemented by

the

newly appointed Governor Harry Smith
(1847-1852), who had formerly been

in

charge of the Queen Adelaide Province
under D'Urban. The territory between
the

Keiskamma and Kei River was now known

as "British Kaffraria,"

and became a "reserve

under the sovereignty of the Queen." 86

The power of the
in the Eastern

Xhosa, were

state

and

its

representatives in enforcing a colonial racial
order

Cape remained, however,

in

limited. Smith's efforts to control the
western

many ways more memorable

for their theatricality than for their

effectiveness. In meetings with the western Xhosa,
Smith posed as the "Inkosi Inkulu" or

the "Great

Chief of the Xhosa, waving

wand," as a sign of his

authority.

He

"a long stick of the Chiefs.

Xhosa' s

87

Smith also attempted

traditional culture, to

undermine African

raids

Smith pressured them

Earl
86

87

demand with which

the chiefs were forced to

undermine

end "witchcraft" and the "sin of buying wives," and

on the colony. These decisions antagonized the Xhosa

"[t]o

to

further.

acknowledge no chief but Her Majesty the Queen of
in the

Cape colony, and

"[t]o listen to the missionaries"

Grey of Howick

a species of magic

to revitalize the colonial state's efforts to

England" and her representatives

wanted the Xhosa

.

angered the Xhosa by insisting that several leaders

kiss his feet during public ceremonies, a

comply.

.

to Sir

Henry

Pottinger,

and

Nov.

2,

to

to

remain

faithful to Britain.

send their "children

1846,

He

to schools,

BPP 912/1847-48,

1-5.

Smith, Autobiography, 229-230.

Smith

to Earl Grey, Dec. 23, 1847,

BPP 969/1847-48, 24; South African

Advertiser, Dec. 29, 1847.
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Commercial

to

leam those habits of industry and
knowledge which make Englishmen

rich,

good,

happy and clothed." At one of several
meetings, grandiose performances
which Smith
loved to host for his African "subjects,"
the governor ordered a wagon
to be blown up

some

distance to intimidate the

Xhosa with

his "great

power." "That

is

what

I

will

do

at

to

you," he wrote in his autobiography, "if
you do not behave yourselves." Smith then
took
a treaty and ripped

No more

treaties."

it

88

into pieces.

"There go the

Smith crowed "Do you hear?

This incident signaled the end of the treaty
policy.

Smith revitalized the argument
early 1830s

treaties!"

by maintaining

that humanitarians

that the costs

had advocated

in the 1820s

and

of bringing "civilisation" to the Xhosa would

ultimately bring "peace and tranquility to the
colony" at a fraction of the cost of war. Yet
the Cape's financial assistance for "civilisation
programs"
States' efforts

much

aid

among Ohio

Indians,

would impede Xhosa

was

limited.

among

Many Cape

the Xhosa, as United

officials

argued that too

agricultural productivity, that gifts could be seen

by

indigenous groups as an effort to pacify them, and would encourage
them to stay out of
the colonial labor force.

89

The over-confident Smith misjudged
the Xhosa,

among whom,

Cape continued

to

more

as discussed in

detail in chapter 5,

named Mlanjeni,

especially

alike.

among

on many of

resentment toward the

grow. The undermining of their sovereignty and

angered Xhosa commoners and leaders
figure

the impact of colonial policies

territorial losses

The increasing popularity of a prophetic

the Ngqikas,

was

also seen

by government

88

Meeting between Smith and Xhosa leaders, Jan. 7, 1848, BPP 969/1847-48, 50; see
also Smith, Autobiography, 2: 231. See also Graham 's Town Journal, Oct. 14, 1848.
89

Smith

to

Smith, July

Early Grey, Jan.
2,

1848,

BPP

4,

1848,

BPP 969/1847-8,

1056/1849, 18-22.
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39-40; George Mackinnon to

officials as a factor

m fanning the flames in Xhosaland.

Ngqika paramount

the

Smith's dismissal of Sandile as

October 1850, and subsequent

in

efforts to arrest this chief (an

endeavor eventually declared as too
dangerous by the colonial authorities due

to the

Ngqikas' resistance) led to a rapid escalation
of hostilities. The Ngqika retaliated with
attacks against colonists. In the ensuing
war, the

Maphasa's Thembu

Mounted

Rifles,

faction,

Ngqika Xhosa received assistance from

mutinous members of the Xhosa police force and
the Cape

from a group of Ndlambes under the leadership
of Mhala, as well as

numerous Kat River

settlers.

Khoikhoi from the western Cape, the Mfengu, the majority

of the Ndlambes, and the Gqunukhwebe figured
prominently as

war

that

would

last until

Outrage existed

1853.

in the

allies

of the Cape

in a

90

Cape

especially over the

Kat River

settlers

who joined the

resistance against the colony. Smith and the English settler
elite in the Eastern

Cape

portrayed the Kat River insurgents as ungrateful rebels, and ignored
the fact that colonial

encroachments on

their lands

pursue such militant

and the

tactics, issues

threat

of a vagrancy law had motivated them

discussed in more detail in chapter

5.

to

Instead Smith

alleged that the Kat River settlers, this "most favored race on earth," had been stirred up

by
the

radical

members of the

LMS society. 91

The Graham

war on humanitarians who had repeatedly

's

Town Journal

as well blamed

told Africans that the colony oppressed

T.R.H. Davenport and Christopher Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History (New
York; St. Martin's Press, 2000), 140. For a more detailed discussion see Crais, White
Supremacy and Black Resistance, 173-188; Mostert, Frontiers, 998-1 160.
91

For quote see Smith, Autobiography, 2: 272-273. See also Smith to Earl Grey, June 12,
1851, BPP 1428/1852, 35. See also Smith to Earl Grey, Feb. 18, 1851, BPP 1352/1851,

13;
in

Graham

's

Town Journal,

Feb.

1,

1851; and Rev. George Brown, Personal Adventure

South Africa (London: James Blackwood, 1855), 4-5.
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them. For the newspaper as for
final battle in

raging with

many

English

settlers, the

War of 1850-53, marked the

"a contest between stern justice
and mistaken philanthropy

more

or less

vehemence

for

[that]

has been

upwards of thirty years." 92

Conclusion

The War of 1850-53,
Upper Ohio Valley, proved

War of 1812

like the

for white

American

to be a decisive victory for
Eastern

surprisingly such developments led

some whites

Cape

settlers in the

colonists.

in southern Africa to

Not

draw comparisons

with North America. In the early 1850s, for
instance, one official observed:

The

history of the

Cape

already written in that of America, the gradual
increase of the white race must eventually
though slowly ensure the
disappearance of the Black. Providence vindicates this
its unalterable
is

law

by rendering

all

the philanthropic efforts that have been

such a destiny subservient to

The war

its

led to massive dispossession

fulfillment.

made

among Xhosa and Kat River

were crammed on even smaller parcels of land or

to avert

93

lost their

settlers.

They

either

land entirely. Nevertheless,

indigenous dispossession did not occur at a level that satisfied the land
hunger of

members of the English

settler elite.

officials to reassess their policy

The

and the

intensity of African resistance led colonial

interests

Cathcart, appointed as the Governor of the

system of direct rule over Africans that
the

92

93

Ngqikas

in 1853,

Quoted

state.

in 1852,

his predecessor

he reinstated Sandile

Graham's Town Journal, March

Cape

of the

See also

Smith's successor, George

overhauled for example the

had advocated. After the defeat of

to his position as

15, 1851.

ibid.,

paramount

March

8,

chief. Cathcart

1851.

Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), 257-258.
in Galbraith, Reluctant
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I

also advocated that in

its

policy decisions the colony had
to pay greater attention to what

British officials called African
"customary law" and "traditional authority." 94
in the

Upper Ohio Valley, where

beliefs that

the colonial racial order

Thus unlike

was increasingly shaped by

embraced Native American removal and
stereotypes of the "vanishing

Indian " Africans in the Eastern Cape
continued to play a central role in the colonial
racial order, figuring either as a
servant class

of "drawers of water and hewers of wood"

or as a class of "independent producers for"
the "markets" of the British empire.

Despite these differences, in both the Upper
Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape,
the state

became

the prime enforcer of an emerging colonial
racial order. In both places,

these very different systems were shaped by local
and world historical developments and
interests,

but also by indigenous capacities in dealing with
these issues.

indigenous groups to maintain their sovereignty and independence,
attention.

Davenport and Saunders, South Africa, 140.
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we

To
will

the efforts

now

by

turn our

PART

III

CHAPTER 4

THE OHIO INDIANS' REVOLUTION: A STRUGGLE
FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND
INDEPENDENCE

Following Dunmore's
the developments in the

this

by getting involved

War of

1

774, indigenous Americans continued to influence

Upper Ohio Valley. As we have seen
in imperial

States and Great Britain. Native

power

struggles

Americans

in chapter 2, they often did

between the newly emerging United

in the region

developed a variety of strategies

to deal with the rapid transformations they
encountered in the last three decades of the

eighteenth and in the early nineteenth century. For instance,
and as alluded to

groups

like the

Delaware Indians who

settled

earlier,

around Coshocton on the Muskingum and

the Tuscarawas Rivers during the early years of the

American Revolution,

as well as

native leaders like Little Turtle of the Miami, Tarhe of the Wyandots,
and Black
the

Shawnee

in the years that

partial political

Confederacy
brother the

Shawnee Prophet Tenskwatawa

embraced

States. Others, like the

Ohio

1780s and 1790s, and the Shawnee Chief Tecumseh and his half

territorial separation

also

followed the Treaty of Greenville of 1795, advocated

and cultural accommodation with the United

in the

Hoof of

in the early nineteenth century,

of Indians and Anglo-Americans. The groups

militant resistance against the United States

But no matter which

particular strategy each of the

when

it

who

advocated

sought separation

seemed unavoidable.

above mentioned

historical players

pursued, their ultimate goal was to maintain their sovereignty and autonomy.
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Th e Ohio

Indians' Revolution,

1

775-1 7<K

The outbreak of the American Revolution
marked not only

the beginning of a

war

of independence for white Americans,
but also for Native Americans whose
position was
increasingly challenged

American

became

by white encroachments. With

state to create a colonial racial
order north

the starting point for an

Ohio Indian struggle

the

mounting

efforts

Americans

in the

the

of the Ohio River, the Revolution
for

independence and sovereignty

that lasted into the nineteenth century.
This section explores the variety
that Native

by

Upper Ohio Valley devised

of approaches

to obtain their goals.

It first

considers the diverse responses and views that
American Indians in the region had to the

outbreak of the Revolution. Secondly,
the

it

examines the strategies of accommodation with

American colonies by the Delaware Indians around Coshocton
and the Mequashake

Shawnee during
efforts

the second half of the 1770s and the early
1780s.

by the Ohio Confederacy

to maintain the sovereignty

The

final part looks at

of Native American peoples

north of the Ohio River and to curtail Anglo-American encroachments
onto their
territory.

Ohio Indian Responses

to the

Outbreak of the Revolution

The beginning of the Revolutionary War between
required tough decisions on the part of the Ohio Indians.
influential

Delaware

leader,

Netawatwees argued

"brothers."

Due

Americans and the

Some heeded

British

the advice of the

Netawatwees, to remember the high casualties they had

suffered during the Seven Years

British.

the

War of the

that

it

was

to increasing pressures

1750s and 1760s between the French and the

best to stay out of a conflict between

on

their territory, though,

142

two

most Ohio Indians had

eventually few options but to

become

directly involved in the conflict.

As noted

earlier, a

majority of Native Americans in the
region assisted the British in the
Revolution because

they posed less of a threat to their
territory than did the Americans.
Others, however,

sought closer

ties

to avoid white

west.

with the Americans

in

hopes of preserving

their

homeland.

Still others,

encroachments and the pressures of the Revolutionary
War, moved further

1

Those Ohio Indians who sought
colonies

saw

their strategy as a

way

at least partial

accommodations with the former

to obtain territorial guarantees that

white advances into Indian country without bloodshed.
American

Ohio Indians

that they

would prohibit

officials' assurances to

had "not the most Distant thought of Possessing any part
of [their]

lands," certainly encouraged

American Indians would

some indigenous

live separately

leaders to envision a social order in which

from whites divided by the Ohio River.

Generally, the native groups that opted for closer diplomatic contacts
with the United
States

were located

representatives

conference

in the vicinity

who were

Ohio.

initially willing to attend

at Fort Pitt in 1775,

and the Mingo nations

of American settlements. Of the 644 Indian

most belonged

in the eastern

an American-sponsored treaty

to the

Delaware, Mequashake Shawnee,

and southern parts of what

is

today the

state

of

2

1

For the neutral stance of a number of Ohio Indians before the outbreak of the American
Revolution see for example Captain James Wood's diary, 1775, in The Revolution on the
Upper Ohio, 58. For Netawatwes speech see "Diarium von Lichtenau am Mushkingum

vom

July 1776 bis 21 ten Juni 1777," in Herrenhutter Indianermission, 332-3.

On American assurances

Ohio will remain the final border see
John Walker to the Mingoes, Wyandots, Delawares, Shawnees, and Ottawas, Oct. 10,
1775, The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 98-99. For the treaty conference in 1775 see
Col. George Morgan to the President of Congress, Nov. 8, 1775, in ibid., 216-217;
to the Indians that the
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A

growing number of Native Americans
north of the Ohio River were,
however,

m the words of one American officer, angry and
Anglo-American
their

colonists

who "were now

"complained of the Encroachments" by

settling in

Great Numbers

in the

Midst of

Hunting Grounds on the Kentucke River."
Moreover, and despite assurances by

American

officials,

backcountry

settlers

were crossing the Ohio

3
and "killed and drove off the region's
game.

colonists

would adhere

to treaties

Many Ohio

in

ever larger numbers

Indians had

little faith

that the

and complained of the many mistreatments they
had

received at the hands of whites. These factions
saw

little

use in seeking accommodation

with the newly emerging United States. For more
and more western Indian groups,
militant resistance

was seen

as the only viable

way

to stop the

colonization, maintain territorial separation, and
sovereignty.

advance of white

The American Revolution

provided an opportunity to renew assaults on Kentucky and
to regain territory

Dunmore's War - land concessions

many Ohio

Indians.

to the Virginians that

had been forcibly imposed on

to avoid being caught

struggle, revived older migratory patterns

by choosing

to

up

in the revolutionary

move westward

had not been affected by warfare. As the fighting on the Upper Ohio
1

780, for instance, a growing stream of Shawnee

Edmund De
Lippincott
3

4

during

4

Other Ohio Indians who wanted

and

lost

left

to areas that

intensified

the volatile region,

by

1

779

moving

Schweinitz, The Life and Times of David Zeisberger (Philadelphia: J.B.
Co., 1870), 387.

&

Captain James Wood's Diary, 1775, in The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 61.

Gov. Henry Hamilton to Gen. Guy Carleton, Nov. 30, 1775, in ibid., 129-130;
Indian Speeches at Detroit, Jan. 2, 1779, in Frontier Advance, 191-3. See also Edward
Williams, "The Journal of Richard Butler, 1775," The Western Pennsylvania Historical
Magazine 46 (1963), 394-5.
Lieut.
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further south in the

Ohio

valley. In the years preceding
the revolution this faction of some

1200 Shawnees eventually moved

to Missouri

where they took up lands under the

auspices of the Spanish government. 5

The Delaware*' and Mequashake Shawnee's

Failed Strategy of Accommodation

with the United States during the American
Revolution

As seen

earlier,

when

the Revolution reached the

Ohio region, the former

colonies' closest Native American neighbors

seemed most

friendly relations with the United States.

result

factions of Delawares in the

Mequashake Shawnees on

Mequashake during

The

was a

interested in maintaining

strategy pursued

by several

Muskingum and Tuscarawas River Valleys and among

the

the lower Scioto. Cornstalk, an influential chief among the

the 1770s,

had chosen to adhere

to a position

of neutrality

after the

destructive experiences of his people during

Dunmore's War. Members of the Delaware

Council

either

at

Coshocton on the other hand, had

had assisted the Virginians during
later

had

this conflict.

Netawatwees, also had proven

built their first

towns

in the

to

remained neutral

Delaware leaders

or, like

like

White Eyes,

White Eyes, and

be supporters of the Moravian missionaries,

who

Tuscarawas River Valley by 1772. They had pursued

these alliances in an effort to gain territorial guarantees for the Delaware from the crown
in England,

5

and now wanted

to get similar guarantees

On the westward migration of some Shawnees

in

Indian Country,

1

from the United

see Calloway, The

6

States.

American Revolution

69-70.

6

"Diarium von Schoenbrunn am Mushkingum vom 13ten September 1774 bis zu Ende
February 1775," Nov. 1,5, Dec. 19, 1774, in Herrenhutter Indianermission, 237-9;
"Diarium von Schoenbrunn am Muskingum vom Monat Marius April und May 1775,"
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The
means

leaders

who

sought limited accommodation with
the colonies were by no

uncritical of, or blind to,

November

Anglo-American encroachments on then

lands. In early

1776, for example, Cornstalk delivered a
speech to American officials

reminding them of Ohio Indian grievances:

When God created

World he gave this Island to the red people
placed your younger Brethren the
Shawnees here in the Center - Now we
they see your people seated on our
Lands which all Nations esteem as
their
our heart - all our Lands are covered by the
white people
we
are jealous that you still intend to make
larger strides
We never sold you
our Lands which you now possess on the
Ohio between the Great
Kenhawa the Cherokee, which you are settling without
ever asking
our leave, or obtaining our consent - Foolish
people have desired you to
do so,
you have taken their advice. That was our hunting
Country
this

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

.

you have taken

from

This

&

.

&

what sits heavy upon our Hearts
on
the Hearts of all Nations, and it is impossible
for us to think as we ought to
do whilst we are thus oppress 'd with your [presence]. 7
it

us.

is

Thus, Cornstalk condemned the loss of land

Ohio Indians had never been compensated.
territorial losses in the future that

Still,

Ohio Indian

"Now

Council

I

stretch

of what

In addition, he

today Kentucky, for which

was concerned about

potential

leaders like Cornstalk pursued peaceful relations with the

to stop the

advance of whites

my Arm to you my wise Brethren

at Philadelphia,"

is

could undermine native sovereignty.

Americans and applied diplomatic pressure
river.

in parts

he told American

officials. "I

at the

of the United States met

open

my hand &

Ohio
in

pour into your

heart the cause of our discontent in hopes that you will take pity on us your younger

April 7, 1775, in ibid., 267; "Diarium von Schoenbrunn

1775," Sept.

5,

1775, in

ibid.,

vom

1

Juni bis 7.

September

285.

7

Speech of Cornstalk to Congress, Nov. 7, 1776, in Revolution and Confederation, ed.
Colin Calloway (Bethesda, Md.: University Publications of America, 1994), vol. 18 of
Early American Indian Documents: Laws and Treaties, gen. ed. Alden Vaughan, 147.
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Brethren, and send us a favorable
Answer, that

we may be eonvineed of.be sineerity
of

your profession." 8

The Delaware around Coshocton
States.

They argued

also

that they held "the chain

themselves "with both their hands." But

wanted peaceful

relations with the United

of friendship" between the Americans
and

in return they

expected

territorial

guarantees

from the Continental Congress. 9

The proponents of the
limited

power

summer of

at best,

position of non-aggression toward the
Americans possessed

and faced strong

internal

and external pressures. As early as the

1775, the Mequashake leader Cornstalk reminded
United States officials that

he had influence only over the Shawnee villages
on the lower Scioto
further to the north. Besides, Coshocton
Delaware leaders and

river, not

over those

Moravian missionaries

repeatedly informed American officials about a growing
number of Delaware "deserters"

who

left

the Delaware towns of the

to the vicinity

Muskingum and Tuscarawas River Valleys

of the British military post

at Detroit.

the fall of 1777, the Delaware chief Captain Pipe,

to

move

After returning from a hunting trip in

who had until

then attempted to remain

outside the conflict between the British and the Americans, had to pursue a
group of

Frenchmen who fought alongside
from

his town.

Though Pipe

Speech of Cornstalk

the British, and

who had recruited about

forty warriors

eventually caught up with the party and convinced most his

to Congress,

Nov.

7,

1776, in Revolution and Confederation, 147.

9

For the Delaware Indians see John Heckewelder, A Narrative of the Mission of the
United Brethren Among the Delaware and Mohegan Indians, from its Commencement in
the Year 1740, to the Close of the Year 1808 (New York: Arno Press, 1971), quote 159;
and Delaware Chiefs to Congress, May 17, 1779, in Frontier Advance, 320-1.
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men

to

abandon the campaign, support

for the

Delaware council's position toward
the

United States was declining among
the Delaware rank and
Nevertheless, Coshocton Delaware
leaders

who

10

file.

advocated non-aggression had

little

patience for American finger-pomting
at violence committed by
Delaware warriors

who

fought against the United States.
The Delaware leader Killbuck reminded
American

officials that

"we

are told that there are in several
of your states People

but as that does not

make

those particular States your Enemies,
so

a proper Distinction between our Nation
and Individuals

Conduct have become Outcasts from

you

call Torries

-

we hope you will make

- who, on Account of their

11

it."

Delaware-United States relations also generated disunity
and power struggles

at

the council of Coshocton. Proponents of
friendly relations with the Americans were

frequently criticized by
in their contacts

American

with the United States. Their

states only

encroachment.

some members of the

made indigenous

lands

council for overstepping their authority as
critics felt that close ties to the thirteen

more vulnerable

to

United States

A severe blow to Delaware unity at Coshocton occurred late in October of

1778. In reaction to the Treaty of Pittsburgh of the same year that established
close

between the Delaware and the United

abandoned

their

the Sandusky.

towns

in the area

States, Pipe along with a

ties

few hundred warriors

and joined the anti-American Ohio Indian villages on

12

10

For Cornstalk see Capt. William Russel to Col. William Fleming, June 12, 1775 in
Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 14-16. See also Zeisberger to Hand, Nov. 16, 1777, in
Frontier Defense, 165; and "Diarium von Lichtenau am Muskingum vom 15ten Martius
bis 6ten Julij 1778," April 2, 5, 1778, in Herrnhutter Indianermission, 439.
11

Delaware Chiefs

to Congress,

May 29,

1779, in Frontier Advance, 352.

148

An unnamed Coshocton

Delaware religious leader and

internal opposition to a friendly
stance

his supporters offered

toward the United States and the
Moravian

missionaries. Late in 1776, this prophet
advocated that the Delaware revitalize
their
religion

and

rituals,

and cleanse

their society

of white influences.

message of several Native American prophetic
Christianity

was

figures before

reiterated the

him who had argued

that

a religion for whites and not for Indians.
This prophet also argued that

Moravian missionaries should be driven off and

who were

He

less inclined to

accommodate

Furthermore he threatened

to create

that the

Delaware should

the interests of the

an "apartes town,"

in

elect leaders

Moravians and Americans.

which those who shared

his

views could join together. 13

The message proclaimed by

the Coshocton prophet reflected the sentiments
held

by many Ohio Indians toward white influences, customs, and
culture
Revolution. In the

1

770s, for instance, the missionary David

Shawnees "have always shown
helper

who

On the

among

was

time of the

McClure observed

great opposition to Christianity." 14

traveled to preach to various Ohio Indians,

at the

told

that the

A Moravian Indian

by a group of Shawnee

members of the Council at Coshocton see for example
"Diarium von Lichtenau am Muskingum vom 24ten September 1777 bis lOten Martius
disunity

the

1778," Dec. 19, 1777, in Herrnhutter Indianermission, 422-23. For Captain Pipe see
"Diarium von Lichtenau am Muskingum vom 19ten August bis Ende des Jahres 1778,"
Oct. 28, 1778, in ibid., 473. Zeisberger argued that Pipe

by relocating to the Sandusky
displayed his pro-British attitudes. Historian Richard White contradicts this argument. He
writes that Pipe moved to distance himself from the treaty's pro- American position.
White, Middle Ground, 382-3.
13

"Diarium von Lichtenau am Muskingum vom July 1776 bis 21ten Juni 1777," Dec. 9,
1776, in Herrnhutter Indianermission, 347.Gregory Dowd does not discuss this prophet.
Dowd sees the Delaware around Coshocton as more unified in their position of
"neutrality" and "accommodation" toward the United States. See Dowd, Spirited
Resistance, 68-72.
14

For quote see McClure, Diary, 93.
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that they could not live like

life,

religion, dances,

Moravian Indians or whites, but preferred

that

of

critical stance

toward white people

telling

them

These Delaware shared a view with many
other Ohio Indians, who believed

to do.

God had

theirs.

own way

and ceremonies. The Moravian missionary
David Zeisberger also

observed that numerous Delawares took
a

what

their

created whites to live according to their
ways, and Indians according to

They described

the

European "manner of living

as

wearisome and slavish," and

believed that the efforts of missionaries were
part of a larger scheme by the United
States
to "deprive"

Native Americans "of their land and drive them
within narrower confines." 15

Factions

among

the

Ohio Indians

that

pursued friendly relations with the United

States faced tremendous external pressures from
both anti-American Indian neighbi>ors

and British

officials,

who

against the Americans.

frequently encouraged and put pressure on them to

They warned

pro- American Delawares and

Shawnees

wage war
that they

should not listen to white missionaries and that the Americans wanted
to betray them. As
noted above, such demands were effective, as more and more Coshocton
Delaware and

Mequashake Shawnee joined

the anti-American factions around Detroit that fought

alongside the British in hopes that doing so would reinforce their efforts to maintain
sovereignty.

16

15

For the quote see Zeisberger, "History," 121-2. See also "Diarium von Welhik
Thuppeck und Gnadenhuetten and der Mushkingum," Jan 19, Feb. 23, 28, 1773, in
Herrenhutter Indianermission, 130, 133-5; "Diarium von Schoenbrunn an der Ohio Juni
18ten October 1773, " in ibid., 153; "Kurzer Bericht von Bruder David Zeisbergers Reise
mit den Indianer Bruedern Isaac und Wilhelm zu den Shawanesen," in ibid., 168-9.
16

For pressures on neutral Delawares to get ready for war see for example "Diarium von
Lichtenau am Muskingum vom July 1776 bis 21 ten Juni 1777," Aug. 7, 11, 1776, in

Hand, July 29, 1777, in Frontier
Col. Morgan, Sept. 23, 1777, in ibid., 100-1. For neutral

Herrenhutter Indianermission, 330, 332-3; Zeisberger
Defense, 27-29; White Eyes to
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to

7

The
Valley

left

volatile situation created

the Coshocton Delaware and their

allies in a bind.

On the

one hand, as

about enemy activity to the United
pro-British

by the revolutionary struggle

Ohio Indians who used

we have

States.

frustrated

David Zeisberger wrote

October 6

in 1777,

seen

earlier,

when anti-American

they provided intelligence

other, they

the towns on the

had

to provide hospitality to

Muskingum and the Tuscarawas

Anglo-American settlements.

was not

that there

Upper Ohio

Mequashake Shawnee and Moravian Indian

On the

resting points during their campaigns
against

in the

as

In fact, a

a single day between August 8 and

warriors were not staying at the Moravian

mission towns. The Moravian Indian food supplies
were especially strained when more
than 300 fighters put up their

camp among the

Christian Indians for

more than fourteen

days in that year. 17

As

several historians have pointed out, the search for

accommodation with

the

Americans among the Coshocton Delaware and the Mequashake Shawnee was
weakened

by the Americans'

failure to provide

and trade led friendly Indians

and ammunition. Due

to

promised supplies and

grumble

to

American

to their friendly stance

of the "Delaware Nation" complained

to the

trade.

officials

toward the United

18

The lack of supplies

about the lack of goods
States, several

members

Americans, they had "become poor

&

naked." Yet the Americans in the Ohio Valley had a hard time feeding themselves, and

Indians that joined the British see for example Gov. Henry Hamilton to Sir Guy Carleton,
Apr. 25, 1778, in Frontier Defense, 282; Hamilton and allied Indians to the Delawares,

June
1

18, 1778, in Frontier

"Diarium von Lichtenau

Advance, 94-5.

am Muskingum vom 24ten

September 1777 bis lOten Martius
1778," Dec. 31, 1777, in Herrenhutter Indianermission, 425; "Diarium von Lichtenau
vom 6ten August bis 23ten September 1777," Aug. 20, 1777, in ibid., 401.
18

On this

issue see for

example Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 73-75; and Weslager, The

Delaware Indians, 311-312.
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were chronically short of provisions,

clothes,

and other resources. At times,

their dire

conditions even forced United States
officials to approach friendly
Delawares and

Moravian Indians

The
indigenous

for supplies.

19

British also habitually complained
about the high costs of feeding their
allies,

but they paid these costs because Ohio
Indians played a central role in

Britain's military strategy in the region.
Anti-American indigenous groups had
rely

on British supplies as the protracted revolutionary
warfare

come

to

the destruction of

let to

Native American crops and impeded hunting
excursions. Yet despite United States
officials' portrayal

of the Ohio Indians as pawns of the

functioned as equal partners in a war against a

British,

American Indians

common enemy. They

held the British

accountable for their obligations, such as providing military
assistance and supplies in a

mutual effort to defeat the Anglo-Americans or

at least to

keep them south of the Ohio

River. "If you do neither one or the Other," the British
were reminded by an Ohio Indian

speaker, "I shall begin to think you are as smooth

Edward Hand

Tongued

as the Virginians."

20

to Jasper Yeates, July 12, 1777, in Frontier Defense, 19-20;

Brodhead to
Richard Peters, Dec. 7, 1780, in Frontier Retreat, 301-2; Major Frederick Vernon to
Brodhead, April 29, 1779, in Frontier Advance, 298; Speech of Delawares to Washington

and Congress, May 17, 1779, in ibid., 317-21; Killbuck to Mcintosh, Feb. 18, 1779,
ibid., 231-2; Delaware Chiefs to Congress, May 29, 1779, in ibid.J35l-3; Brodhead
Delawares, June 23, 1779, in ibid., 382-3; Gen. Lachlan Mcintosh's Speech to the
Delawares, Nov. 22, 1778, in ibid., 178-80; Maj. Frederick Vernon to Col. Daniel
Brodhead, Mar. 28, 1779, in ibid., 264-5.

in
to

20

For Ohio Indian quote see Indian Speeches at Detroit, Feb. 7, 1779, in Frontier
Advance, 218-20. Gen. Frederick Haldimand to Gen. Henry Clinton, Aug. 29, 1779,
Frontier Retreat, 50; See also Gen. Henry Hamilton to

Guy Carleton, Aug.

Michigan Pioneer Historical Society: Collections and Researches,
Michigan Historical Society, 1877-1929), 9: 459.
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vols.

8,

1778, in

40 (Lansing: The

The shrinking Delaware and Shawnee
the

Americans found themselves

Following repeated

in a less

threats, incursions,

factions that pursued friendly
relations with

advantageous position with then

allies.

and intimidations by anti-American
factions, the

Delaware and Shawnee around Coshocton
wanted United

States officials to adhere

diligently to the promised alliance of
"everlasting friendship."

more

They encouraged

representatives of the United States to live up
to their guarantees that "if any Nation
strikes

you on our Account," we "will consider your quarrel
as our own." They also

repeatedly

demanded

their Indian allies.

that the

Members

Americans should

at the

openly mocked them for their

ties to the

United States, which
all its

made empty

threats about

pro-British Indian allies. Americans

to strike soon, feared the council, or the Indian

Coshocton would have

and

council at Coshocton complained that other Indians

sending a huge army to destroy Detroit and

would have

strike decisively against the British

to bear the repercussions. Yet,

communities around

American revolutionary

leaders,

preoccupied with battles elsewhere, again postponed and finally abandoned a plan
for an
expedition against Detroit.

21

Despite the United States' inability

emerged among

They served

the

to

provide support, a pro- American faction

Coshocton Indians under the leadership of Killbuck and White Eyes.

as scouts and provided Americans with intelligence. In the aftermath of the

Treaty of Fort

Pitt,

some of these Coshocton

Indians also backed the American

Delaware and Mequochoke-Shawnee to Brodhead, Feb. 7, 780, in Frontier Retreat,
139; Delaware Chiefs to Brodhead, Apr. 23, 1780, in ibid., 172-3. On this issue see also
White Eyes to Col. Morgan, July 19, 1778, in Frontier Advance, 1 17-8; Killbuck to
Mcintosh and Morgan, Feb. 18, 1779, in ibid., 231-2; Killbuck to Mcintosh, March 15,
1779, in ibid., 254; Gen. Hand to the Delawares, Oct. 1, 1777, in Frontier Defense, 134; Delaware Chiefs to Brodhead, Jan. 13, 1781, in ibid., 315-316.
1

1

1
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revolutionary

war effort with

unpopular with the Council

fighters.

at

22

Killbuck's pro-American position,
however, was

Coshocton.

He

eventually lost his leading position,

left

the

Council, and settled with his remaining
supporters in a location closer to the
Moravian
missions.

23

Early in 1781, American inaction and
internal and external pressures finally
led a

majority in the council

Americans and

at

Coshocton

to consider

Killbuck and those Delawares

their friendly relations with the

British.

United States

Brodhead send an army of close

militia against the Indian villages

area.

abandon

an alliance with the

swiftly to these developments.

American

to

who wanted to pursue

strike destroyed

Over twenty Indians were taken

300 regulars and

on the Tuscarawas and the Muskingum Rivers.
a pro-American strategy joined the

forces in the attacks against the Delawares and

The punitive

to

officials reacted

two

villages,

captive.

and

Mequashake Shawnee

in the

killed at least sixteen native fighters

The remaining Indians

fled.

Killbuck and his

band "put themselves under the protection of the Americans" and returned with the
troops to Fort

24

Pitt.

See John Heckewelder to Col. Daniel Brodhead, July 26, 1780, in Frontier Retreat,
23 1-2; Brodhead to Richard Peters, Dec. 7 1780, in ibid., 301-2. On Delaware scouts and
military assistance see for example Brodhead to Washington,

May

3,

1779, in Frontier

Advance, 307; Brodhead to Col. Stephen Bayard, July 9, 1779, in Pa. Archives, 12: 1345; Brodhead to Pres. Joseph Reed, May 18, 1780, in ibid., 8: 249-50; Col. Motrin de la

Balme

to Chevalier

de

Luzerne, June 27, 1780, in Collections of the Illinois State
Historical Historical Library, 5: 163-68.
23

la

Killbuck to Brodhead, Jan. 15, 1781, Frontier Retreat, 316-317; Brodhead to

Heckewelder, Jan. 21, 1781,

ibid.,

321.

For warnings about the breakdown of neutrality at Coshocton see Heckewelder to
Brodhead, Feb. 26, 1781, in Frontier Retreat, 337-9; and Killbuck to Brodhead, Feb. 26,
1781 in ibid., 339-40. For the attack on Coshocton see C. W. Butterfield's narrative of
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A crucial blow to Moravian efforts to stay out

of the fighting was dealt by the

Americans during the Gnadenhuetten
massacre. There, as discussed

American militiamen slaughtered over
ninety Moravian
violence and strengthened beliefs in
racial separation

Americans

Indians.

among

in chapter 2,

The carnage

a growing

m the Upper Ohio Valley. It also led to an intensification

fueled

number of Native

of ritualized torture

of white prisoners, especially among
"the Delawares, who say they will
shew no mercy

any white man, as they would shew none
Moravians."

25

David Zeisberger observed

prosecuting militiamen
it is

known

to their friends

that

that the

who had participated

any prisoner had part

and

Shawnee

in the

relations, the religious

as well,

Gnadenhuetten

in that affair," the

were keen

killings.

in

"As soon

missionary wrote, "he

is

as

fortwith

bound, tortured, and burnt." 26

The Ohio Confederacy and

When

Indian allies were
matter.

the Continuation of the Indians' Revolution, 1783-1795

the British sued for peace with the

left

They were

the Americans,

Americans

by the claims

that their

many Ohio

Ohio

now belonged to
Treaty of

Indians argued that Britain could not forfeit their lands,

since they never had been defeated by either English or

Brodhead's Coshocton expedition,

25

homelands

who contended that Britain had ceded the territory with the

Paris. In contrast,

Pa. Archives,

in January 1783, their

surprised and outraged, as they had not been consulted on the

further angered

in ibid.,

American

troops. In their efforts

376-81; Brodhead to Reed,

May 22

1781, in

9: 161-2.

William Croghan

William Davies, July

to

6,

1782, in Collection of the Illinois State

Historical Library, 19: 71-3.
26

Zeisberger, Diary,

1782, in

MPHC,

1:

133.

10: 594-5;

On this

issue see also DePeyster to Haldimand, June 23,

and Heckewelder, Narrative, 310-25.
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to

to curtail

United States expansion,

attempted to present a united

front.

many of the

Indian peoples in the Upper Ohio
Valley

The Native American confederacy

of these exertions, consisted of a wide
range of Indian nations.

that

emerged out

found support among

It

factions of the Miamis, Shawnees,
Wyandots, Delawares, Mingoes, Kickapoos,
Weas,

and Piankeshaws. At times, the confederacy
also received assistance from groups
Ojibwas, Ottawas, Potawatomis, and from
pro-British Iroquois

Ohio Confederacy attempted the
from

all

difficult task

over the area that Americans would

like

like the

Joseph Brant. The

of uniting a wide array of Indian nations

later call the

Northwest Territory. The

confederation of Ohio Indians maintained that the land
north of the Ohio River was

communally owned by

all

ceded by approval of all

American Indians

tribes.

that lived

on

it,

and

that

it

could only be

Furthermore, the Confederacy advocated the

territorial

separation of Indian country and Anglo-American territory at
the Ohio river. The

Confederacy therefore insisted on the maintenance of the 1768

The

British pullout enticed other

Ft.

American Indian groups

Stanwix Treaty

27

line.

in the region, to pursue

a friendly stance toward the United States. Native American communities
in the region
like the

Mequashake Shawnee who

lived in close vicinity to

American

certainly aware of the pressures that the United States could exert

villages,

and were thus more

likely to give into

demands. The Native American adherents
United States hoped that

it

American

to a strategy

would bring peace and

on

territorial

settlements,

their

were

towns and

and diplomatic

of accommodation with the

territorial

guarantees to Ohio Indian

peoples. Native Americans from outside of the region, like the Stockbridge Indian leader

27
St.

Clair to Knox, Dec. 3, 1788,

Nations,

November 28, December

St.

Clair Papers, 2: 99; Speech of the United Indian

18, 1786,

ASPIA,

156

1:

8-9.

Hendrik Aupaumut from
the

New England, also got involved in the tense situation

Ohio River, and attempted

relations.

28

These native diplomats

intercultural brokers

Ohio

to find diplomatic solutions
to

who

fulfilled

what they saw

north of

United States-Ohio Indian

as a traditional role of

attempted to mediate between whites and
Indians in the Upper

valley.

Native American responses to a series of treaties
during the mid- 1780s, provide a

glimpse
the

at

Ohio

Indians' strategies for dealing with

Ohio Confederacy

discussed in chapter

2,

Anglo-American expansion. Though

rejected the 1785 Fort Mcintosh and the 1786
Great

Miami

treaty,

a few leading chiefs gave into American pressures
and agreed to

the loss of considerable tracts of land in return for a
promise of peace and territorial

guarantees, which United States officials offered to provide only
if the Indians signed
these treaties.

29

United States

Shawnee during

officials put especially strong pressures

treaty negotiations at the Great

American government expected
drawn up with several small

the

Shawnee

factions of other

friendly-minded Mequashake Shawnee,

to

on about 200 Mequashake

Miami River

in January 1786. There, the

confirm the Fort Mcintosh borders,

Ohio Indian

many warriors

tribes.

But even among the

resented American pressures. At a

council meeting on January 27, the Mequashake "head warrior, Kickwaypalathey"
rejected

American

had been decided

territorial

demands. Like many other Ohio Indians, he argued

in previous treaties that the

Ohio

between Native Americans and whites. Following

28

was

to

his speech,

be the

For the

(Summer

1996), 431-457.

treaties see Kappler, Treaties, 2: 6-18.
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final

it

border

Kickwaypalathey handed a

Alan Taylor, "Captain Hendrick Aupaumut: The Dilemmas of an

Ethnohistory
29

river

that

Intercultural Broker,"

mixed

wampum belt to United States officials,

for "peace or war." In response,

and

"Moating"

in a gesture

the Mequashake, General Clark
threw the

meant

wampum

that

to offend, anger,

in the dirt

Meanwhile, the commissioners uncompromisingly
reasserted

Americans owned the lands north of the Ohio
commissioners
hours after

set

river

by

"right

to decide

and intimidate

and "set his foot on
to the

Shawnee

it."

that the

of conquest." Clark and the

an ultimatum to the Mequashake to
sign the treaty or face war. Several

this incident a

group of Mequashake, including Kickwaypalathey,
and the

well-known leader Moluntha returned. Moluntha
declared
willing to

Americans had

that the

Mequashake were

comply with American demands. The Mequashake
Shawnee had given

United States' pressures, and Moluntha declared his
willingness

Americans would only "have

pity

on

into

to sign the treaty, if the

women and children" and not pursue war. 30 Yet,

peace for the Mequashake was short-lived. As noted in chapter

2,

Kentucky

militia

attacked Moluntha' s village only several months after the treaty
had been signed, killing

Moluntha and

several Shawnee.

This massacre, along with other atrocities committed by Americans, fostered
a
cautious attitude toward the United States even

more

among

those native groups that took a

conciliatory position with the Americans and remained outside of the Ohio

Confederacy. During an encounter with a group of Shawnees, John Cleves Symmes, a

major land speculator

in

southwestern Ohio, observed that the Indians wished "to be on

friendly terms," and expressed a desire to trade. Nonetheless, the leader of the group also

cautiously inquired if the United States supported

Ohio River. Symmes,

30

in

Symmes'

an atmosphere of cautious

Denny, Military Journal,

73.

158

distrust,

settlement plans north of the

affirmed to the Shawnees

that the United States did in
fact support his efforts.

To

pointed to the American flag and the
soldiers in his

camp and "informed

intimidate his Indian visitors, he
the chief, that

those were the warriors which the
thirteen fires [the United States]
kept in constant pay to

avenge

their quarrel."

At the same time, he reassured

States' peaceful intentions

by pointing

to the seal

Shawnee spokesman who observed

distrust

emblem of peace

in

one claw." Yet,

"the seal with great attention,"
expressed his

of American assurances of peaceful cooperation.
He replied "that he could not

perceive any intimation of peace from the attitude
the Eagle was

appeared from her bearing a large whip
other,

of the United

of his commission. The letterhead

depicted an eagle that "held a branch of
a tree as an
the

his Indian visitors

and

in full career

of flight,

to

in

in...

To him

one claw, and such a number of arrows

be wholly bent on war

saw

in the

& mischief." 31

Overall, a large majority of Native Americans rejected
the treaties.

Indians

the Eagle

Most Ohio

the land cessions as illegitimate and believed that the
treaties had been

negotiated through American pressures. Reports widely circulated
nations north of the Ohio river that the Americans "intended.

.

.

among

to kill

the indigenous

them

all" at treaty

negotiations "either by putting poison in the spirits" or by "communicating
the small pox

with the blankets." Furthermore, Native Americans accused the United States of charging

them

at treaty negotiations

neither said a word, nor

According
their land.

to

Ohio

They

would hear any thing about

Indians, the United States

injuries they

was attempting

to

had done

do

little

to Indians."

more

but to take

also charged whites with stealing horses, with robbing their hunting

camps, and with several

31

"with injuries they had done to the Americans; while they,

John Cleves Symmes

killings.

to

These encroachments, observed one American

Jonathan Dayton,

159

May

18-20, 1789, in

official,

Symmes, 74-75

induced a growing number of Ohio
Indians "to make a

suppose their

common

grievances."

common

32

Members of the Ohio Confederacy were aware
of the
Anglo-American colonizers who crossed north
of the Ohio

them

cause of what (hey

ever-increasing influx of

river into Indian country,

saw

as a threat to their sovereignty, and
advocated action against them. White
settlers,

so believed the Delaware chief
Buckongahelas, acted not only in violation
of earlier

agreements with the United

States, but also intended "to drive"
Native

form the lands which the Master of Life" had
given
Shall

we

Americans "away

to them.

suffer such thieves

and murderers always to be our neighbours! Let them go in this way, until they have
extirpated us entirely, and have
the whole of our land! - Did not God create
us as well as the white people!
- Did he not place us on this land, and give us strength and
ability to
defend ourselves against any invader... What nation
of Indians, will
tamely submit, to be driven from their lands by another
nation!"

Buckongahelas

call for militant resistance against colonial

many. Native Americans from

all

over the Upper Ohio Valley retaliated against

American boats and attacked white settlements north
which many natives saw

as the

encroachments was heeded by

as well as south

of the Ohio

river,

symbols of white invasion. 34

Heckewelder, Narrative, 370-96; Denny, Military Journal 128-130. See also Captain
John Doughty to Knox, October 21, 1785, in St. Clair Papers, 2: 9-10; Harmar to Knox,
',

July 3, 1786, in

Knox, October 26, 1788, in ibid., 2: 93; St. Clair
to Knox, December 13, 1788, in ibid, 2: 106-107.; St. Clair to Knox, January 18, 1789,
in ibid., 108-109. On the stealing of horses by American militia see also Symmes to
Dayton, May 1 8-20, 1 789 in Symmes, 76. For the wave of white settlers see Harmer to
Knox, May 14, 1787, St. Clair Papers, 20.
ibid., 2: 13.; St.

Clair to

33

For quote see John Sugden, Blue Jacket: Warrior of the Shawnees (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 2000), 74.
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Though
obstacles.

the

Ohio Confederacy frequently asserted

The confederation had

to deal with

groups and leaders. This infighting led
some
the

Ohio "confederacy

heads of it to direct

would not

feel

separately."

its

if

it

its

its

unity,

officials like

Arthur

exists at all, has not that efficiency

much

interested

many

share of rivalries between different

force to a point in the security of
which

themselves

confronted

it

when each had to

St.

Clair to boast that

which would enable the

many of the members

fear for themselves

35

American claims about disunity within

the

Ohio Confederacy were

in part

overstatements by United States officials that had self-serving
purposes. For one, by
rhetorically undermining the legitimacy of the

Ohio Indian

alliance,

reassured themselves of the legality of the treaties of the
1780s

American

officials

- documents which the

Ohio Confederacy opposed. Furthermore, contentions about a weak
Ohio Indian

alliance

aided United States policy-makers in downplaying the alliance's
military strength and
reinforced the official argument that northwestern Native American nations
could be
relatively easily beaten.

Yet the significant defeats of two major American military

missions by Ohio Indians

proved

that

in the early 1790s,

which we have discussed

in chapter 2,

American self-assurance was wrong.

Members of the Ohio Confederacy

frequently complained that

American Indian

policy-makers treated their alliance with a lack of respect by not speaking with properly

1A

For Indian violence see Symmes to Dayton, May 18-20, 1789 in Symmes, 78; Symmes
to Dayton, April 30, 1790, in ibid., 125-128; Putnam to Knox, January 8, 1791, in ASPIA,
1:

35

122.

Knox, September 14, 1788, in St. Clair Papers, 2: 88-89. See also St. Clair
Knox, October 26, 1788, ibid., 2: 93-94; St. Clair to Knox, December 13, 1788, ibid.,
106-107; St. Clair to Washington, May 2, 1788, m ASPIA, 1: 10.

St.

to
2:

Clair to
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constituted leaders, instead dealing
with renegades

Ohio Indian views. "You kindled your
council
their diplomats "without consulting
us, at

who

fires

did not reflect the consensus of

where you thought proper," charged

which you held separate

treaties,

and have

entirely neglected our plan of having
a general conference with the different
nations of

the confederacy." In their efforts to halt
the

Indians reiterated
support. But

it

its

American advance,

willingness to find diplomatic solutions that

also asserted that such efforts

would abstain from

movement of land

the alliance of Ohio

their attacks

all its

would only be successful

on Ohio Indians, and

if they

members would

if Americans

would undermine

the

surveyors and white settlers north of the Ohio river. 36

Despite frequent Native American attacks on Anglo-American
settlements, the
brutal torture

of some white prisoners, and the

members of the Confederacy,
absolute.

racially exclusive rhetoric often

the separation that

used by

Ohio Indians advocated was not

Adopted European captives and metis of mixed European and Indian ancestry

could be found

in

many Ohio

Indian societies.

origin even obtained leadership positions.

Some

people of mixed and of European

The metis Jean

Baptiste Richardville, for

example, acted as a chief in replacement of his uncle Pacane. Moreover, in the

late

decades of the eighteenth century, French and British traders played an integral part in

Ohio Indian

life.

These merchants, alongside some black

White notes, a constant presence
and the Auglaize

in

slaves, constituted, as Richard

Native American towns and villages on the

river. In these integrated

Maumee

and multicultural communities, whites,

Indians, and sometimes blacks, together lived, worked, socialized, suffered, and feared

Speech of the United Indian Nations, November 28 and December
8-9.
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18, 1786,

ASPIA,

1

Anglo-American attacks on

some mutually
essential role.

their settlements.

beneficial sharing

But the United

For members of the Ohio Confederacy

of land and especially cross-cultural

States'

trade, played an

scheme of colonization north of the Ohio

river,

provided a direct challenge to Native
American communities. 37
In the contest over

how

to

shape a colonial racial order north of the
Ohio

river,

negotiation played an important role. Just as
the Ohio confederacy generally tried to

defend

its

open up

homelands through diplomatic

territory

efforts, federal

by non-violent means. As discussed

policy-makers also attempted to

in chapter 2, these efforts

grew

partially out

of a self-proclaimed benevolence toward Native
Americans. But they were

also spurred

by the

fact that the United States

hands of the confederacy

in the 1790s.

officials sent several Native

had suffered two serious defeats

Hence, alongside white diplomats, federal

American representatives

alliance, believing that indigenous intermediaries

States to gain lands north of the

Ohio

river

to negotiate with the

might be useful

interests.

The Mahican Aupaumut who went on

Ohio, understood his attempts
intercultural broker,

at

Aupaumut

in helping the

United

feel obliged to cater to

several peace missions to

mediation rather in traditional terms.

tried to

Ohio Indian

by non-violent means. 38

Native American diplomats, however, did not necessarily

United States

at the

By

acting as an

impose continuity on a changing world. He

attempted, writes Alan Taylor, to revitalize the Mahicans' traditional role to serve as
intermediaries between warring factions. Furthermore,

37

Aupaumut believed

that his efforts

White, The Middle Ground, 448-454; Andrew Cayton, Frontier Indiana, 143-146.

See for example Queries proposed by Captain Hendrik Aupaumut. ., June 27, 1791 in
ASPIA, 1: 169; and "Statement of Causes of the Indian War," January 26, 1792, TPUS, 2
.

359-366.
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served the interests of the Ohio Indians
as

Aupaumut reminded

Secretary of

War Timothy

practices of your people on the frontiers.
the evil smoke."

much

.

.

as those of the Americans.

P,ckering,

who have

was due

to "the

kindled the bad

fire,

The

warfare,

inhuman

and so raised

39

Still,

Aupaumut's

efforts

were largely unsuccessful.

Like Aupaumut, members of the Ohio
Confederacy blamed frontier violence on
the United States' failed policies.

provide

gifts

- an

who among

American negotiators

criticized

essential part of diplomatic discourse.
Furthermore,

angered by copies of the

which indicated

They

that

Ft.

Harmar

treaty

shown

Ohio Indians had consented

to

to

them by United

for failing to

Ohio Indians were

States diplomats,

major land cessions. After inquiring

Native American leaders had supported the

treaty, the

Miami chief Le

Gris

argued that the signers "are only young men, who, without
authority and instruction from
their chiefs,

have concluded

that treaty."

maintained, they had to be signed by

American Indian negotiators
in their efforts to

all

For treaties to be valid, however, Le Gris
leaders of the confederacy.

sent

by

the federal

government fared scarcely

convince members of the confederacy to lay

negotiate land cessions. In the

fall

40

down

of 1792, Iroquois diplomats from

their

arms and

New York

better

to

state,

acting on behalf of the United States, encouraged Ohio Indians to end their resistance and
to cooperate

that

39

with American

officials.

Yet members of the Ohio Indian alliance believed

mutually beneficial coexistence with the United States was impossible. One speaker

Alan Taylor, "Captain Hendrick Aupaumut: The Dilemmas of an

Ethnohistory

(Summer

Intercultural Broker,"

1996), 431-457, for quote see 442. For an introduction to the

historiography on intercultural brokers see the essays in Margaret Connell Szasz,

Between Indian and White Worlds: The Cultural Broker (Norman: University of

Oklahoma
40

Press, 1994).

Mr. Gamelin's Journal

,

April-May, 1790,

164

in

ASPIA,

1:

93-4

ed.,

exclaimed that "our only demand

We can retreat no

great country....

food for

its

is

present inhabitants; and

small place to which

we

the peaceable possession of a
small part of our once

farther,

because the country behind hardly affords

we have

therefore resolved to leave our bones
in this

are confined." Leaders of the

Ohio Confederacy

also

were

concerned with the trustworthiness of the Iroquois,
some of whom had actively supported
their alliance in the 1780s, but

The

was probably

mistrust

who

also

largely stayed out of the fighting in the
early 1790s.

augmented by the history of often tense

the Six Nations and the Indian peoples of the

relations

Upper Ohio Valley throughout

between

the

eighteenth century, in which the Iroquois often declared
political preeminence over their

neighbors to the west. Members of the Confederacy accused the
Iroquois as

spoke "from the outside

of their "lips" and

as

"packs and attend

As discussed
1794 resulted
cede

all

Indiana.

is

States," they immediately took

41

chapter 2, the defeat of the Ohio confederacy at Fallen Timbers in

in the Treaty

of what

The

in

their councils."

who

pawns of the Americans. "[F]or

whenever" the Iroquois heard "the voice of the United
their

liars

of Greenville of 1795. The treaty forced Native Americans

to

today southern and eastern Ohio, as well as significant parts of eastern

land losses dramatically altered the lives of American Indians in Ohio,

Indiana, and Michigan, and dramatically undermined the position of Indians in the upper

Ohio

region.

Even though,

after their defeat

by the Americans, the Ohio confederacy was

position to challenge the treaty, a few critical voices, like that of the

Turtle,

41

were raised during the

Speeches

at the

negotiations. Little Turtle argued to

1:

323

no

chief Little

American

Buffalo Creek Council, Nov. 16, 1792, in ASPIA,

165

Miami

in

officials that

the treaty "takes in the greater and
best part of your brothers' hunting
grounds, therefore,

your younger brothers are of [the] opinion,

At the conference,

Little Turtle

[that]

you take too much of their lands away."

invoked the French-Indian relations of earlier
decades - a

period frequently imagined by Native Americans
in the Great Lakes region in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century as a
"Golden Age."
the French formerly possessed this country,

Turtle to

and

American

we now
42

States."

we were but one people,"

officials at the treaty conference.

entertain the

"You know,

brother,

when

explained Little

We "had but one fire between us;

hope of enjoying the same happy relation with you, the
United

Mirroring Little Turtle's hope for a brighter future, the
Wyandot chief Tarhe

reminded government representatives

that they should "take care of all

your

little

ones, an

impartial father equally regards all his children."43

By at least temporarily undermining Native American militant resistance,
treaty

the

of Greenville of 1795 signified the end of the American Revolution for Ohio

Indians.

But the struggle

to maintain their

independence and sovereignty continued as

Native Americans attempted to influence their destiny through familiar patterns and
processes of accommodation and militant resistance. At the same time, the treaty marked
a dramatic turning point for

American Indians north of the Ohio River, leaving them with

fewer means of influencing and contesting the transformations that occurred

in the

region.

Treaty of Greenville, Aug.

7,

1795, Speech of Little Turtle, ASPIA,

Treaty of Greenville, Aug.

7,

1795, Speech of Tarhe, ASPIA,
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1:

1:

580.

576-577.

The Continuing Struggle
Greenville

Upper Ohio

for Sovereignty and In dependence
in the

the treaty of Greenville. Helen

Hornbeck Tanner argues

Ohio

river followed

that whereas, the white

population in the region consisted of only
5,000 people in 1796,
In contrast,

M

Valley. 1795-1812

A massive stream of Anglo American migration north of the

by 1810.

Pn.t.T,^,

increased to 230,000

it

Tanner estimates the Indian population of the

entire Great

Lakes

region in 1768 at about 60,000." Such rapidly
growing white population numbers
increased the pressures on Ohio Indian communities
and led federal officials to take more

Native American land for white settlement. Hence, as
with so

many

other "permanent"

dividing lines between white and Indian country before,
the Greenville line
dismissed, and American officials obtained
treaties.

more indigenous land through various new

Such developments, warned some Native American

violent retaliation

by young

grumbling about the
the Ohio."

fighters, as well as

treaties,"

leaders, could encourage

by those Ohio Indians who "were

and were "threatening

to drive the

Americans back over

White encroachments on American Indian lands exacerbated the

game and decreased

was soon

scarcity

of

the Indians' ability to feed themselves. This led to further land sales

by Ohio Indians who were increasingly forced
and income generated by

selling parts

of their

to rely

on United

States annuity

territory for their subsistence.

payments

45

Alcoholism, which was worsened by land losses, social upheaval, and poverty also rose

44

Population numbers are from Helen Hornbeck Tanner,

ed., Atlas

of Great Lakes Indian

History (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 66, 96, 101.
45

Little Turtle to

Dearborn, January

7,

1802,

M15,

roll 1,

138-143, National Archives;

Harrison to William Hargrove, 12 November 1807, Harrison Papers,

Governor Huntingdon, December 23, 1808, Edward
Historical Society, Columbus.
Tiffin to
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1:

273; Edward

Tiffin Papers,

Ohio

to

endemic

levels

among Native American communities

north of the Ohio, and reinforced

the crisis in Indian country. 46

In the face of all these challenges,
Native Americans in the Northwest
Territory

continued to contest white power and
attempted to influence the region's emergent
colonial racial order.

As

in earlier years, significant

numbers of Ohio Indians, most

noticeably under the leadership of Black
Hoof, Tarhe, and Little Turtle, sought to affect
their circumstances

by seeking some measure of accommodation and
peaceful

coexistence with Americans. Others, following
the leadership of Tecumseh and

Tenskwatawa, endeavored

to

shape their future by rejecting coexistence and by using

militant resistance. Yet, despite these major differences,
the
objective.

They

trusted that their strategies

two groups had a common

would aid Ohio Indian communities

in their

struggle for survival and sovereignty.

Accommodation and

the Search for Sovereignty

Most Native Americans
partially to

in the

Northwest Territory

Anglo-American culture and

to

accommodate

the federal policy of civilization did not see

themselves as having embraced a superior

American

who chose

way of life. Many remained

colonization. Their strategy of limited

critical

of Anglo-

accommodation rather grew out of a

realization after the Battle of Fallen Timbers (1794) that militant resistance against the

United States was

futile.

Several indigenous leaders

saw

the adoption of certain white

46

See for example Diary of the Little Indian Congregation on the White River for the
year 1802, May 18, 1802, in Lawrence Gipson, ed., The Moravian Indian Mission on
White River (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1938), 164-5. For a general
discussion of this issue see Peter Mancall, Deadly Medicine: Indians and Alcohol

Early America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 169-180.

168

in

ways

as the best

situation.

in

many

But

way

it is

to

cope with their communities' deteriorating
social and economic

important to underscore that accommodation
was partial and occurred,

on Native American terms. Thus, Ohio
Indians clung eagerly

cases,

established traditions and to their sovereignty.
Chiefs like Black

Hoof and

to

numerous

Little Turtle

lobbied for example for the opening of federal
trading stations in Indian country,

underscoring the fact that
living

many male Ohio

Indians continued to be keen on making a

by hunting. 47
In their efforts to transform their villages and
towns,

Ohio Indian

chiefs also

sought the support of missionaries. The Quaker William
Kirk, for example, assisted the

Shawnee

in

Black Hoofs settlement of Wapakoneta

in clearing land, setting

up orchards,

growing vegetables, building more log cabins, and erecting fences. With
Kirk's
assistance, the

Shawnees

also obtained

new hogs and

cattle,

two yokes of oxen, and farm

implements. Kirk and the Shawnees began construction of a gristmill and a sawmill.

Black Hoof thanked President Madison
friends, the Quakers, to help us,

and

we

in a letter

on April

find that they are

10, 1809, for sending

good people and concerned

our welfare and have done a great deal for us in instructing our young

on how

to use the tools

we

"our

men

in a

for

good way

48

see in the hands of our white brothers."

Ohio Indian leaders who sought partial accommodation saw
presence of Kirk and wanted him to remain.

When the

federal

benefits in the

government discharged the

47

See Hopkins, 165, see also 169-173; Little Turtle to the President, January 4, 1802,
Leonard Hill, John Johnston and the Indians in the Land of the Three Miamis (Piqua:

Stoneman
48

Press, 1957), 14-18.

Henry Dearborn, 20 July, 1807, M221, roll 8, 2874-8, National
Archives; Shawnee Headmen to Madison, April 10, 1809, ibid., roll 24, 8048.
William Kirk

to

169

in

Quaker missionary

in

December of 1808 because

it

saw

his efforts as too costly,

indigenous leaders protested his dismissal.
The Shawnee

submitted whether

it

would be a good

Upper Sandusky, wrote

49

policy."

at

Wapakoneta

"respectfully

Tarhe the leader of the Wyandots on the

Kirk had fallen victim to a character
assassination.

that

He

argued that false reports were spread
about the missionary by certain white people

"have always been trying
effort "to

to

keep us

by

telling false stories

about us" in an

keep us down." Tarhe described the Quakers
as "good people" who "never

have wanted

to cheat us or take our land

would enable Ohio Indians

"come

to

But Kirk allegedly overspent
federal

in the dark

who

government

for

more

from us." Tarhe believed

in" to the

that the missionaries

Anglo American "way of living." 50

his inadequate funds

support. After only a

and repeatedly lobbied the

few months of work in several Ohio

Indian communities, his position was eliminated. Government
officials declared his

mission as too costly and "without an adequate benefit to the Indians."
The protests by
the

Wapakoneta Shawnees and

the

Wyandots of Upper Sandusky over Kirk's dismissal

were largely ignored. 51

Black Hoof to the President, 1808, M221, roll 17, 5258, National Archives; Johnston to
Secretary of War, April 15, 1809, ibid., roll 24, 8045-7; Shawnee Headmen to Madison,
April 10, 1809,
50

2,

51

ibid., roll

The Crane [Tarhe]

24, 8048.

et. al.

to the Secretary

of War, March 30, 1809, M222,

roll 4,

1631-

National Archives.
Eustis to Johnston,

Dearborn, April

May 23,

12, 1808,

1809,

M221,

M15,

roll 25,

roll 2,

440-1, National Archives; Kirk to

81 14-81 15, National Arcives; Duchouquet to

Dearborn, Dec. 4, 1808, ibid., 8145; Kirk to Dearborn, August 8, 1807, ibid., roll 8, 2880;
Kirk to Dearborn, January 28, 1808, ibid., roll 8, 2897; Kirk to Dearborn, Dec. 10, 1808,
ibid., roll

25, 8143-4; Kirk to Duchouquet, Dec. 4, 1808, ibid., 8145; Settlers of the

Frontier Counties of Ohio to Madison, Sept. 25, 1808, ibid, quote 8147.
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Ohio Indians saw missionaries not only

as instructors in

manual

arts

and as

intercultural brokers, but also as
potential allies in their struggle to
maintain sovereignty

over their land. The Wyandots

at

Sandusky

for

example encouraged the Presbyterian

missionary, Joseph Badger, to remind
Anglo-American officials that the United States

had

to

acknowledge the Wyandots' landownership. This

Wyandots, would be a prerequisite
success.

if the civilization

official recognition,

argued the

program among them were

to

be a

52

Like indigenous prophets

who

rejected white culture, the

Ohio Indian

leaders

sought partial accommodation with the Americans were
concerned about alcoholism
their

who
in

communities. These chiefs saw alcohol abuse as a direct challenge
to their

communities' social

fabric, successful

change, and sovereignty. Little Turtle reminded

President Jefferson that "your children are not wanting in industry, but
introduction of this fatal poison which keeps them poor.

command

it

is

the

Your children have not

the

over themselves that you have, therefore, before anything can be done to

advantage, this evil must be remedied." In conversation with Quakers, Little Turtle

maintained that the devastation induced by liquor "causes our young people to say, 'We

had better be
country

is

at

more

war with
to

the white people.' This liquor that they introduce into our

be feared than the gun or the tomahawk; there are more of us dead

since the Treaty of Greenville, than

we

lost

by the years of the war before." In 1802, the

lobbying by Ohio Indian chiefs and missionaries, led to the passage of a federal law that
forbade the sale of alcohol to Native Americans. Yet no law alone could stop the sale of

Joseph Badger

to

Thomas Worthington, December

Paper, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus.
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13, 1806,

Thomas Worthington

bootleg liquor. White and
Native American traders alike
would continue to

by

selling alcohol,

American

and Ohio In dl an leaders and
missionaries soon resumed

officials to enforce the

make
to

a profit

lobby

law they had passed more
53
effectively.

Competition and jealousies among the
chiefs that had allied their

interests to the

United States occurred frequently. In
part these animosities emerged
from old

rivalries,

but developments in the post Treaty
of Greenville years also helped to
harshen Indians'
conditions. Several

government

Ohio Indian

for providing too

leaders, for example, criticized
the

much

attention,

American

and financial and material support,

to Little

Turtle at their expense. Little Turtle
had close connections with the Indian agent
William

Wells, a former adoptee
relationship led the

among

Shawnee

about Wells partiality

in

the

Miami and

the chiefs son in law. This intimate

leaders Black Snake and Black

Hoof to

repeatedly complain

devising assistance to Ohio Indian communities,
and eventually

aided in his demotion. 54

Indigenous rivalries were
partial

and

much more pronounced between

accommodation and those who were ideologically opposed

territorial

encroachments. Ohio Indian chiefs

Tarhe saw the Shawnee prophet Tenskwatawa,

53

For quotes by

like Little Turtle,

his half brother

Little Turtle see Little Turtle to the President,

those

to

who

sought

American

culture

Black Hoof, and

Tecumseh and

January

their

4, 1802, in

Johnston, 14-18; and Hopkins, 169-173. See also Little Turtle to Dearborn, Jan.
7, 1802,
M15, roll 1, 138-43, National Archives; Black Hoof to the President, 1808, M221, roll

5258, National Archives. David Zeisberger, Benjamin Mortimer, and John
Heckewelder to St. Clair, October 28, 1798, in St. Clair Papers, 2: 434; Black Hoof and
17,

Black Snake

to

Edward

Tiffin,

June 28, 1807, Edward Tiffin Papers, Ohio Historical

Society, Columbus.
54

Wells

to Dearborn,

May 28,

M221,

2854-62, National Archives. See also
Harvey Carter, The Life and Times of Little Turtle (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1807,

roll 9,

1987).
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growing number of supporters, as a

direct challenge to then position.

I

These leaders

repeatedly accused Tenskwatawa
for making "use of bad medicine,"
and encouraged

United States officials to suppress
militant factions. Militant factions
also undermined the

power of pro-United

States

supporters. Furthermore,

government chiefs since they provided an

alternative to their

government chiefs also blamed the prophet and

his followers for

the killing of their followers and
livestock and for the murders of American
55
settlers.

Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa, on
chiefs

who

the other hand,

denounced the actions of those

took a friendly position toward the United
States. They attacked these leaders

for their support

of several

treaties that led to

To Tecumseh, Tenskwatawa, and
Native Americans' sovereignty,

major land sales north of the Ohio River.

their supporters,

way of life, and

such losses of territory challenged

survival in the region. Hence, rival

leaders were accused of being chiefs in the service
of the

become "Big Knives," and
The
during the

War of

Shawnees,
to

who

by assuring them

Wells
Kirk

to

to

who pursued

Dearborn,

that

May 28,

strategies

prior to the Battle of Tippecanoe, pro- American

mostly lived on the Auglaize River in northwestern Ohio

numerous Anglo-American

settlers,

1,

had

Upper Ohio Valley, which peaked

1812, posed a severe test to Native Americans

of partial accommodation. In 181

that

of their people. 56

traitors to the interests

crisis in intercultural relations in the

American government

in close vicinity

settlements, once again attempted to ease the fears of white

"your interest and ours

1807,

Dearborn, 20 July, 1807,

M221,

roll 9,

ibid., roll 8,

[are] inseparable.

We wish to live

2854-62, National Archives; William

2874-8; Black

Hoof and

other leaders to the

President, 1808, ibid., roll 17, 5258.
56

Wells

to Harrison,

Aug. 20, 1807,

in Harrison,

14, 1810, in ibid., 422-30.
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1:

239-43. Harrison to Dearborn, June

in

peace -

we have no more

to say."

Ohio Ind,an leaders who sought
accommodation,

repeatedly pledged to officials that
they had "no intercourse or connection
with" the

Shawnee prophet Tenswatawa or with Tecumseh,

whom they blamed as the "principal

cause of all the mischief that has been
done." Several chiefs reaffirmed their
alliance to
the United States, arguing that the British
had "always

Ohio Indian leaders
that

officials

if

us in difficulties." Friendly

certainly preferred to stay outside of
the fighting in an

seemed unavoidable. Yet, they were

"information

left

we know of any

willing to assist the

American war

mischief coming your way." After assuring American

more support and

to allow the

Quakers to return "to

soon as possible." Such aid would support Native Americans

together."

assist"

States

them "as

in their "civilization"

so that both whites and Indians would "be more united until

we

all

land in heaven

57

With the outbreak of the War of 1812, Ohio Indians continued
Americans about
officials

effort with

of their friendship, these Ohio Indians, however, also
encouraged United

officials to provide

efforts,

upcoming war

their friendly disposition at various conferences.

were especially disappointed about a meeting

which only a

little

at

to reassure

Yet United

States

Piqua in the summer of 1812,

more than 900 American Indians attended (of which 590 were Ohio

Shawnees (who resided

closest to Piqua),

26 Ottawas, 24 Kickapoos, 124 Mingoes, and

160 Delawares). American representatives had expected 3000 participants. But several
disastrous defeats of United States troops by the British and their Native American allies

57

Shawnee

chiefs in council at Fort

Wayne, Nov.

18, 181 1,

Archives. See also Johnston to Eustis, Aug. 27, 1811,
Eustis,

ASPIA,

Aug. 29, 1811,
1:

ibid., roll 38,

M221,

ibid., roll 38,

roll 46,

997, National

4726-7; Johnston to

4723-5; Little Turtle to Harrison, Jan. 25, 1812, in

805-6.
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diminished Ohio Indians' confidence
setbacks led to a heightened alert

in

American military

among pro-American

increasingly concerned about their security.

capabilities.

The

Indian communities

military

who were

The Wyandots of Upper Sandusky

did not

attend the conference as they feared
retribution from the British and hostile Indians.
also obtained military reinforcements from
villages.

To

numerous other Ohio Indian towns and

address American fears and pressures, Ohio Indians
attending the Piqua

conference pledged once again their friendship
they were not interested

in siding

to the

United States and exclaimed that

with the British. American Indian leaders at the treaty

also assured officials "that they even had restrained their
to

do so." Despite the low attendance

American

They

at the

officials estimated that at least

States throughout the conflict.

August conference, by the spring of 1814

3000 Ohio

Shawnee, Delaware, Mingo, and Wyandot

young men and would continue

nations,

Indians, the majority

of the

had remained friendly with the United

58

Ohio Indians who sought accommodation with
though sometimes reluctantly - supported the United

the United States also actively

States'

war

-

effort in the region.

Their contributions, argued the Indian agent John Johnston, had played a valuable role
the United States' campaign against the British.

this

brought

American
States

to loyal Indians

allies,

and

their

As seen

in chapter 2, despite the

dangers

communities, both from enemies but also from

"loyal" Native Americans provided reconnaissance

work

for the United

and gave frequent warnings about enemy operations. They also provided

scouts.

58

See for example Johnston to Eustis, March 12, 1812, M221, roll 48, 2772, National
Archives; Worthington to Eustis, June 24, 1812, ibid., roll 49, 3921-3; Worthington to
Eustis, Sept. 11,1812, ibid., roll 49, 4105;
roll

in

Meigs

49, 4163-6.
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et al. to Eustis, Sept. 10, 1812, ibid.,

Furthermore, Ohio Indian fighters
British and their Indian allies

who joined American

numbered

forees in their attacks against the

in the hundreds. 59

Militant Resistance and the Search
for Sovereignty

Attempting to contest and shape the colonial

racial order in the

Ohio

region, other

Native American groups rejected Anglo
American culture and employed violence to

oppose the advance of white colonization. Like
indigenous groups
sought

territorial

and cultural separation from the United

the British, and during the

resistance.

one

last

Determined

War of

1

8 1 2, defended their homelands through militant

to retain Indian sovereignty, this

spiritual

guide of this

pan-Indian confederacy

made

pan-Indian confederacy in the Upper Ohio

last

Valley was the Shawnee Prophet, Tenskwatawa.
formerly a minor chief of the Shawnees
leader of the anti-American resistance.

An

pursued an alliance with

attempt to stop American advances north of the
Ohio river

The major

us.

States,

in earlier decades, they

who became

like so

many

the

the brother of Tecumseh,

major

political

Much of Tenskwatawa' s

inadequate hunter and warrior, he held

Tenskwatawa,

He was

little

status in

and military

early life

Shawnee

is

unknown

to

society.

other Ohio Indians, turned to alcohol and had the reputation

of an infamous drunk. One day,

in 1805,

he

fell into

a trance, from

which he emerged

Johnston to John Armstrong, March 25, 1814, M221, roll 54, 8399, National Archives;
Johnston to Eustis, May 12, 1812, ibid, roll 46, 1064-6; Stickney to Armstrong, Nov. 21,
1 8 1 3, in Gayle Thornbrough, ed., Letter Book of the Indian Agency at Fort Wayne, 1 809-

1815 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1961), 202-204.
60

For a good introduction

among Ohio

Indians see

Shawnee Prophet

to the historiography

Dowd,

of the militant revitalizations movement

Spirited Resistance; and R. David

(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).
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Edmunds, The

saying that he had spoken to the
Master of Life

who had

sent

him

to lead the

Ohio

Indians on a path to redemption from
their desperate situation.

The prophet

told

Ohio Indians

that the

Master of Life wanted them

to

abandon

white ways, give up metal implements
and weapons, and put aside Anglo-American
clothing as polluting influences on their
societies. The Master of Life also warned
Ohio
Indians:

am

the father of the English, of the French
of the Spaniards and of the
Indians, I created the first man, who was the
common father of all these
people, as well as yourselves and it is through him,
whom I
I

have

awakened from his long sleep that I now address you. But
the Americans I
did not make. They are not my children, but the
children of the evil spirit.
They grew from the scum of the great water, when it was
troubled by the
evil spirit.
They are numerous, but I hate them
My children: You
must not speak of this talk to the whites. It must be hidden from
them.
.

.

I

am now

on the

by the Great Spirit to instruct you.
you must
come to see me, and be instructed. Those villages which do not listen to
this talk, and send me two deputies, will be cut off
from the face of the
earth, sent

.

.

earth.

The prophet and

his supporters believed that a strict separation

Anglo American world, would
Master of Life

Then

Indians, they

lead to a restoration of the old order.

to "overturn the land,"

the forests

told

The prophet condemned
accommodate American

traditional

the cornfields

grow

would

entice the

shall inhabit."

plenty, and the

Ohio

by Tenskwatawa, would be reunited with "your children or your

friends that have long been dead."

to

It

which Native Americans "alone

would again teem with game,

were

of the Ohio Indian and the

61

the strategies of Native

American groups who attempted

culture and expansion, and he

way of life. Ohio

Indians

who

wanted

to maintain the

sought accommodation, he explained to

61

For bloc quote see Speech of the Trout, May 24, 1 807, in ASPIA,
Tenskwatawa see Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet, chapter 2.
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1

:

798. For

Governor Lewis Cass of Michigan, "now

live like

you whites." Instead the prophet

believed that American Indian
males should adhere to hunter and warrior
ways.

Contesting missionary demands that
native

women

should "raise corn."

compelled to
wish

live as

we

do."

to live as our fathers

Wapakoneta who "do not

River

should farm, Tenskwatawa argued that

He reminded Cass that "you

[too]

would think

The prophet continued, "we cannot

have lived before

us.

.

live as their forefathers

Militant factions used violent
strategies

men

means

.

live as

it

you

hard to be

do...

We

We cannot live with our brothers" at
used

to live."

62

to challenge Native

Americans who pursued

of accommodation. In March 1806, the Moravian
missionaries on the White

in southeastern Indiana, reported several
attacks

on leaders

in the surrounding

Delaware communities, which they believed had been singled
out by the Shawnee
prophet for having supported the United States' civilization
policy. The missionaries
reported the killing and burning

at the stake

influential persons including the

been accused of witchcraft.

Delaware council
the

Moravian Indian helper and

When the

for advice

translator, Joshua. All

their mission,

Delaware leadership had been influenced by Tenskwatawa's

know how

missionary Abraham Luckenbach, "but
to teach us.

Quoted

in

None of us

will

come

had

intimidated Moravian missionaries approached the

on how they should pursue

olden times the Indians did not

one

of several friendly chiefs, and other

it

was

clear that

nativist rhetoric. "In

to live alright," the councilors told the

now we

to hear

Sugden, Bluejacket, 238.
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ourselves

know how

to live

and need no

your Word, for you are white people and

we

are Indians.

You have another eolor than

we.

.

.

your teaching

is

good

for white

people but not for us." 63

A wave of witchcraft persecutions also occurred among
villages

out,

on the Sandusky

some Shawnee,
were

deterioration

in the spring

the

Wyandot towns and

of the same year. As R. David Edmunds
points

like the prophet, believed that
land loss, alcoholism,

in part

caused and reinforced by witchcraft. 64 In the
Sandusky villages,

Tenskwatawa "had named four" women who supported
accommodation
witches, and

and economic

condemned them

to

be executed." Tarhe, the

influential

"in the nation as

pro-accommodation

chief among the Wyandots, challenged the
prophet and his followers and disrupted their
efforts. Still, at times,

gain support

among

Tarhe was not successful

in counteracting

Tenskwata's

efforts to

the Wyandots. In the early

summer of 1810,

for example,

Wyandots

loyal to the prophet succeeded in murdering the
influential Leatherlips and

two women,

whom the Presbyterian missionary Joseph Badger described as "the most respectable
people.

.

.

peaceable and industrious." 65

While

American

his brother

Tenskwatawa emerged

militant resistance

the political initiative.

movement

in the

Tecumseh worked

collapsed after Fallen Timbers. Like

as the spiritual leader

of the

last

Native

Ohio region, Tecumseh took on much of

to rebuild the

Ohio Confederacy, which had

members of earlier Indian

alliances,

Tecumseh

See diary entries from March 13-26, 1806, "Diary of the Little Indian Congregation on
the White River for the Year 1806," in Lawrence Gipson, ed. The Moravian Indian
Mission on White River (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1938), 412-9.
64

65

See Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet, 24.

See Badger, Memoir, 145,

1

14,

and 125.
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complained about Anglo American
disunity

among Native American

efforts to take over indigenous
lands

by

creating

nations.

The

great spirit said he gave this
great island to his red children. He
placed
the whites on the other side of the
big water, they were not contented
with
their own but came to take ours
from us. They have driven us from the
sea to the lakes we can go no farther.
They

have taken upon themselves to
say this tract belongs to the Miamis,
this to the Delawares
so on, but the
Oreat Spirit intended it as the common
property of all the Tribes, nor can
it be sold without the
consent of all.

&

The Shawnee

leader also objected to the sale of more
Indian land, and blamed "village

chiefs" for failing "to

During negotiations
territory

manage

in the

summer of 1810

governor Harrison

leaders since

that

should be separated.

between United States

selling

"common property."

Vincennes, Indiana, he also warned Indiana
treaties

with Ohio Indian

the acknowledged chief of all the Indians." Like his

Tecumseh believed

He

at

by

he should hold no further

Tecumseh "alone [was]

brother Tenskwatawa,

boundary

the affairs of the Indians"

that Indian country

and American

territory

told Harrison that he intended to disregard recent treaties

officials

line to continue."

and "government chiefs." Tecumseh wanted "the present

Should Americans "cross

it,"

he assured Harrison

"it will

be

productive of bad consequences." 66

Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa worked hard
could. Their

message appealed

two brothers'

to several

of the

efforts in recruiting supporters

American Indian

situated further to the north

to build as

first

people of Ohio and Indiana. But the

were generally more successful among
and west. Since these factions lived

greater distance from Anglo-American settlements than

Harrison to Eustis, August

6,

1810, in Harrison,

22, 1806, in ibid., 1:459-69.
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broad an alliance as they

1:

at

a

Ohio Indian groups, they were

456-9; Harrison to Eustis, August

likely to feel less threatened

with factions

among

the

by United

States' pressures.

Tecumseh

also

had contacts

Muskogee, the Choctaws, and several other
southern

tribes.

Finding support divided among
indigenous Americans, Tecumseh sought
assistance from

whom he believed were interested in trading fur but who

the British,

Indian land.

67

be derived from the fur

to the threat

posed by American expansionism and the benefits

trade, rather than to

the British and the Indians." 68
gifts,

take

This alliance, like previous British-Indian
coalitions, writes historian Colin

Calloway, "was testimony
to

would not

As Tecumseh

any friendship and mutual respect between

rejected

American annuity payments and

he saw the British as a useful source of supplies as well
as collaborators

impeding the United

in

States' territorial advances.

Relations between the Ohio Indian confederacy and the
British became even
closer after the Battle of Tippecanoe, in which American troops
attacked

pan-Native American alliance but failed to decisively defeat
started

its

offensive against the British and

few months

summer of

later,

its

indigenous

it.

allies

When

members of the

the United States

on the northern

frontier a

native troops played a crucial role in the defense of Canada. In the

1812, the Great Lake Indians under the leadership of Tecumseh played a

pivotal part in forcing back an American invasion. Fighters of Tecumseh's confederacy
also

were present when Americans surrendered Detroit to

lost his life

on Canadian

when he was

soil,

Johnston to Eustis, July

3,

1810,

M221,

killed

roll 38,

the British.

on October

68

Aug

18,

181

1813, at the Battle of

4614, National Archives; Johnston to

Eustis, July 25, 1810, ibid., roll 38, 4621; Johnston to Eustis,

4623; John Shaw to Johnston,

5,

Tecumseh himself

1, ibid., roll

Aug.

7,

1810,

ibid., roll 38,

38, 4625-7.

Colin Calloway, Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815 (Norman:

University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), for quote see 17-8.
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Thames while attempting
With

to aid the British in repudiating
another

the death of Tecumseh ended
the last effort

by Ohio Indians

American

offensive.

to resist the territorial

advances of Anglo Americans by military
means.

The

final

Treaty of Ghent.

blow

to the confederacy's aspirations to
sovereignty

On Christmas Eve,

resistance effort in the

the

1814, the British signed yet another peace treaty

with the United States without consulting their
Native American

marked the abandonment of the

came with

allies.

This treaty

British effort to actively support a Native

American

Ohio region.

Conclusion
For Ohio Indians the War of 1812

left

an important legacy. Regardless of which

side they supported during the conflict, their experiences during
and after the

1812 were similar. During the war, most Native Americans

in the region,

War of

whether friend

or foe to the United States, suffered from shortages of supplies as well as from the
destruction of their fields, houses, property, and livestock. In the years following the war,
the

Ohio Indians'

inability for militant resistance

undermined

their capabilities to

negotiate and contest the transformation of the region. Since a growing

number of first

nations faced increasing debt, poverty, and scarcity of resources, American Indians in

Ohio and Indiana had

American
after the

officials

to

submit to more Anglo-American

pushed Ohio Indians

War of 1812,

it

became

to

territorial

demands. As

submit to removal in the years and decades

clear that the region's indigenous people

were becoming

increasingly marginalized and unable to maintain their sovereignty in the region.
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CHAPTER 5
THIS

LAND IS OUR LAND:" AFRICANS IN THE EASTERN

CAPE AND THEIR

STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY

Like Native Americans

Cape continued

their efforts to

in the

Upper Ohio Valley, the

local peoples

shape their region's transformation

of the Eastern

in the first half of the

nineteenth century. Africans pursued various strategies
in their interactions with
colonialism, ranging from militant resistance to partial
accommodation. But the lines

between

tactics

of accommodation with, and resistance

to,

the colonial state and white

expansion in the Eastern Cape were even less clear than in the Upper
Ohio Valley.

Whereas so-called "government
Black Hoof, sought

chiefs," like the

at least partial

Miami,

accommodation and

Little Turtle, or the

Shawnee,

lent military support to the

States in the post-Treaty of Greenville years after 1795, only a

few groups

United

in the Eastern

Cape, like the Mfengu, followed such a strategy. The majority of western Xhosa factions
like the

Ngqika, Ndlambe, or Gqunukhwebe pursued changing alliances either

of or in opposition

waged with

the

had one goal

in

to,

the colony during the

Xhosa during

the

first

mind; to maintain as

numerous wars

that the

in support

Cape government

half of the nineteenth century. Ultimately, Africans

much of their independence and autonomy

as their

situation allowed.

Contested Grounds (Part
In the

first

I):

Rivalry, Christianity, Frontier Policy, and Sovereignty

three or four decades of the nineteenth century, various

as well as other Africans in the region, pursued a
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Xhosa

wide variety of strategies

factions,

in their

interactions with the

Cape Colony

in their efforts to maintain their
independence,

sovereignty, and autonomy. Especially in
the 1810s,
faction,

when

the leader of the

Ngqika, maintained a loose alliance with the
colony, he also attempted

establish stronger control over such
neighboring groups as the

Gqunukhwebe, and other smaller
the aftermath of the

War of

factions. After the

were not the only

how

a small

Christianity

tactic Africans

and missionaries as

and

1

how

sour.

implemented

number of Africans

concludes by examining

Ngqika

1818-19 through a dubious

Cape government turned progressively more

at

lost part

of their

territory in

treaty, their relations with the

Yet alliances with the colonial

state

to secure their position. This section looks

in the Eastern

Cape drew on or intended

allies in their struggle for sovereignty.

the

to

Ndlambe, the

Cape Colony's

The

to use

section

"frontier policy" throughout the 1820s

830s angered a growing number of western Xhosa factions.

Nxele and Ntsikana: The Rivalry of the Ndlambe and Ngqika to the

Throughout the 1810s, and

as briefly

Ngqika pursued a loose partnership with

the

mentioned

Ndlambe Xhosa and

their allies,

officials declared

accountable for

all acts

Ngqika

in chapter 3, the

Cape Colony. During

for example, colonial forces with the assistance of the

Cape

Ngqika

the

War of 1818-19
Xhosa

leader

War of 181 1-12,

Ngqika Xhosa defeated

the

and removed them from the Zuurveld. After the war,

the

paramount chief of the Xhosa, and held him

committed against the

with the colony were often ambiguous, these

colonists.

Even though Ngqika's

ties reinforced his increasing

among many of the western Xhosa. Numerous

western Xhosa

relations

unpopularity

who came to

see Ngqika's

position as compromised, believed that his strategy of partial accommodation with the
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colony was wrong. The fact that the
colonists reserved the right to retrieve
allegedly
stolen cattle

authority.

from Xhosa

Many Xhosa,

Colony as a major

territory led to

more

tensions,

and further undermined Ngqika's

including several of Ngqika's subjects,

came

to see the

Cape

threat.

The abduction of one of Ndlambe's wives by Ngqika

also fueled tensions, leading

a growing number of minor western Xhosa
chiefs and their supporters to defect and join
forces with

Ndlambe.

In

Amalinde. Ngqika and

October 1818,

his

remaining

frictions

allies

among

the

Xhosa

led to a clash at

were decisively defeated. But colonial

forces,

as discussed in chapter 3, with the military assistance
of the Ngqika, swiftly struck

against the

Ndlambe Xhosa

his supporters

in

December of 1818,

were eager to remain

at

despite

Ndlambe's appeal

that

peace with the colony. The Cape military

reclaimed Ngqika's territory and captured 23,000 of Ndlambe's

cattle,

of which only

9,000 were given to the Ngqikas. Military authorities distributed the remaining

among Dutch-speaking
loss

of cattle

result, the

left

their cattle as well.

cattle

farmers or sold them to defray the costs of the expedition. The

Ndlambe's people

Ndlambe

he and

in dire straits

and on the brink of starvation. As a

staged a renewed attack on the Ngqika, raiding the colony to reclaim

They

also declared that the British military intervention had been an

intrusion in an internal dynastic quarrel and a violation of their sovereignty. In their

views, the colony had no right to attack them, especially as the
the borders of the colony.

war.

Cape

military intervention

Ndlambe had

had amounted

not violated

to a declaration

of

1

1

The House ofPhalo, 58-63; Major Fraser to the Landrost of Uitenhage, Feb. 4,
1819, in RCC, XII: 134-136; Pringle, Narrative, 277-278; Switzer, Power and Resistance
in an African Society, 53. On the limitations of the power of chiefs and the fluidity of
factions among the Xhosa see for example Maclean, Compendium, 13, 24-25; Testimony
Peires,
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As with

the territorial dispossessions that proceeded
the

Upper Ohio Valley,
the persistent raids
leaders in

was

the

Xhosa

most

the crisis created

by commandos,

society.

influential

European culture and

the prophet

set the stage for the rise

of prophets as important

Nxele who became a prominent leader among the Ndlambes,

Xhosa prophet

in the early

Christianity.

in

decades of the nineteenth century.

Yet as the popularity of Nxele's message increased,
in his message. Instead

he embraced more

traditional

customs such as dance, polygamy, the use of red ochre body

demanded

gifts in

form of cattle. He also saw a

colonization.

He

Grahamstown, where he had been introduced

abandoned the Christian elements

by European

in the

by colonial encroachments on the Xhosa, including

had spent a considerable amount of time
to

War of 181 1-12

spiritual

component

Nxele considered the Eastern Cape as a

paint,

and he

to the contest created

battlefield

god of the blacks, which he called Mdalidiphu, and Thixo, the god of the

between the

whites.

He

preached that the whites had killed the son of the god of the blacks, likely a reference
Jesus Christ, and had therefore, been expelled to the sea.

From

to

there the colonists had

returned in search for land, and the prophet believed that Mdalidiphu would push them

back again. Nxele's emphasis on the symbolic division of land and

sea, representing the

Xhosa and

two groups.

the European, advocated a clear separation between the

2

The message proclaimed by another prophet named Ntsikana, which mixed
Christian and

Xhosa

homestead

Ndlambe's chiefdom, Ntsikana's

leader

who

in

religious elements, stood in clear contrast to that

spiritual services

of Nxele. Head of a

were rejected by

his

favored Nxele, which led Ntsikana to join ranks with Ngqika. Ntsikana

of Tshuka, Cape of Good Hope Report and Proceedings of the Government Commission
on Native Laws and Customs, 2 vols. (Cape Town: W. A. Richards and Sons, 1883), 1:
83-84; Kay, Travels and Researches, 50.
2

J.B. Peires,

The House of Phalo, 69-7;

Pringle, Narrative, 277-287.
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articulated a pacifist message, urged his
followers to

accommodation
the battle

to colonial expansion.

among

the

He

embrace

Christianity,

and advocated

also directly challenged Nxele's

cosmology of

good god of the blacks Mdalidiphu and

the evil

god of the whites

Thixo, which was in Nxele's views represented in
the struggle between Xhosa and
colonists. Instead, Ntsikana argued that this contest
did not exist

had one

common god

in Thixo.

and

that all

humankind

Ntsikana also embraced the Christian concept of the

divinity of Jesus Christ, Thixo's son. In a religious

hymn, written by Ntsikana, he

depicted this god as a protector and unifier.

the one

which oppose each

we put

other.

He

is

the leader

"He

who

is

has led us.

on." Submission to god, the prophet believed,

in 1821,

who

brings together herds

He

the great blanket

is

would bring peace. Before

which
his death

Ntsikana encouraged his followers to join Christian missions in Xhosaland,

embrace European

religion, farming, clothing, housing,

to

and education. Even though

Ntsikana's message was never popular with a large number of Xhosa, historians and
religious scholars underscore the importance of his vision since

it

set the stage for the

spread of an African Christianity in the southern part of the continent. Thus, Nxele's and
Ntsikana's strategies became "models" for Africans in the Eastern Cape, aiding them in
conceptualizing their interactions with European colonization. 3

Whereas Ntsikana pursued a

strategy of accommodation,

militant resistance against the colony. During the

War of 1818-19,

alleged that the prophet Nxele had encouraged the

attacks

Cape

3

on the Cape and

officials also

Peires,

to

Nxele proclaimed

Ndlambes

to

colonial officials

commit small

plunder and destroy Christian missions in Xhosa

scale

territory.

argued that Nxele had ordered a frontal assault against Grahamstown

The House ofPhalo, 72-74; David Chidester, Religions of South Africa (New

York: Routledge, 1992), 48-49.
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on April 22, 1819. This was an unusual

tactical

maneuver

for the

Xhosa who

preferred to

confront British and Cape forces in the thick
of the bush. Xhosa confidence in the success

of their attack seemed

to

have been further boosted by Nxele's prediction

that the

Xhosa's ancestors would arise from the dead to support
the endeavor and that

their

enemies' bullets would be turned to water. But the
Xhosa were no match to the firepower

of Khoikhoi and British soldiers as well as
town's defensive

lines.

Of the

that

of the colonists, and failed to breach the

over 6,000 fighters that joined in the attack, several

4
hundred were killed or wounded and the survivors fled toward the
Kei River.

In retaliation for the assault

fighters struck against the

in the

Cape

in

on Graham's Town, colonial forces and 600 Ngqika

Ndlambes and

their allies. This

which colonial forces conducted

total

was one of a

Xhosa

artillery,

fighters.

They bombarded bushes

in

who had

further violence.

He was

On August

15,

fallen behind the

which the Xhosa were hiding with

and killed or drove out thousands of Xhosa from the

and the Keiskamma River.

of conflicts

warfare against Africans. The

invading army killed elderly persons, women, and children
fleeing

series

Nxele surrendered

territory

between the Fish

to British troops to avoid

imprisoned on Robben Island, and drowned during an attempted

escape in 1820. After Nxele's surrender, colonial forces struck against the Gcaleka Xhosa
east of the

Kei River, capturing 30,000

cattle, despite their

paramount leader Hintsa's

assurances to colonial officials of his peaceful stance toward the Cape. Colonial officials
justified this attack

Ndlambes.

4

by arguing

that the

Gcaleka harbored stolen

and had aided the

5

Pringle, Narrative, 277-87. Stockenstrom, Autobiography,

Bathurst,

cattle

May

22, 1819, in

RCC,

XII: 193-202.
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1: 1

15-166; Somerset to

.

As mentioned

earlier, the

War of 1818-19

resulted in dramatic land losses for the

western Xhosa. Colonial forces pushed the
Ndlambes and their

Keiskamma River. Furthermore, and
Sommerset pressured Ngqika

Keiskamma

The Cape

River.

justification to dispossess all

to also surrender his land

between the Fish and the

authorities used this agreement with

Xhosa

it

in the area.

Ngqika

as a

Many western Xhosa were

angered by

was "never ceded," and

that

it

could have been ceded." Groups like the Ndlambes, the

Gqunukhwebe, and

other smaller factions of the western

Xhosa questioned

the treaty, reasserted their sovereignty, and challenged British claims.
that

of the

despite his assistance to the colony, Governor

these territorial losses. Their leaders argued that their
land

was "impossible

allies east

the legality of

They maintained

Ngqika "could give away no part of our territory without our consent." 6 The

Gqunukhwebe

chiefs

Kama and Pato complained that their loss

of land was "owing

probably to some blunder of the interpreters." Pato argued that "[i]f we had known Gaika
[Ngqika] dared to give away any part of the country
the Xhosa's understanding of the 1819 removals

we would have opposed

was

that the territorial loss

it."

Instead

was not

permanent, and that they would be eventually allowed to reoccupy their land. 7

5

Sommerset to the Earl of Bathurst, Sept. 24, 1819, in RCC, XII: 319-322. For the
Cape's campaign against the Xhosa see for example Maclennan, A Proper Degree of
Terror, 200-217
6

Quote see South African Commercial Advertizer, April 3, 1830. On this issue see also
Testimony of Stockenstrom, Aug. 14, 1835, BPP 538/1836, 46; W. Shaw to the Earl of
Aberdeen, April
7

7,

1835, in

BPP 252/1835,

137-142.

South African Commercial Advertizer, April

1826,

BPP 50/1835,

177-178.
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10, 1830;

Shaw

to

J.

Gregory, April

6,

Christianity and the African Struggle for Sovereignty
In their struggle to maintain sovereignty and
autonomy,

Eastern Cape saw Christianity, missions, and missionaries
as

some Africans

new

in the

strategic possibilities.

Missions, for example, provided Khoisans with limited
access to land and a measure of
protection from abuse and violence
in the early nineteenth century, the

many Khoikhoi

insurrectionists

by farmers. After an insurrection among

the Khoikhoi

LMS mission of Bethelsdorp became a refuge for

who would

otherwise have suffered assassinations or

ill-

treatment by farmers in revenge for their uprising. Elizabeth Elbourne points
out,

however, that not

all

Khoisan conversions were solely instrumental. They rather took the

messages of Christianity "in accordance with

Khoisan and other "converts" developed
Christianity independently of colonists.

their

their

By

own needs and

existing situations."

8

assumptions about and interpretations of

adhering to pastoralist lifeways whenever

possible, Khoikhoi, attempted also to preserve their personal and

communal

identity.

9

Yet, as elaborated on in chapter 3, in the 1820s and 1830s missions and other Khoisan

communities were also places with high
despair,

rates

and an increasing burden of debt - a

humanitarian writings.

of poverty, rising alcoholism, social
fact that

remained generally unaddressed

in

10

Africans within the colony frequently connected their social grievances to the loss

of land. "The loss of our country reduced us to poverty," asserted Valentyn Jacobs, a

Elbourne, Blood Ground, 174.
9

Elbourne, Blood Ground, 130-146, 156-159, 174, 236. On the Khoikhoi rebellion see
Susan Newton-King and V.C. Malherbe, The Khoikhoi Rebellion in the Eastern Cape,

1799-1803 (Rondebosch: Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, 1981).
10

Elbourne, Blood Ground, 260-262; Elphick and Malherbe, "Khoisan to 1828," in The
Shaping of South African Society, 46; Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 117.
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Khoisan

leader, in a public meeting, "then

whole year for a

of the 50

Cow or a Heiffer." Access to

who were

Khoisans

th

came

land was thus a major

we

asked that the remainder of the land

granted to the Hottentots, but this

was not acceded

Commercial Advertiser in 1834.

to,"

still

us work a

demand

for

in the

Colony might be

wrote a Khoikhoi commentator in

"It is true, the

the Hottentots a small parcel of land at Kat River, for
is

made

increasingly frustrated with their situation. 11 "After
the promulgation

Ordinance

the South African

the brandy and [that]

which we

Government has granted

are always grateful: but

it

calculated that the Hottentot nation counts 30,000 souls and there are
only 5,000 at Kat

But even

River."

at

Kat River, despite limited economic success and material

accumulation, non-white settlers received

little

James Read junior, James Read's son who was
a minister at

of the promised government assistance.
part Khoikhoi

and

like his father served as

Kat River, wrote:

To

get implements of husbandry they had to dispose of their oxen and
horses. To support life they had to run into debt with a shopkeeper who

them to buy things on credit (no doubt in expectation of
getting a mortgage on their lands) but being foiled in this attempt, came
upon them with summons before they were either aware or prepared to
meet the demands.
after enticing

Due

to

such developments and crammed on limited land with no hope for new

Kat River
colonists

whites.

settlers

who by

territory,

faced a steady economic decline, especially compared with white
the 1840s and 1850s also increasingly desired the fertile lands of non-

13

ii

Quote Elbourne, Blood Ground, 260.

12

South African Commercial Advertiser, June 25, 1834. See also South African

Commercial Advertiser, Feb. 20, 1830.
13

James Read Jun.

to

John

Philip,

Nov.

16, 1835, in
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Kitchingman Papers, 156-159,

Khoisans,

who were

often of Christian background, also protested
the eventually

unsuccessful Vagrancy Legislation of 1834, discussed
in chapter
to

compel non-whites

to perform

3.

This law threatened

to find "legal settlement," a master, or face
the

work on public

projects.

As

danger of being senl

several historians point out, the Vagrancy

Legislation of 1834 challenged traditional Khoisan

modes of subsistence such

as

pastoralism as well as hunting and gathering. The 1834 law
especially targeted Khoisans

who eked

out a living on unallocated crown lands, and attempted to
compel them to join

the Cape's non-white labor force. Khoisan speakers

Vagrancy Legislation posed a clear

made

frequently remarked that

threat to their "liberties"

a danger to individual Khoikhoi, but

and "rights."

It

was not only

was an "oppression of the [Khoikhoi]

'nation'."

Other Khoikhoi speakers denounced the law as racially oppressive. Khoisan

frustration

it

over colonial labor and land policy, and
rhetoric,

would only grow

its

in the following

dissonance with imperial humanitarian

decades as the Cape passed harsher

apprenticeship and Masters and Servants laws.

In the

1

820s, several

Xhosa

their struggle to maintain political,

relationships built

economic, and social independence for their people -

The aging Ndlambe,

settle in his territory in the

potentially useful advisors

I

chiefs looked at missionaries as potential allies in

on differing goals and objectives, mutual misunderstandings,

ambiguities, and discord.

permission to

14

is

who gave

missionaries

mid- 1820s, considered the missionaries

to

be

and protectors.

see indeed strange things to-day.

The Missionary

for instance,

come

to

be

I

am old and unable to

defend myself.

my great Captain. My eye shall he be and

14

Elbourne, Blood Ground, 274-276; Crais, White Supremacy and Black Resistance, 147;
Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 120-122.
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my ear also.
been

To-day does

safe; but the

it

appear that

I

have

friends.

.

.

Never have we

umfundis [missionaries/teachers] shall be our bush. 15

Political reasons also motivated the influential

Gqunukhwebe

leader Pato to

presence of missionaries. In 1823, Pato told the missionary
William
serve

him

as a "bescherm bosh"

- a "bush of defence from wind and

and Shaw clashed frequently over

ceremony "apparently

in

Shaw

welcome

the

that he should

rain."

16

Still,

Pato

cultural differences. Pato, for example, left a marriage

Shaw preached

anger" after

against polygamy. Furthermore,

leaders like Hintsa, the paramount chief of the Gcaleka Xhosa,
or Ngqika, were

extremely reluctant to accept missions in their

work among

the Xhosa,

major leaders due

Xhosa

Shaw complained

that

he

still

to their resistance. Yet, missionaries

leaders like Pato's brother

Xhosa "conversion"

follower of Ntsikana

who

to Christianity

was unable

to baptize

any of the

had some success with minor

was a

transitional process

life

by using

shaped by religious

and career of Soga. Soga was a

quickly abandoned the mission at

death, and built a thriving homestead

own

After four years of missionary

Kama and Dyani Tshatshu a Ntinde. 17

syncretism, a development exemplified by the

conducted his

territory.

irrigation

Chumie

after the prophet's

and plow agriculture. There he

version of Xhosa Christian services, performing only the

hymns and

prayers of Ntsikana. Soga also practiced polygamy, allowed his followers to practice
ancestral rituals, and like other

Xhosa

leaders conferred with diviners. In addition, and

15

Kay, Travels and Researches, 73.

16

William Shaw, Memorials of South Africa (New York: Negro University Press, 1970),

280-283.
17

William Shaw, The Journal of William Shaw,
Balkema, 1972), 72-86; 90-91.
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ed.

W.D. Hammond-Tooke (Cape Town

along with Dukwana, Ntsikana's son, and
an evangelist leader

at

vehemently opposed the Cape Colony's annexations
of Xhosa

lands.

War of 1834-35,

Before the

Chumie

mission, he

18

missionaries and white visitors often drew a

deceptively successful picture of developments at
Xhosa missions and of the conversion

of Xhosa to Christianity. W.R. Thomson, a merchant
and member of the English

Graham's Town,

elite in

living

for example, favorably described changes

on the Chumie mission and

towards civilisation."

He

the European fashion."

their

improvements

in

among the Xhosa

"mode of life and advances

reported that the settlement had "30 houses.

Thomson welcomed

the fact that

.

men built the

.

constructed in

mission's houses

and gardens, rather than women, as had been customary among the Xhosa.

had "trained

to the

yoke and worked

their

own

obtained varying proficiencies in "ploughing,

hand or

pit

oxen." Male residents at

wagon

settler

A few men

Chumie had

driving, brick laying, sawing, with

saws, planing, [and] thatching." The Inhabitants of Chumie also began to

"rear a few potatoes and culinary vegetables" along with "their usual crops," and

had adopted European

dress.

19

some

Yet such portrayals were drawn from a European

perspective, and often provided an incomplete representation of developments on

Xhosa

missions.

Prior to the 1850s, missionaries had only limited success

Historian Colin

Bundy

writes that

perhaps 400,000, lived on mission

18

Rev.

W. Chalmers

among

by 1850 only about 16,000, out of a
stations.

to Lt. Col. Smith,

Moreover,

June 20, 1836,

W.R. Thomson

to

John Gregory, April 30, 1825,

Shaw, Journal, 68.
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total

population of

many Xhosa "converts" joined the

BPP 503/1837, 266; Janet

Hodgson, "Soga and Dukwana: The Christian Struggle for Liberation
South Africa," Journal of Religion in Africa XVI, 3 ( 1 986), 1 87-208.
19

the Xhosa.

BPP 50/1835,

in

mid- 19

th

Century

185-187; see also

anti-colonial resistance during the

remained skeptical toward
Stephen Kay

no use

for

in

me

to

Christianity.

Clearly, the majority of Xhosa

One Xhosa,

for instance, told the missionary

1825 that "I have lived long in the world, without
God; therefore

By

the 1840s

is

of

and 1850s, Xhosa leaders saw missionaries as

other than threats to African sovereignty and agents
of empire. During the

little

it

change now." 20 The attitudes of many Xhosa leaders
toward

missionaries also changed.

1

War of 1850-53.

War of

850-53, the Ngqika paramount chief Sandile, for example, expressed
his frustration with

missionaries,

who

at

me?"
take

whom he saw as challenging the social

order he desired. "Are they not

home have no people of their own, and they come

Sandile exclaimed. "I will allow no

here to take

more of them among

men

my people from

my people. They only

my people and give them to the Government. What brings white men over the sea? -

has not

God

put

The Xhosa and

it

between us and them?"21

the

Cape Colony's Frontier

As mentioned

earlier, in the first

Policy

decades of the nineteenth century, numerous

western Xhosa grew increasingly frustrated with the Cape Colony's frontier policy.

of them especially perceived the removal of Maqoma and

his people

region in the late 1820s, discussed in more detail in chapter
sovereignty.

It

especially angered the Ngqika, to

which

3, as a

Many

from the Kat River

challenge to their

Maqoma belonged, who

angrily

Quote Kay, Travels and Researches, 36. See also Colin Bundy, Rise and Fall of the
South African Peasantry (Cape Town: David Philip, 1979), 40; Peires, House ofPhalo,
74-78.
21

Quote George Brown, Personal Adventure in South Africa (London: James
Blackwood, 1855), 154. See also Henry Calderwood, Caffres and Caffre Missions; with
Preliminary Chapters on the Cape Colony as a Field for Emigration and Basis of
Military Operation (London: James Nisbet, 1858), 210.
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questioned the claim by Cape officials that their
former leader Ngqika had ceded the Kat

River region as part of a

treaty.

The Ngqika

administrators that their removal

also rejected claims

was justified by

by colonial

their aggression against their northern

neighbors the Thembu, an attack which according to the
Xhosa had been

response to

Thembu

cattle stealing.

Furthermore,

Maqoma protested the

made

in

confiscation of

1,400 head of cattle. The Ngqika argued that they had been "friends"
of the English and

had "assisted" them over the years, which made the removal and
colonial

"most

difficult thing" to understand.

Cattle raids

among

the

cattle raids the

22

Xhosa by

colonial patrols, allegedly in retaliation for

African livestock theft throughout the 1820s and 1830s, further fanned their anger.
Testifying in front of the

Commission on Aborigines

Stockenstrom reported that Xhosa frequently told him:

you shoot

if

they

come

the territorial violations

country you

make

into

23

that "for every

cow you

In 1823, a single military patrol led by

military officer and the governor's son,

Xhosaland. Colonial patrols were

at

women and children - and claiming

was rumored

to

take from our

Henry Sommerset, a

have captured 7,000

cattle in

times accused of attacking innocent Xhosa

cattle

from villages

of different communities. Other observers suspected
cattle to authorities for fear

"We do not care how many Xhosa

your country, and you catch them stealing." But they opposed

by commandos, claiming

a thief."

1835 in London, Andries

in

for thefts

-

killing

committed by members

that several villages

handed over

of being attacked by commandos. Some Xhosa attempted

22

Xhosa to Gov. Sir B D'Urban, Dec. 31, 1834,
African Commercial Advertiser, May 16, 1829.
23

BPP 503/1837, 49.

See also South

Testimony Strockenstrom, Aug. 19, 1835, BPP 538/1836, 83. See also letter of H.
Huntley to the Commission of the Inquiry, Jan. 17, 1826, BPP 50/1835, 184-185.
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to

resist colonial efforts to take cattle

by attacking

diplomatic solutions. Yet emissaries

military patrols. Others attempted to find

who tried to travel

presence of patrols faced the danger of being shot
into the colony.

On numerous occasions,

the

at,

into the colony to discuss the

Xhosa were forbidden

as

to cross

Xhosa did cooperate with commandos.

In

April 1832, for example, a group of Xhosa aided a patrol
in an attack on a faction from a

neighboring homestead, accused of having killed two soldiers. 24
In the early 1830s, the situation escalated further, as a growing

Xhosa came

to see the

sovereignty.

The Ngqika

encroachments by commandos as an intolerable violation of their
leader

intrusions of the patrol system

fire to[o],

their

and

I

number of western

Maqoma,

on

for instance,

his people: "I

am

can only sleep with one eye open."

complained about the constant

shot every day;

He

also

my huts

grumbled

are set [on]

that his people in

mountain exile suffered from death and hunger. 25 At a meeting with Stockenstrom

in 183

1

,

Ngqika leaders assured the Cape

But they seemed

certain "that the white

foot of land or a gat cow."

government claimed

that

26

The

"we

official that they

man will

influential

not

Xhosa

let

us

would

try to maintain peace.

sit still,

as long as

leader Tyhali protested that the

are at peace with you, but during that peace

murdered, our chiefs have been

killed,

we have

a

Cape

we have been

our people murdered. What sort of peace

is

that

The Wrongs of the Caffre Nation (London: James Duncan, 1837), 1 14-1 15,
1 17-121; Graham 's Town Journal, April 13, Aug. 17, Sept. 7, 1832. Lieut. W. H. Rogers
to Lt. Col. H. Sommerset, Jan. 13, 1826, BPP 252/1835, 145-146; Commissioners of
Inquiry to Lt. Col. Henry Somerset, Jan. 27, 1826, ibid., 146-147; Thomas Pringle to the
Justus,

Commission of Inquiry,

Jan. 12, 1826,

25

BPP 50/1835,

Testimony of Tshatshu, June 20, 1 836,
Commercial Advertiser, Dec. 7, 1833.

26

Stockenstrom, Autobiography,

1:

183-184.

BPP 538/1 836,

398-399.
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571 See also South African
.

which has murdered 44 of our men." 27 Late
by a military patrol became the

They were now unwilling
on

in 1834, the injuring

final offence for

to tolerate

many Ngqika Xhosa and

of their

on the colony. The Cape military had "disturbed

in pieces."

their allies.

anymore the encroachments by colonial commandos

their territory, reacted angrily to the annexations

attack

of another Xhosa leader

cattle,

and responded with an

the peace of the land, and torn

it

28

Contested Grounds (Part

African Strategies of Partial Accommodation.

II):

Resistance, and the Search for Sovereignty. 1835-1853

As

discussed in chapter

especially strong

among

the

3,

Xhosa

resistance during the

War of 1834-35 was

Ngqika and Ndlambe. They attacked colonial

settlements,

missions, farms, and wagons, and plundered sheep, cattle, and horses. Ngqika resistance

was

further spurred

according to Cape

by anger over the

officials, the

not agreed to the land cession.

the anti-colonial struggle

Ngqika had conceded. Most Xhosa believed

One Xhosa

it

11

W. Chalmers

28

had

set

him on

fire,"

and

that

loss

of land.

"he fought

in

hopes of

29

getting

Rev.

that they

chief reported, for example, that the leader of

Maqoma, was extremely angry about the

According to Stretch, "the subject always
back."

of the "Ceded Territory" - land, which

loss

to

D'Urban, Feb.

6,

1835,

BPP 503/1837,

156.

D'Urban, Jan. i, 1835, BPP 503/1837, 48. See also Xhosa to Col.
Somerset and D'Urban, Dec. 31, 1834, ibid., 49-50; Chalmers to D'Urban, Feb. 6, 1835,

Maqoma to

ibid.,

29

82-83.

Quotation in Stretch, Journal,

Col. England to D'Urban,

May

17.

7,

For Xhosa attacks against the colony see for example

1835,

Documents Relating

150.
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to the

War of 1835,

147-

Militant resistance

was not

Mfengu, who emerged as a

the only strategy pursued

politically

by Africans. Groups

like the

independent faction of the Xhosa during the

War

of 1834-35, pursued tactics of partial accommodation
to European colonization with the
intention of gaining and, later, maintaining as

much of their

sovereignty as possible.

Overall, however, the line between militant resisters and
those seeking

remained

much more

blurred. In the Eastern

Cape most indigenous

Ndlambe, the Gqunukhwebe, and even the Kat River

some

settlers

factions like the

woul4 support

the colony in

conflicts, yet refused their support in others.

The Creation of the Mfengu: The War of 1834-35 and
Colonial officials responded to the Ngqika and

War of 1834-35

both night and day.

war

is

Aftermath

Ndlambe

in

which Cape forces conducted the

complained that the assaults had put them "in a dreadful

this

its

attacks that initiated the

with a relentless counter-offensive, leading the Ngqika and Ndlambe to

complain about the severity

when

accommodation

You bum

state

conflict.

of alarm.

The Xhosa

We are hunted

houses and destroy our cornfields. What shall

we

live

on

over?" Yet, Ngqika and Ndlambe resistance continued for several

months, and was based predominantly in the Amatola mountains, an area which colonial
forces found especially hard to subjugate.

By

30

April 1835, as noted earlier, the Cape military focused

the Gcaleka

Xhosa

area, rendering

east

of the Kei River. The Gcaleka lived in a

them more vulnerable

to military attacks.

its

campaign instead on

much more

Governor

flat

D 'Urban accused the

Gcaleka paramount Hintsa of "playing a double game" by harboring "plundered

30

Quotation in Stretch, Journal, 65
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and open

cattle in

his territory,"

and by actively supporting Ngqika and Ndlambe

campaign eventually led

to the capture, killing,

more
the

Xhosa word ukumfenguza

Mfengu
as

to the colony.

identity formation.

- of the Mfengu people,
(to

They

a

name

- or perhaps,

believed to be derived from

seek service). Scholars widely disagree on the issue of
believe though that the groups that later

became known

Mfengu, largely consisted of mostly northern migrants who attached
themselves

Xhosa

in the first

number of the

decades of the nineteenth century.

so-called

Mfengu

settled at the

By the mid-1 830s,

Methodist mission

direction of the missionary John Ayliff. Ayliff seemed keen
the

Xhosa and

They now passed

as

existed between the

Mfengu, since apparently few

Xhosa and

the Mfengu.

Mfengu

as a

from the Xhosa. Also with

Mfengu joined

the

to

strife

cultural

in joining the

and

among

also

Mfengu.

linguistic differences

32

due to the strong lobbying of Ayliff,

poor and oppressed people who needed the protection of the

British empire

D'Urban

Butterworth under the

on promoting

who saw advantages

Official colonial discourse in the Cape,

portrayed the

at

to the

a growing

Mfengu. Under the missionary's auspices, the Mfengu were

the

joined by a significant number of Xhosa

31

31

the Gcaleka also led to the so-called "liberation"

accurately, the creation

The Cape's

and mutilation of Hintsa, and reparation

payments of 25,000 heads of cattle by the Gcaleka Xhosa

The war against

resistance.

the

encouragement of Ayliff, numerous

campaign against the Gcaleka Xhosa and,

Lord Glenelg, March

19, 1835,

BPP 279/1836,

after the war,

an estimated

10-11; Sarhili to D'Urban,

Dec. 11, 1835, BPP 503/1837, 15-16. See also Peires, House ofPhalo, 111-1
Imperial Networks, 124-125.
32

12; Lester,

See for example Peires, The House ofPhalo, 87-89, 110-111; Davenport and Saunders,
South Africa, 65; Lester, Imperial Networks, 89-94; Keegan, Colonial South Africa and
the Origins of the Racial Order, 145-147; Switzer, Power and Resistance, 58-60; Bundy,
Rise and Fall, 33-34.
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16,000 to 17,000

Mfengu moved west of the Kei

Governor D'Urban likened

this "liberation"

River. In letters to the colonial office,

with "the great national act of negro

emancipation" - the abolition of slavery in the British Empire in
33
the early 1830s.

Though

the Secretary of State for colonial affairs in London, Lord
Glenelg,

felt

"quite

unable to perceive the slightest accuracy in [D'Urban's] comparison,"
he responded
the fait accompli that the

Mfengu had

to

entered "British protection," by suggesting that

they should be settled "on territory to the westward of the Keiskamma, from
which the
Caffres were expelled," and used as a military buffer against the Xhosa. 34

The Xhosa

in contrast

were outraged by these developments. Xhosa leaders

accused the Mfengu of ingratitude toward the people
Hintsa's son Sarhili also accused the

the

Xhosa when they joined

relations with those

Mfengu of having
35

the British.

of the colonists and

Moreover,

their

now

fed them in times of need.

stolen 30,000

head of cattle from

Maqoma compared Xhosa-Mfengu

Khoikhoi laborers, and protested

Xhosa had frequently returned runaway Khoikhoi
whereas the colony

who had

that the

laborers at the request of the colony,

"detained" the Xhosa's laborers

calamity rose up against us and carried off [our] cattle."

"who

in the

day of public

36

For English accounts of the victimization of the Mfengu by the Xhosa see for example
D'Urban to the Earl of Aberdeen, June 19, 1835, BPP 279/1836, 16-17; John Ayliff and
Joseph Whiteside, History of the Abambo Generally Known as Fingos (Cape Town: C.
Struick, 1962); John Ayliff to the Editor of the Graham 's Town Journal, Aug. 17, 1835,

BPP 503/1837,
34

Lord Glenelg

245-246; Smith, Autobiography,

to

D'Urban, Dec. 26, 1835,

2: 33.

BPP 279/1836,

35

70.

South African Commercial Advertiser, July 1 8, 1 835; Sarhili to D'Urban, Dec. 11,
1835, BPP 503/1837, 15-16. Peires argues that the Mfengu took 22,000 cattle from the

Xhosa. Peires, House of Phalo, 110-111.
36

Quoted

in Stretch, Journal, 126.
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For the Mfengu, on the other hand, the collaboration
with the colony brought
certain advantages such as cattle as

campaign plunder, access

military protection, and political sovereignty.

to land, potential British

The Mfengu seemed

strategy of pursuing an alliance with the British

seemed more

to believe that the

beneficial than one with the

Xhosa. In subsequent decades the Mfengu emerged as strong military

and many Mfengu worked as agricultural laborers

allies

of the Cape,

in the colony, while others

became

independent agricultural producers. 37

During the

War of 1834-35,

as in every conflict fought in the

Cape

in the first half

of the nineteenth century, the colony depended on the military assistance of African
allies. In this

war, Khoisans, several smaller Xhosa factions, and the

the suppression of anti-colonial resistance

Mfengu supported

by the Ngqika and Ndlambe. As

in previous

wars, Khoisan fighters played a central role in the Cape's military campaigns. After
aiding in the attacks against the Gcaleka,

Ndlambe and Ngqika.

Pato,

Mfengu

Kama, and Kobe and

fighters aided in the

their

Gqunukhwebe,

war

against the

as well as

Tzatzoe's Ntinde, assisted the Cape, by protecting and escorting Europeans safely out of

Xhosa

territory.

They

also provided scouts

and troops for several campaigns. About 1200

Gqunukhwebe and 300 Mfengu combatants,
efforts to clear the

river.

mountainous range

for instance, assisted colonial forces in their

that reached

from the Chumie

to the Buffalo

38

See for example Richard Moyer, "The Mfengu, Self-Defence and the Cape Frontier
Wars," in R. Derricourt and Christopher Saunders, eds. Beyond the Cape Frontier
(London: Longmann,1974), 101-102.
38

D'Urban

to T. Spring Rice, Feb. 27, 1835,

Documents Relating

to the

D'Urban, June 1, 1835, ibid., 194-196; Smith to D'Urban, June
201; Ayliff and Whiteside, History, 35; Stretch, Journal, 86-87.

Smith

to

202

War of 1835,
3,

1835,

81;

ibid.,

Collaboration with colonial forces posed problems
and risks for Africans.

Khoisan

soldiers, for example, frequently faced

service, unlike that of white colonists,

was

poor treatment and degradation. Their

often extended, leading Khoisan

the plowing or harvesting season. For this, they
received

Kat River

settlers,

who

by

their supporters.

leader to join the

some Xhosa

or no compensation. The

also assisted the colony, faced several severe

their territory causing severe destruction. 39

desertion

little

Xhosa

allies

Xhosa

attacks

on

of the colony faced the risk of

Seven hundred of Pato's men,

Ngqika and Ndlambe

men to miss

for instance,

abandoned

their

resistance. Anti-colonial factions also pressured

collaborators to flee to the colony. 40

After months of conflict, Ngqika and

Ndlambe

resistance

came

to a halt in

September 1835. But as historian Jeffrey Peires emphasizes, these western Xhosa
factions

"were not beaten," and had only surrendered with the understanding

remained "autonomous

Xhosa had

tributaries

41

of the British."

that they

Thus, in their views, the western

retained their sovereignty from the colony.

The. Xhosa suffered tremendous losses during the war. According to Les Switzer,

no information

exists

on

fighters died as a result

estimated 60,000

cattle,

civilian casualties, but

of the

thousands of sheep, and hundreds of horses, and the Ngqika and

on Kat River settlement see

to Lieut. Col. Smith, Jan. 12, 1835,

Plaatje (Khoikhoi),
40

Furthermore, colonial forces confiscated an

conflict.

Stretch, Journal, 88-94. For attacks

Armstrong

he estimates that about 4000 Xhosa

March

6,

1835,

ibid.,

BPP 503/1837,

Jan. 2, 1835;

example A.B.

84; Statement of Klaas

88-89.

Statement of Klaas Plaatje (Khoikhoi), March

Graham 's Town Journal,

for

6,

W. Shaw to

BPP 252/1835,

1835,

BPP 503/1837,

88-89;

the Earl of Aberdeen, April 7, 1835,

141-142; Charles Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kafir Lives and History
(Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1977), 27-29.

41

Peires,

House of Phalo,

113.
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Ndlambe had

Keiskamma

to contend themselves with a

River.

much

smaller territory west of the

42

Colonial officials parceled up Xhosa land and removed
them by

clearing and burning their villages.

The Cape government moved over 70,000 Xhosa

into

an area of approximately 7,000 square miles, where the
population density was,
according to the South African Commercial Advertiser,
"about Ten times greater than,
in the

Colony

43

itself."

the Ngqika's and

Colonial officials settled mostly British farmers and Mfengu on

Ndlambe's

lands,

and erected several

forts in the region.

Xhosa

factions

if

like the

Gqunukhwebe, who had

homelands. Colonial

encouraged these groups to switch

officials

agricultural production,

and

assisted the British during the war, remained

to

keep "their

tribes

to

on

their

European modes of

on the most friendly terms with the

44

colonists."

The Colonial Office's order
in 1836, spurred the

reinstitution

Xhosa -

to

abandon Queen Adelaide Province, implemented

especially the

of the pre-war situation

Ngqika and Ndlambe - to demand

in respect to their territorial

and

the

political

sovereignty. During a meeting with the newly appointed Lieutenant Governor Andries

Strockenstrom, the Xhosa emphasized their sovereign status, demanded the "restitution of
the country from

the

which

[they]

had been expelled, and complained of the suppression of

power of the Chiefs." The Xhosa

also desired "the free exercise of their customs

connected with" what Europeans in the Cape termed "witchcraft" and the "eating up
system." Stockenstrom heeded these demands as he believed

42

43

Switzer,

Power and Resistance

in

See Napier to Glenelg, Nov.
Oct. 10, 1838, ita/., 37-38

8,

impossible "to undermine

an African Society, 57-58.

South African Commercial Advertiser, Feb.

44

it

1838,

3,

1836.

BPP 424/1851,

204

39. See also

J.

Hare

to Napier,

the

power of the" Xhosa

leaders, while "at the

same time" keeping "the nation

subjection and order, without a force far beyond
what even

now we have

at

in

our disposal."

Yet, even the potential threat of renewed
African militant resistance did not lead the Cape
to

heed

to all

of the Xhosa's demands. For instance, Ndlambe and
Ngqika requests

removal of the Mfengu, white

settlers,

as the restoration of cattle taken by the

The settlement of Mfengu on
considered the

Mfengu

and of the military

forts

Mfengu remained

unsuccessful.

their lands severely

from

for the

their lands, as well
45

angered the Xhosa. They

as competitors for a shrinking territorial basis

and as

thieves,

and

they wanted their land and cattle returned. In the view of many
Xhosa, the Mfengu were

"dogs fattening before
hold so dear."

their eyes

upon

the flocks of a chief [Hintsa]

whose memory they

46

Yet, the tensions and rivalry between the
rhetoric. In the aftermath

of the

War of 1834-35,

between the Mfengu and Xhosa, and continued

Xhosa and Mfengu went beyond mere
several clashes over cattle occurred

for years to

come. In August 1837, for

example, a faction of several hundred Ndlambe under the leadership of Seyolo accused
the

Mfengu

were

killed

Mfengu

in the Fort

and an alleged 1,500

at the

especially the

45

46

47

Peddie area of cattle

theft. In

cattle taken.

The

an ensuing fight several Mfengu

tensions between the

time were probably worsened by the drought that

Ndlambes and Ngqikas on

Stockenstrom, Autobiography,

2:

Stockenstrom to D'Urban, Aug.

their

Xhosa and

hit the region, hurting

diminished land base

47

100-102.

3,

1

837,

BPP 424/1 85

1

,

20-22.

See also Stockenstrom to D'Urban, Aug. 3,
1837, BPP 424/1851, 20-22; J.M. Bowker to D'Urban, Aug. 3, 1837, ibid., 17-18. South
African Commercial Advertiser, March 3, 1838. See also ibid., Sept. 16, 1837.

Graham 's Town Journal, Aug.

10, 1837.
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Treaties, Labor,

Commandos and

Autonomy: The Changing

As

According
horses.

At

3, the

by white

the

same

time,

Xhosa

to their

drought in the Eastern Cape also coincided with an
about Xhosa livestock raids against the colony.

ranged in the thousands of cattle and hundreds of

many Xhosa

frequently cooperated with

Cape

authorities.

On

leaders aided in the persecution of thieves, or returned livestock

owners. Xhosa chiefs also aided in the apprehension of deserters

fled into Xhosaland.

who

48

The harsh circumstances

in the post

War of 1834-35

led to the migration of an estimated 6,000 Africans into the

years in the Eastern Cape,

Albany

growing number worked as Merino sheep herders, aided as laborers
or took up

and

and Economic World of Africans, 1834-47

settlers

to colonists their losses

several occasions

and horses

Political

discussed in chapter

increase in complaints

the Challenge to African Sovereignty

employment

in other sectors

of the Cape economy.

49

district alone.

in

Here a

wool production,

Yet, whenever possible,

Africans remained interested in maintaining economic autonomy. Thus during periods of

"abundant crops" many Xhosa and Mfengu preferred
with their relations.

50

African workers

responded to the changing economic

48

Hudson

1842,

who

realities,

50

Graham

live

which increasingly undermined African

Aug. 25, 1842, BPP 424/1851, 137; Hudson to Stretch Nov. 16,
142-143; South African Commercial Advertiser, Dec. 23, 1837, March 24,

April 28, 1838.
49

colony behind to

continued to work in the colony often

to Stretch,

ibid.,

to leave the

's

Town

Journal, Jan. 13, 1842.

Graham 's Town Journal, March

28, 1844.
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political sovereignty

and economic autonomy, by stealing livestock and by
destroying

packed wool for the international market. 51

The changes

in the treaty

system

in the first half of the 1840s, explored in

detail in chapter 3, again permitted colonial patrols
to

pursue allegedly stolen livestock, or to confiscate
for theft.

It

Xhosa and

and horses as "compensations"

colonial officials negotiated changes in the treaty system,

Ngqika leader Tyhali complained

because

cattle

territory, to

provided a major challenge to Xhosa sovereignty. At a meeting in October

1840, during which
the

encroach in Xhosa

more

we do

not

know of it." He

that the

argued, as

Xhosa could not "put an end
Xhosa

to stealing,

chiefs often did, that their authority

over their followers was limited, and that they had only inadequate power to influence the
actions and decisions of the rank and

52
file.

Furthermore, several leaders were angered

because they believed that they were already fully cooperating with the Cape
Less than two years after

meeting, for example,

this

Maqoma angrily

authorities.

responded to the

repeated accusation about cattle stealing.

Why do you speak to me about the depredations in the colony? ... I am
not capable of answering such a word.
I have thrown off my authority.
.

am a policeman.

As mentioned

on the spoor daily, and I have sent cattle and horses
were stolen from it. The reason I do it is, that my name

be used that

we

earlier, the arrival

are the delinquents.

53

of governor Peregrine Maitland

renegotiations of treaties

by the Cape government with

Gqunukhwebe. This new

set

51

Crais, White

I

I fall

to the colony that
shall not

.

the

in 1844, led to further

Ndlambe,

the Ngqika, and the

of treaties, pushed through by colonial administrators

in

Supremacy, 148.

For quotes see "Meeting of his Excellency with the Kafir Chiefs," (1840), BPP
424/1851, 75, 80. See also Graham's Town Journal, Dec. 10, 31, 1840, Jan. 7, 1841.
52

53

Stretch to Hudson, July 11, 1842,

BPP 424/1851,
207

124.

.

1844 and 1845, permitted the colony to erect more

forts,

gave colonists more

rights to

recover or be compensated for their livestock, removed
African Christian converts from
chiefly authority, and

some Xhosa

demanded

that

Xhosa

criminals be judged in the colony.

leaders' support for the treaties, the

salaries. Still, the

changes seemed to anger

To

Cape government promised them annual

many Xhosa. 54

Throughout the 1840s, Xhosa leaders faced further government pressures

undermined
conflict

18, 1846, right before the outbreak

of a

that

new

between Africans and the colony, the conservative missionary Henry

Calderwood wrote
feeling

On January

their positions.

gain

among

had caused an extremely "deep and

that colonial intrusions

bitter"

the Xhosa.

The feelings of the nation seem now to be against all white men.
Amongst all the vexatious questions between the Colonial government and
.

the Caffres, the

most vexatious

[They are] so
sensitive on this point that they cannot and will not consider any question
calmly when that is mixed up with it.
the land question is a powerful
engine by which the war party can work upon the feelings of the more
peaceably inclined.
[N]o argument will ever convince them that it is
is.

.

.

the land question.

.

.

.

.

.

.

either just or reasonable to take their land

from them.

55

The Ngqika paramount Sandile and many other western Xhosa

especially opposed the

construction of a military post at Block Drift as well as the encroachments by white

surveying parties and military, which they saw as a dangerous violation of the

and Xhosa

territorial

and

political sovereignty.

treaties

56

See for example Switzer, Power and Resistance, 61; see also Graham

's

Town Journal,

Sept. 26, 1844, Jan. 30, 1845.
55

Quoted

56
J.

Hare

ibid.,

in Mostert, Frontiers, 863.

to P. Maitland, Feb. 19, 1846,

BPP 786/1847,

22-28.
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64-67; Maitland to Lord Stanley,

Numerous Xhosa

leaders and

commoners

also put pressures

seen as being too closely associated with the colonial
officials,

state.

on

According

chiefs

to

who were

government

Xhosho, a son of Ngqika and brother of Sandile, was disposed by a
councilor

for punishing cattle thieves

among

his people.

Governor Colonel John Hare, faced

threats

57

Another minor

from

chief, reported Lieutenant

Xhosa who had become

rival

"suspicious" of his "attachment to the Government." In response to these
threats, this
chief invited the Cape Colony to build a fort on his strategically located
land, and

declared his "loyalty" to the British government. 58

The War of 1846-47 and
In

1

846,

the

Xhosa and

War of 1850-53

colonists in the Eastern

Cape were once again on

the edge of

war. For the western Xhosa the changed treaties and resulting encroachments of patrols

onto their territory intensified their hostility toward the colony. The arrest of a Xhosa

named

Tsili, alluded to in

chapter

3, further

fanned the flames. Colonial authorities had

detained Tsili for stealing an axe, which resulted in a small skirmish between Tsili 's
friends

and

to the death

off by

by

and colonial guards.

Xhosa

Tsili' s

rescue by his friends led to the death of one Xhosa

of a Khoisan prisoner who, being handcuffed

attackers and, as a result, bled to death.

British officials, the

Xhosa reminded them

to Tsili,

had

his

hand cut

When challenged about the

that the

newly changed

treaties

incident

only

allowed thefts of cattle and horses and not of axes to be prosecuted by colonial
authorities,

57

58

and declared the

arrest

of Tsili a violation of the

Extract from Stretch's Diary, Sept. 10, 1845,

Hare

to Napier, April 27, 1843,

BPP 786/1847,

BPP 424/1851,
209

treaties.

144.

67.

According

to the

s

Xhosa, the death of the Khoisan prisoner had also been
atoned for since the attackers had
lost

one of their

men

in the fight.

Xhosa

leaders also appealed to colonial officials not to

overreact to the confrontation. British administrators,
however, frustrated with Xhosa'

accused livestock

reported incidents of harassment of some colonists and traders
by

theft,

Africans and, spurred by the land hunger of settler

interests,

used the axe incident as a

justification to send a military expedition against the

Ngqika stronghold

mountains. The Ngqika successfully intercepted

mission and the Cape's military

forces withdrew.

Once

again, a pre-emptive strike

interracial conflict in the Eastern Cape.

Most western Xhosa joined
instance, Pato

this

by

the

Cape colony

in the

Amatola

triggered an

59

the anti-colonial resistance of the Ngqika. For

and the Gqunukhwebe,

allies

War of 1834-35,

of the Cape during the

did

not side with the colony in this conflict, since in the years before the war, they had been

angered by the establishment of permanent Mfengu settlements on their land. Despite
repeated requests by Pato to remove

and evasive on the

Mfengu homes,

issue, a stance that the

sovereignty and mistreatment by an

ally.

colonial officials remained inactive

Gqunukhwebe
With

interpreted as a violation of their

the eruption of war, Pato ordered the

capture of Mfengu cattle and attacks on their settlements. The

attacked Fort Peddie, a military post to which

After failing to take the

fort, in large part

operated mostly out of the

due

Gqunukhwebe

many Mfengu had moved
to

Mfengu

Keiskamma and Chalumna

resistance, Pato

river areas,

also

for security.

and

his fighters

where they were

protected by thick bush. Here they continued small-scale attacks and resistance

59

Transcript of Stretch's Diary,

Stretch's Diary,

March

March

20, 1846 in

12-18, 1846, ibid., 90.
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BPP 786/1847,

86-87; Transcript of

operations,

and were the

last

Xhosa

paramount of the Ndlambe, and
forces defeated the

May

1846. 500

in a surprise attack

resistance.

Select

Committee

in

61

60

Ndlambe

by seizing and delivering stolen

in the 1830s, as well as

cattle

in

to

from the

target for cattle raids

The Ntinde leader Tshatshu who had

London

Siwani, the

on the plains of the Gwangqa

Thus the Ndlambes themselves became the

militant western Xhosa.

1847.

in this battle. This crushing defeat led the

surrender, and to assist colonial forces

Xhosa

December

his followers also joined the resistance, until
colonial

Ndlambe army

Xhosa died

to surrender in

testified in front

by

of the

Mapassa's Thembu faction also

joined the war against the colony, thus underscoring increasing African
discontent with
colonial policies and territorial encroachments.

had done," wrote a private

The Xhosa

felt "fully justified in all

in the British forces stationed in the

"England had no more right to

their country than they

had

Cape. They believed that

to take England. It

a question of might against right." 62 Thus, only a few minor western
the

Ndlambe Mqhayi and

the Christian

Gqunukhwebe Kama,

they

Xhosa

was merely

leaders, like

sided with the colony at the

outset of the war.

During the
into the

colony up

first

couple of months of the war, western Xhosa forces attacked

to the

Sunday

river, threatened Port Elizabeth,

captured livestock, and plundered army

ftU

Pottinger to Earl Grey,

March
62

destroyed farms,

trains. Still, after

an

initially

Moyer, "The Mfengu Self-Defence," 111; Memoranda on the Kaffir War

of the Axe, 37-48; Pottinger
61

wagon supply

16,

to Grey,

March

May

13, 1847,

far

in 1847,

16, 1847, ibid., 67.

War of the Axe,

1847,^,68.

Adams, Narrative, 244-247.
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29-32; Pottinger to Grey,

War

unsuccessful counter-offensive by the colony, the
Cape Colony and the British empire
63
with their greater military resources eventually
prevailed.

Militant

Xhosa

especially targeted the African allies of the British
such as the

abovementioned Mfengu. The Kat River

War of

settlers,

also aided the colony during the

1846-47, had to endure a renewed wave of Xhosa attacks, and their
settlement

faced severe destruction. The Xhosa burned
cattle

who

fields,

houses and pastures and numerous

died "for the want of grass." During the war, the Kat River settlement
had also

become

a

major "thoroughfare"

undermine Xhosa raiding

Xhosa

for

Xhosa with

in their territory

and

from the colony. To

cattle stolen

in the colony,

Kat River

raiders crossing through the region, of whom "[s]everal

cattle recaptured."

As

had been shot and the

64

in previous wars, African allies contributed significantly to the

military efforts.

cattle raids,

during the

settlers attacked

They provided

and aided

in

Cape Colony's

intelligence, protected supply trains, tried to

undermine

combat. George Berkeley, commander of the colonial troops

War of 1846-47,

wrote about the military contributions of the Khoikhoi:

The only mode of effectually punishing the Kafirs is by taking their cattle,
for which the Hottentots are admirably calculated.
They possess
wonderful power of vision, great celerity of foot and powers of endurance;
have experience in finding out the track of Kafirs and cattle, and, when
found, they never lose it till they come up with the enemy or their cattle;
.

and when they have taken the
them.

63

cattle

they

.

know how

to drive

and guard

65

For a short discussion of the

War of 1846

to

1847 see Peires, House of Phalo, 150-160.

64

James Read Sen. to James Kitchingman, Dec. 30, 1846, in Kitchingman Papers, 263;
James Read Jun. to A. Tidman, Feb. 28, 1848, in ibid., 272.
65

Berkeley to Pottinger, April

9,

1847,

BPP 912/1847-48,
212

77.

Yet Khoikhoi

soldiers

had fewer

rights than colonists.

They

especially complained about

the government's failure to adequately provide
for their families during their time of
service,

and for having

estimated

1

to serve longer periods

Mfengu

,200

also enrolled in special levies

their assistance they received

officials recruited a

for fighting in the Amatolas, to capture

abilities in close

Ngqika

soldiers, as well as the

cattle

Xhosa

undermining the independence of western Xhosa
3,

it

who

western Xhosa,

For

Xhosa

and

to

police force, widely used

spy on enemy Xhosa. The

police force, were praised for their

much of the

War of 1846-47 marked a major event in
in the Eastern

and missionaries. The war led
lost cattle, crops,

Harry Smith annexed the
Cape, and denied

all

the

territory

Cape.

As

pointed out in

officials,

Xhosa who

lived

newly appointed Governor

title

to the

between the Keiskamma and the Kei River, an
to their land.

the English settler elite,

the remaining land available to

tremendous suffering among the

land. In 1847, the

had now come under British

among

further spurred

and

to

between the Fish and the Keiskamma River

area renamed British Kaffraria, legal

speculators

officers.

strengthened white control and domination, and imposed the rule of military

officers, magistrates,

Cape

An

66

Several historians have observed that the

chapter

commanded by white

range combat in the bush and forests, which dominated

fighting in this conflict.

colonists.

promises of land, supplies, and plunder mostly in the form

of livestock. Furthermore, colonial

Mfengu and Khoikhoi

and more frequently than

rule.

The western Xhosa, according

Much of their territory was

many Xhosa were

to

sold to

forcefully relocated, and

them became overcrowded and overgrazed.

A drought

economic depression and starvation among the Xhosa, and forced a

66

Moyer, "The Mfengu Self-Defence," 111-117; Ayliff and Whiteside, History, chapter
8; J. F. G. Campbell to Sommerset, Sept. 24, 1847, War of the Axe, 182.
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growing number to seek labor agreements with

colonists.

The Ngqika paramount Sandile

expressed Xhosa frustration with colonial encroachments on their land
and sovereignty

when he exclaimed

that "[t]he

whole of the land of our

man's houses and white [surveyor]

flags,"

and

that

forefathers

is

dotted [with] white

he would "rather die for his country

than die without a cause." 67

To add

insult to injury, as discussed in chapter 3,

Smith also attacked Xhosa

sovereignty by declaring himself the supreme chief of the Xhosa, by abolishing the treaty

system, by attacking "polygamy," "witchcraft," and the "eating up system," by
establishing military courts,

by seeking

to collect taxes

from Africans, and by paying

annuity payments to Xhosa leaders. Smith also publicly humiliated several Xhosa chiefs.
In

1

847, for instance, colonial troops arrested Sandile despite assurances to the Ngqika

paramount

that

were forced

he had safe passage.

to kiss Smith's feet in a public meeting.

part not participated in the fighting

Elizabeth,

A few months later, Sandile and other Xhosa leaders

was made

Maqoma's neck and

Even Maqoma, who had

and spent most of the war

to kneel in front

in the

for the

most

colony close to Port

of Smith, while the governor put his foot on

verbally abused the

Ngqika

chief. Late in

October of 1850, fearing

another arrest, Sandile refused to meet Smith, leading the Cape governor to dispose him

as the senior

Xhosa

chief in British Kaffraria, and to replace

him with Commissioner

Charles Brownlee. Such humiliations, along with oppressive colonial policies, motivated

many Xhosa

in their decision to try

soldiers into the

once again to militarily

Amatola Mountains

in

December 1850. At

resist

when Smith

sent

this point, a majority

650

of the

For quotes see G. Cyrus to Civil Commissioner of Albany, Aug. 15, 1850, BPP
1334/1851, 42-43. See also leCordeur and Saunders, War of the Axe, 15; Switzer, Power
and Resistance in an African Society, 62-63; Peires, House ofPhalo, 161-163; Keegan,
67

Colonial South Africa, 233.
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Xhosa

laborers in the colony had already left white farms,
and 365 of 400

officers deserted to join the anti-colonial struggle,
underscoring

disillusionment that

many

Africans

felt

Ndlambe and

later

among

53, advocated separation

would

named
the

Mlanjeni,

who

Nxele almost

rose to prominence

between whites and Xhosa.

He preached that

men would melt away,

leader Sandile expanded on Mlanjeni's message and

British colonization

first

thirty years

among

the

Ngqika between the War of 1846-47 and the War of 1850-

"rigidly" adhere "to his words, the white

The Ngqika

once again the anger and

military resistance to colonization also found

reflection again in religious developments. Like the prophet

prophetic figure

police

about British colonization. 68

The commitment by many Xhosa to

earlier, a

Xhosa

and the willingness

to resist white

if "all the

people"

or disappear."

69

Xhosa sentiment about

domination in January 1851 early

in the war:

God made

Men cross it to rob us
of our country. When the Son of God came into the world, you White Men
killed Him. It was not the Black Men who did that; and you White men are
now killing me. if you kill me my bones will fight, and my bones' bones
70
will fight. I will rise up and fight against the White Man for ever.
a boundary by the sea, and you the White

.

.

The prophet Mlanjeni attempted

to influence the

Before the conflict, he gave pelargonium roots
the roots

would provide protection

some Xhosa

68

to risk frontal assaults

Smith, Autobiography,

2:

to

outcome of the war more

Xhosa

fighters

and promised them that

against British bullets. This promise

Brown, Personal Adventure,
Quoted

in Elbourne,

that

229-231, 262; Smith to Earl Grey, Oct. 21, 1850,

4-7; Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 222.

70

may have

on Fort Beaufort - a military experience

1334/1851, 29-29; Graham's Town Journal, Dec. 28, 1850; Peires, The

69

directly.

40.

Blood Ground, 354.
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Dead

enticed

proved

BPP
Will Arise,

costly in

more

human

After the

life.

defensive, focusing on the

wooded Amatola Mountains,

As discussed
the

initial

War of 1846

supplies.

made up of Mfengu,

War of 1850-53 was an

latest rifle

became

of the densely

old, inferior

intensely brutal conflict.

As

in

guns whereas British regular troops

and rocket technology, and had seemingly unending

relied heavily

various

resistance

strategically advantageous positions

Xhosa used

to 1847, the

The colony

more

Xhosa

the Waterkloof, and the Great Fish River Bush. 71

earlier, the

experimented with the

offensive assaults, western

Xhosa

on

British regulars

factions,

and on non-white auxiliary

forces,

and Khoikhoi. During the war, colonial

troops and their African allies followed their usual tactics of burning villages, capturing
cattle,

and destroying crops. Even more so than

committed

By

atrocities against Africans, especially as the conflict

the time the

were dead.

in previous wars, colonial forces

war was

over, an estimated 16,000

remained

Xhosa and 1400 on

at

a stalemate.

the colonial side

72

The

anti-colonial resistance

occasion since the

War of

movement

in the early

1850s was also the

1799-1803 that Xhosa and Khoisan cooperated

degree against white expansion. But

why

did so

many Kat River

settlers,

first

to a noticeable

Khoikhoi, and

other non-whites choose to resist at this point?
In the years prior to the war, a growing feeling

settlers

and other non-whites

to their cultural

and

in the Eastern

political sovereignty.

Cape

emerged among many Kat River

that British colonialism

posed a threat

Throughout the 1830s and 1840s, non-whites

faced a shrinking land basis in the Eastern Cape, a process encouraged by the colonial

71

72

Peires,

The Dead Will Arise, chapter

1.

The Dead Will Arise, 12-30; Mostert, Frontiers, 1014-1156;
Supremacy, 173-188.
Peires,
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Crais, White

The Kat River

state.

government

which led
allotted

settlement, for instance,

settled dispossessed non-whites

to the severe

crown

growing number of British

some

from other parts of the colony, a policy

overcrowding of the community. In addition, the colonial

lands, areas in

settlement and

had become a place where the Cape

which many Khoisans had

settlers.

settled without formal

state

title,

to a

Thus, outside of the overcrowded Kat River

missions, most non-whites had few opportunities to obtain land. The

lack of property and minimal access to credit left them with few
options but to join the

ranks of the colonial labor force. Kat River settlers were further angered
by broken

government promises
of the

War of

for aid in rebuilding their

1834-35 and the

War of 1846-47,

community

after the severe destructions

even though up

to

90%

of the adult male

population of the settlement had served the colony during both conflicts, compared to a

mere

3% among the English and Dutch speaking population. The years after the War of

1846 to 1847, saw instead the taxing of successful Kat River timber businesses, the
appearance of a growing number of white surveyors and
colonists'

and Xhosa police

by members of the English

officers' abuse

settler elite to

of non-white

open

their

settlers

settlers.

community

debate about the passage of vagrancy laws infuriated Kat River
the Eastern Cape,

made

slaves"

by

who

the

on

their land,

and

Furthermore, demands

to white settlement

settlers

and a

and non-whites

in

argued that they would not give up their lands and would not "be

new

laws.

73

73

Testimony of Paul Dry, June 7, 1852, BPP 1635/1852-3, 141. See also Report of
Parley held with the Leaders of the Rebel Commando at Fort Armstrong, Jan. 22, 1851,
BPP 1352/1851, 7; Stockenstrom, Autobiography, 2: 377-380, 427-429; Graham's Town
Journal, Dec. 18, 1847; Tony Kirk, "The Cape Economy and the Expropriation of the

Kat River Settlement, 1846-53"

in

Economy and Society, 226-246.
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Yet, as noted above, the

War of 1850-53

can hardly be characterized as a war

between whites and non-whites. Despite major grievances

Kat River, 900

at

settlers

along

with numerous other non-whites in the Eastern Cape fought on
the side of the colony
during the war. Anti-colonial leaders

among

the Kat River settlers

worked hard

to

convince their pro-colonial peers to join the anti-colonial struggle, using rhetoric

that

envisioned a sovereign Khoisan nation ready to overthrow the Cape government's
oppressive rule.

Cornet

at

One of the

leaders of the insurrection,

Speelman Kiewit, wrote

to a Field

Kat River:

Our circumstances

and other circumstances
connected therewith are now become very melancholy, and on this
account we have put our hands to a work from which we have wished to
retreat. We have done this without acquainting all of you who belong to
our nation, and in this we have acted very improperly (find ourselves very
as the Hottentot nation

acknowledgement we take the liberty to acquaint
you, as our nation, that we have commenced war with the settlers
(meaning the English), and to call upon you as our nation to assists us.
Break the bands of the indecision, or come at once with all speed to assist
guilty); but with this

us in this great important matter.

Time

is

important.

It is

a national cause,

and can you, as a nation, remain inactive. Arise courageously, and work
for your motherland and freedom. The cause is now begun; and will you
yet remain under the great oppression and slavery of the settlers without
74
resisting. Come immediately to our assistance.
For Kat River insurrectionists, land also played a major role
land

is

our land;" exclaimed one fighter about the Cape, "but what portion of it

possession of the Hottentots? Strangers inhabit

ostrich nest, the

74

Kat River; and

Speelman Kiewit

to

Quoted

in Elbourne,

it,

One of the

75

Field Cornets at Kat River, Jan. 10, 1851,

Blood Ground, 350.
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is in

while the real owners have only

this is called giving a nation land."

1635/1852-3, 143.
75

in justifying the war. "This

BPP

the

this

Tensions existed however not only between different Kat
River factions, but also

among Xhosa and Khoisan

anti-colonial forces,

who had very

different views of

sovereignty. For instance, a Kat River insurrectionist
reminded the

Xhosa

should not "think that because

we will

we

are ready to fight

you

at

we

are with

any day

we

if

you against the

settlers,

that they

submit to you;

see that you wish to domineer over us." 76

Khoisan forces also abducted the pro-colonial Xhosa leader Toise, an act
which angered
the

Gqunukhwebe and Ndlambe, and embarrassed

who

Sandile

Ngqika paramount

assured the Xhosa that he had nothing to do with Toise's seizure, and that

the Khoisan fought their

alliance

especially the

own

war. Such statements indicated a growing

rift in

between Ngqika and Khoikhoi, which undermined the effectiveness of their

resistance.

77

As noted
operations of the

above, African allies played a crucial role in the defense and military

Cape Colony during

Gqunukhwebe and

a good

the

War

of 1850-53.

Among the Xhosa, the

number of Ndlambe saw advantages

in allying

themselves to

the colony in this conflict. Their decision in previous wars to fight against the

proven costly
this time,

in life, territory,

which would aid them

They believed

cattle.

By

in

in the securing

Cape had

pursuing a strategy of military cooperation

in maintaining political

that militant resistance

Gqunukhwebe aided

Quoted

and

they hoped to secure plunder and, more importantly,

the colony,

76

the fragile

had ceased

to

territorial

guarantees from

and economic sovereignty.

be a viable option. Thus, Pato's

of King William's

Town and ensured the

colony's

Elboume, Blood Ground, 350

77

John Maclean to George Mackinnon, May 25, 1852, BPP 1635/1852-53, 126-131;
Statement made by Chief Toise, May 26, 1852, ibid., 158-159; Maclean to Mackinnon,
July 3, 1852, ibid., 147. On the issue of increasing tensions between Xhosa and Khoikhoi
see also Information from

Mkay, July

10, 1852, ibid., 148.
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ability to obtain supplies

was "deeply indebted"
slaughtered]

Xhosa

from the

to those leaders

cattle, carr[ied]

allies also

sea.

Governor Smith, for example, observed

who

my mails,

escorted

assisted]

"my wagons

me

in every

that

he

with supplies,

way

in their

provided intelligence, helped the colony to keep up

its

power."

lines

of

communications, and provided active military support - such as Pato's Gqunukhwebe

who

aided the Cape with "1400 fighting men." 78 In addition, and as in previous conflicts

Khoisan and Mfengu forces played a crucial
operations of the Cape.

role in the offensive

and defensive military

79

Conclusion

The War of 1850-53, much
militant

Xhosa

like the

War of 1812

resistance in the Eastern Cape.

was followed by

in the

Upper Ohio Valley, broke

A crushing defeat of the Gcaleka Xhosa

under

Sarhili,

in the

Amatola mountains. Smith's replacement

British efforts to force the

Ngqika Xhosa

as governor,

into submission

George Cathcart,

finally

negotiated a peace with the Ngqika, and expelled them from the Amatolas. Public

executions of Kat River "rebels" and the removal of the non-white populations from the

Kat River settlement also followed the war. Cathcart gave these newly acquired lands

to

white settlers and Mfengu. For most of the remaining non-whites in the Eastern Cape, the
aftermath of the war signified dramatic changes. Though British officials advocated the
;

78

Smith, Autobiography, 2: 238, 242;

Graham 's Town

Journal, Jan. 14, Dec. 21, 1851;

Grey, Dec. 12, 1850, BPP 1334/1851, 58-59; Maclean to Mackinnon, Dec.
65-66.
2, 1850, ibid., 59; Meeting with Ndlambe and Gqunukhwebe, Dec. 16, 1850, ibid.,
See also Smith to Earl Grey, Feb. 18, 1851, BPP 1352/1851, 11; Metting with
Gqunukhwebe and Ndlambe Chiefs, April 16, 1852, BPP 1635/1852-53,88-89, Cathcart

Smith

to Earl

to Earl
79

Grey,

Smith

May 20,

1852, ibid., 103-105.

to Earl Grey, July 6, 1851,

BPP

1428/1851, 80-81; Ayliff, 48-51.
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need to bolster "traditional authority" among Africans
and to strengthen "customary
law," colonial policies nonetheless aided in increasingly
undermining Xhosa sovereignty.

Furthermore, and though some non-whites became independent
agricultural producers,
the changing

economic

realities forced a

growing number of Africans

into labor

arrangements with colonists. Thus, as a colonial racial order became entrenched
in the
Eastern Cape, just as one had earlier in the Upper Ohio Valley, the ability
of indigenous

peoples to maintain and imagine their independence, sovereignty, and autonomy
became
increasingly restricted.

its

officials,

who

More and more,

these developments were shaped

by

the state and

increasingly imposed their system of domination in each region.
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CONCLUSION

COMPARING THE ENTRENCHMENT OF TWO COLONIAL RACIAL

The entrenchment of colonial,

racialized orders in both the

ORDERS

Upper Ohio Valley

and the Eastern Cape, created by the power of United
States and British imperial
expansion, continued in the years that followed the

War of 1812 and the War of 1850-3.

In both regions, Native Americans, Khoisans, and western
ability to militarily resist

and white

the

white claims to their homelands. Race consciousness and

ideologies of racial subjugation

officials

Xhosa no longer had

settlers.

became even more

These

intense

among many government

attitudes helped to shape the policies that aided in

strengthening systems of racial supremacy and exclusiveness.
It is

important to reiterate though, that the systems that emerged in the two

regions differed dramatically. These differences were shaped by local and world
historical interests

and developments as well as indigenous

capacities. In the

Upper Ohio

Valley, advocates of national expansion rejected not only native sovereignty, but also a
multiracial society that included Native Americans.

They favored

instead their removal.

In the Eastern Cape, on the other hand, local and imperial interests

incorporation of Africans on

whose economic

demanded the

contribution the region depended.

Furthermore, and unlike in the Upper Ohio Valley, in the Eastern Cape

much

longer for stronger political

ties

between

settlers

it

would

take

and the imperial government

to

emerge. Though certain governors like D'Urban or Smith had helped to maneuver the
imperial government to assist colonial settlers on several occasions, the British authorities

in

London were

often reluctant to provide the military and financial support
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demanded by

the English settler elite in the Eastern Cape.
Yet, as the British empire retreated from
the

Cape and granted
which gradually

a degree of self-government to the colony in 1853

led to white rule in the region

and opportunities became more

The Colonial Racial Order

a development

- Africans' economic and political

options

restricted.

in the

In the aftermath of the

-

Upper Ohio Valley

War of

1812,

many

Indians in the

Upper Ohio Valley

continued to embrace the government's "civilization program" on their

own terms.

Federal officials in the Department of War described the Wyandots, Senecas,
and

Shawnees

at

Upper Sandusky, and Wapakoneta, along with

the South, as groups that

were "making gradual advances

the five "civilized" tribes of

in industry

and

1

civilization."

Native Americans continued to actively lobby for support by the federal government and
missionaries.

The Indian agent

in

Piqua Ohio, John Johnston, observed about the

"Indians under" his "charge" that

many of them
milked the

are considerable farmers, there are several individuals

last

summer

are fast renewing stock.

12
I

cows and before

am

introducing

the

fall

who

war had many more. They

crops this season

among

the

Shawanoese and making arrangements for dispersing the population on
farms. A mill is now running at Wapaghkonetta which cost the Society of
Friends upwards of $1,600.

Progress

Made

Representatives, January 17,
2

Communicated
1820, in ASPIA, 2: 200.

In Civilizing the Indians:

See for example Johnston to Crawford,

of War, Registered Series,

roll 63,

May 4,

to the

House of

1815, Letters Received by the Secretary

6469; George Graham to Johnston, April 27, 1816,

John Johnston Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus.
3

Johnston to the Secretary of War, October 10, 1816, in Johnston, 95.
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Still,

Native Americans in the Upper Ohio Valley
continued to adhere to their

traditional settlement patterns,

to

even though federal

officials

used every "exertion

induce them to break up their villages and scatter over
their reserves on

detached farms after the manner of whites."4
Settler-Indian relations also remained tense in the post

war years. Ohio

Indians continued to complain about acts of violence, stolen
horses, livestock,

timber

theft, deforestation,

depredations.

5

encroachments by whites on

their lands,

The missionary Joseph Badger observed

that Indians

and other

were shamefully and cruelly treated in several instances by unprincipled
men.
They generally bere with patience the insults and injuries they
often met with. They were often made drunk with whiskey and their
.

.

peltries taken at a very

low

rate.

.

.

and sometimes they were miserably

wronged out of valuable property." 6

The Moravian missionary John Heckewelder
and

thefts

also reported several violent acts, threats,

committed against the native inhabitants of the mission

Heckewelder argued

that

at

Goshen.

laws needed to be passed to protect Indians

if missionary

establishments and the "policy of civilization" were to succeed. But the missionary also
realized that for as long as "the doctrine that the Indians are not susceptible of being

4

Johnston to Calhoun, January

1,

1819, in Johnston, 102.

5

John Johnston to Lewis Cass, August 24, 1831, National Archives, Letters Received by
the Office of Indian Affairs (M234), roll 601, 78; John McElvain to Elbert Herring, May
20, 1833, National Archives, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs (M234),
roll

6

601,438-443.

Badger, Memoir, 133.
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civilized or

and

becoming a

politicians,

civilized people"

would remain popular among American

settlers

such support would not be granted. 7

Official pressures

on native lands and communities continued. Several

throughout the 1810s, 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s led to further
eventually Indian removal. In 1818, at the Treaty of St.

Mary

territorial losses

treaties

and

in Ohio, for instance,

groups like the Wyandots, Delawares, Ottawas, Shawnees, Mingoes, and
Chippewas

made major

land cessions in the Upper Ohio Valley. 8 Native Americans' debts also led
to

further indigenous land losses.

9

Furthermore, a growing number of officials, land

speculators, and settlers in the region openly argued that Native

undermined "national improvement." 10 Federal

officials

American reservations

were also eager to cut

their

spending on "civilization programs" and were concerned about the cost in keeping "down
animosities which appear naturally to arise between the whites and the red man." 11
In the

minds of many whites, the Indian had become a "problem"

be removed. American
as early as the

War of

1

officials in the

8 12.

Upper Ohio Valley contemplated

They were too cautious

to

push for removal

John Heckewelder to the President and Directors of the Society
Gospel among the Heathen, February 22, 1822, ASPIA, 2: 382-6.
8

For Treaty

at St.

Mary

see

ASPIA,

2:

that

needed

to

this idea at least

at that time, out

for Propagating the

166-71.

9

John Johnston to Secretary of War, October 18, 1824, National Archives, Letters
Received by the Office of Indian Affairs (M234), roll 601, 148; Delaware Indians to the
President of the United States, March 1, 1832, ibid., 148-9.
10

John Johnston to Ethan Brown, January 27, 1824, Ethan Brown Papers, Ohio Historical
Society, Columbus.
11

John McElvain to Secretary of War, February 2, 1831, National Archives, Letters
Received by the Office of Indians Affairs (M234), roll 601, 91.
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of fear that such a policy could antagonize Native
American
years, however, Indian removal gradually

makers.

American administrators advocated

by "the National Government"
people."

became

to preserve

it

the

as a

"from

12

allies.

In the post

main goal of federal

way

war

policy-

to protect the Indians, a strategy

total destruction this

ill

fated race of

14

Native Americans in the Upper Ohio Valley frequently complained
about the

American government's
lands. Native leaders

failure to support

them and about

the encroachments

on

their

from several Indian communities on the Auglaize River pointed

out:

war we have been faithful to the United States at every
call.
It hath made us poor. The warriors, white or Indians,
passing
through our country would kill and rob everything they could get,
Brother, in the late
.

.

particularly cattle

and hogs.

We were just getting in the way to live by the

help of our friends the Quakers, but the war took everything from us.

The Auglaize
complained
supplied

chiefs,

who had

supported the Americans during the

War of 1812,

that the British continued to supply their Indian allies, while the

little

despite their promises.

15

Many Native Americans

in the

also

Americans

Upper Ohio Valley

also opposed removal. Johnston observed:

12

Cass and Harrison to Armstrong, July 17, 1814, National Archives, Letters Received
by the Secretary of War, Registered Series (M221), roll 62, 5556-60; ASPIA, 1: 826-32.
13

Duncan McArthur to William Crawford, April 6, 1816, in ASPIA, 2: 136-7; John
Johnston to Thomas Worthington, January 3, 1812, Thomas Worthington Papers, Ohio
Historical Society,

Columbus.

14

John Johnston to Ethan Brown, July 31, 1821, Ethan Brown Papers, Ohio Historical
Society, Columbus. See also C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, January 17, 1820, in ASPIA, 2:
200-1; James Monroe to the Senate of the United States, January 27, 1825, in ASPIA, 2:
541-2.
15

Indian chiefs to Secretary of War,

December 29, 1815,
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in Johnston, 88-9.

have never known the Indians of my Agency
so favorably disposed for
improvement as they are at this time, they are becoming
more convinced
daily that a retreat westward will not relieve
them from the encroachments
of the Whites. The Black Hoof lately told me that
he conceived they were
arrived at the point beyond which they could not
go, that when they
looked over the Mississippi, they saw the White
people moving
I

there as

fast as in

16
former times they spread themselves over Kentucky and
Ohio.

The Shawnee and Delaware Indian communities
privatized, so that

it

among our people

that

lands.

.
.

as

could not be dispossessed.

it

may

words without writing would have nor

were

who wanted Ohio

later reflected in the

Yet despite

Ohio even lobbied

"We

not be taken from us.

the natives of these communities believed,

removal,

in

would

.

to

have

their land

desire to have our land divided

.

we

force."

satisfy

expect to get Deeds for our
17

This unsuccessful strategy,

most American advocates of

Indian sovereignty obliterated. These American priorities

Removal Act of 1830.

their resistance,

many

Indian nations in the Upper Ohio Valley, like

the Delawares, Ottawas, Mingoes, Shawnees, and Wyandots, had to face removal from
the late 1820s on to the 1840s.

Few Native American reservations

in

Michigan and

Indiana, as well as several individuals and families, escaped removal. For

the region, the Indian had

become

a negligible presence

either "wild" or "noble savages" that

16

17

Johnston to Calhoun, January

Shawnees and Delawares

1,

had

to

make way

- the

last

many

remnant of a "race" of

to "progress."

1819, in Johnston, 102.

to Johnston,

May 5,
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whites in

1820, in Johnston, 104-105

The Colonial Racial Order in

the Eastern

Cape

A different but equally complex colonial racial order became entrenched in the
Eastern Cape after the

War of 1850-3. A new

Cathcart in 1854. Like Cathcart, Grey,
repressed Maori independence in

African authorities.
generation.

He

He argued

governor, George Grey, replaced George

who had participated

in the

wars that had

New Zealand, promised to work with "traditional"

also espoused the humanitarian

that Britain

had

and

liberal

economic

ideals of his

to

accept the duties and responsibilities of our position, that we should admit
that we cannot live in immediate contact with any race or portion of our
fellow men, whether civilized or uncivilized, neglecting and ignoring our
duties towards them, without suffering those evils which form the fitting

punishment of our neglect and indifference; that we should feel that if we
leave the natives beyond our border ignorant barbarians, shut out from all
community of interest with ourselves, they must always remain a race of
troublesome marauders, and that, feeling this, we should try to make them
a part of ourselves, with a common faith and common interests, useful
servants, consumers of our goods, contributors to our revenue; in short, a
source of strength and wealth for this colony, such as Providence designed

them

to be.

We should, I think, use our time of strength, when our generosity
cannot be misunderstood, to instruct and civilize - to change inveterate
enemies into friends, alike from interest and increased knowledge destroyers of our stock and produce into consumers of our goods and
1

8

producers of our markets.

But

important to reiterate that even though Grey advocated a sort of mutual

it is

coexistence, like the humanitarians of earlier generations, he argued that Africans had to

assimilate to

program

what he saw as a superior European way of life. He

to educate "the Natives,

"national" policy.

18

Grey

and training them

to habits

also

promoted a

of industry" as a matter of

19

to Legislative Council

and the House of Assembly, March

1969/1855,56-59.
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17, 1855,

BPP

Despite his rhetoric of good intentions, Grey played
a key role in damaging

western Xhosa society. Like Smith
fees

and fines from

their subjects, a

earlier,

Grey undermined the

chiefs' authority to raise

system that had been tolerated by the Cathcart

administration. Instead he paid salaries to

Xhosa

leaders,

which increased

their

dependency on the Cape government. The "Village System" - land
allotments
deliberately keep

society and the

Xhosa communities small - was a

power of the

chiefs.

further effort to

to

weaken Xhosa

Moreover, Grey actively pursued policies

that

would

push Xhosa into public works programs, as well as into poorly paid labor agreements
with colonists, by allocating Xhosa on poor lands and by taxing them. 20 His plan
to
educate the Xhosa in "habits of industry and honesty, of training them to various

domestic duties," was "to render them efficient servants, and thus making them a blessing
to the

Colony and

the inhabitants at large."

The Xhosa
Xhosa

society

cattle-killing,

would be

21

which followed a prophecy by a young Xhosa

revitalized

and the dead would be resurrected

girl that

if all cattle

and

crops would be destroyed, aided Grey in his plans to undermine western Xhosa society.

Between 1855

to

1858 the Xhosa population of "British Kaffraria" dropped from

approximately 105,000 to 37,500 due to mass starvation. As in other parts of the world,

and despite

their ability to

do

so, the British

the plight of non-white people.

and colonial authorities did

little

to alleviate

Instead, they used the cattle killing as justification to

Graham 's Town Journal, May 26, 1855
20

On this

issue see Peires, The

Africa, 288; Crais, White
21

Dead

Will Arise, chapter 2; Keegan, Colonial South

Supremacy and Black Resistance, 199-203.

Graham 's Town Journal, May 26,

1855.
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strengthen their position in the region and for further
territorial dispossession. With few
alternatives, over

20,000 of the western Xhosa survivors ended up as laborers

in the

colony. Others were forced into monetary or labor tenancy
agreements. During the

aftermath of the cattle killing, the Cape government also approved
stricter pass laws to

undermine the mobility of African laborers and

to protect the interests

of white agrarian

producers. Furthermore, the cattle killing resulted in further weakening the power
of

Xhosa leadership by sending many

to prison

on Robben

Island.

23

Despite such developments, the Eastern Cape region also witnessed the rise of

independent African peasants
discussed in chapter

communities

who

5, prior to

the

participated in the colonial market economy.

War of 1850-3,

such processes had already occurred

pre-colonial pastoralist and cultivators in southern

Africa continued to participate in agricultural production for the market.

landholdings of many Africans in the Eastern Cape were too small and

to

become

in

Kat River settlement, on several missions, and among the Mfengu.

like the

As Colin Bundy shows, numerous

them

As

profitable agricultural producers.

becoming laborers or

tenants.

They were

As Timothy Keegan points

left

out, the

24

Yet the

infertile to

enable

with few alternatives to

emergence of an

African farmer class did not reflect the nineteenth century liberal economic beliefs

espoused by colonial administrators
social

and economic

realities."

like Grey. Rather,

Keegan writes

it

surfaced as a "compromise with

that "the black elite could legitimately be

held up as a buffer against the increasingly dispossessed majority, and against the

22

On a global perspective on this

Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El
Third World (New York: Verso, 2001).

issue see

Nino Famines and the Making of the
23

For Xhosa

24

Bundy, Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry.

cattle killing see Peires,

still

The Dead Will Arise.
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menacing authority of the

quite

chiefs,

who

could not be eradicated with the finality that

the administrators might have wished." 25

With "self rule"
least

in 1853, the

on paper non-racial

the black vote

posed

Cape

also received a constitution that appeared at

in its franchise qualifications. Yet, as several historians
argue,

little

challenge to white dominance in the 1850s.

faced economic and social pressures and dispossession, few

pounds
vote.

in property or

made

Cape parliament was

passed a

new Masters and

As many

owned the

Africans

required 25

the necessary 50 pounds in yearly income to be permitted to

also quick in undermining the rights of Africans. In 1856,

Servants Act.

Though

the measure

was not

it

explicitly racial, the

law clearly targeted the non-white working class of the Colony, and enforced tougher
penalties for labor code violations such as desertion. In 1857, the

Cape government

introduced stricter pass laws that impeded the mobility of African laborers. 26 Moreover,

when by

the

1

880s the black vote

undermined by several
white

settlers,

legislative

in the

Cape became a noticeable

and judicial measures. For

factor,

it

was

instance, the legal efforts

by

successfully challenged the efforts of African leaders to register their

supporters in groups. Cape politicians also passed the 1887 Parliamentary Voters

Registration Act,

which disenfranchised those voters who owned property under

communal tenure - a measure
raised property qualifications

that hurt African voters.

and imposed

The 1892 Franchise Act, which

literacy tests,

25

Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 289-291

26

Maylam, South Africa 's Racial Past, 107-109;

was another law

Crais, White

Supremacy and Black

Resistance, 193-194; Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 244-246.
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that effectively

took the vote from blacks. 27 Thus, as Britain expanded
into other parts of Africa,
granted self-government and self-rule to the whites of the
Cape.
States,

where the federal government and white

settler interests

closely tied, the British government realized that

dominions were strong
realization

allies in the pursuit

would culminate

all-white legislature.

it

As with the United
became

members of the white

increasingly

elite in its

of empire. In the early twentieth century,

in Britain's setting

this

up of the Union of South Africa with an

28

The Making of Two Colonial Racial Orders
In the late eighteenth and nineteenth century in the

Upper Ohio Valley and

the

South African Cape, systems of racial exclusiveness became entrenched through
increasingly close ties between settlers and the state. In both places, settlers, indigenous

groups, missionaries and humanitarians attempted to influence the emerging colonial
racial orders

officials

and

with varying success. Yet ultimately,

it

was

with their ability to defeat indigenous groups

to legislate,

which ultimately shaped

27

Maylam, South Africa 's Racial Past,

28

Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 293.

the

128.
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the

power of the

state

militarily, to dispossess

two regions' colonial

and

its

and move,

racial orders.

APPENDIX A

A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

In writing both

South African and American history, terminology poses numerous

problems. Comparing the two areas further complicates
briefly

my own

reservations with

some of the terminology

The "proper" naming of the two

later

for the Italian navigator

become fashionable

I

need

to explain

use.

was given

to the inhabitants

of the so-called

thought he had arrived somewhere in Asia. The

"American" component was added
Hemisphere

I

Thus,

regions' indigenous groups of peoples proves a

challenge. For instance, the term "Indian"

"New World" by Columbus, who

this issue.

when Europeans

Amerigo Vespucci.

labeled the Western

In the United States

to refer to indigenous people as "Native

it

has also

Americans" or "natives."

Yet even these terms have semantic problems. The word "native" generally specifies
anyone's place of origin. Furthermore, "Native" carries a negative connotation
imperialism as a term for colonized peoples.

It is

frequently affiliated with

"backwardness" and "ignorance," and has an especially negative meaning
Africa. Native

Americans and Africans

are in

some ways

also

hundreds of different peoples living on the two continents.

however, that despite

many common

all

occasion,

Eastern

Cape

I

South

in

misnomers since there

It is

are

important to emphasize,

differences, the indigenous peoples of each continent shared

experiences throughout the colonial encounter. This

group the various indigenous peoples

On

in English

in the

I

why

Upper Ohio Valley together

also refer to the diverse Khoisan and

as Africans.

is

as

at

times

Ohio

Xhosa speaking groups

Indians.

in the

also use the term non- white to describe the indigenous

233

I

Khoisan and slave laborers, who were brought
Asia.

to the

Cape from other parts of Africa and

1

The terminology regarding "white" South Africans and Americans

also presents

problems. Frequently they are described as "settlers," which reinforces the
erroneous idea
that

American Indians or Africans were

therefore

had

less

all

nomadic people who did not

claim to the land in the minds of many whites.

American colonists as "Anglo-Americans," knowing
people

who were not of

full

I

settle,

and who

often refer to white

well that this usage includes

English-speaking origin. Furthermore,

I

distinguish between the

Dutch-speaking Boer (who were often of either Dutch, French, or German origin) as well
as English colonists.

I

use the term Boer instead of Afrikaner because

commonly used term throughout

1

it

was

the

most

the nineteenth century.

Despite the noteworthy cultural diversity

among

southern Africa's and North America's

indigenous societies, Africans and American Indians respectively also shared many
similar experiences through colonialism. For North America see for example Neal
Salisbury, "The Indians' Old World: Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans,"

The William and Mary Quarterly (July, 1996), 435-458; see also Nobles, American
Frontiers. For South Africa see for example Shula Marks, "Khoisan Resistance to the
Dutch in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," Journal ofAfrican History 13
(1963), 80.
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APPENDIX B

A NOTE ON SOURCES

Sources pose a problem for historians of colonialism.
for

example,

left

only few,

if any, written

Many

indigenous people,

documents. Thus their voices and experiences

often appear through the filter of the colonizers in

government documents,

letters,

autobiographies, diaries, and travel accounts.
Historians need to approach their sources critically.

They should

evaluate not only

the factual information sources provide, but the factors and biases that motivated or

influenced the source's author to write

Finally, the historian

documents

I

indigenous

elites,

used for

this

in

often a captive of the sources she or he works with.

little

concerns to issues concerning the "rank and

The gender transformation spurred by

Ohio Indian and Xhosa

in areas

in the first place.

The

study primarily provided insights into the views of white and

and gave

class in those societies.

is

it

societies in the late eighteenth

of indigenous farming, were not discussed

future historians will explore these questions,

in

my

file"

and

colonization that occurred

and nineteenth century, such
sources either.

I

hope

that in the

which were outside of the scope of my

study.
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APPENDIX C

MAPS

Map

1:

The Ohio Country
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Map 2: The

Eastern Cape (Source Timothy Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 130.)
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